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ABSTRACT
The structure of the U.S. hog industry is changing rapidly. U.S. hog farms have become
smaller in number, larger in size and more specialized. This study examines the factors that
influence the hog producer’s choice among business arrangements offered in the U.S. hog
industry. A national survey was mailed to 4,986 hog producers to determine these factors. The
survey consisted of questions covering topics such as: production characteristics, autonomy,
transaction costs, risk, social relationships, and demographics. A response rate of 21% was
received from the mailed surveys.

Four alternative business arrangements were used:

independent production, cooperative farming, flat-fee contract, and incentive payment contract.
The multinomial logit and binomial logit models were employed to determine factors influencing
producers’ choice of business arrangement. Results indicate that independent producers are, in
general, more likely to be breeding sow operators, diversified, corn producers, located in the
same counties as flat-fee contract producers, frequent checkers of market prices, have higher
debt, value autonomy and relationships with feed merchants more, and be relatively more
educated than incentive payment contract producers. Cooperative producers are also more likely
to be breeding sow operators, diversified, corn producers, and located in the same counties as
flat-fee contractees. They are also likely to have accumulated higher assets, have higher debt
and greater farm assets, be risk averse, be concerned about autonomy and relationships with feed
merchants, and be relatively more educated than incentive payment contract producers. Flat-fee
contract producers are more likely to be finishers located in counties with independent and
cooperative producers, work more hours off-farm, and be owners of greater farm assets. They
are less likely to value autonomy and more likely to value relationships with neighboring
farmers. Finally, incentive payment contract producers are generally larger, lower debt finisher
or breeding sow operators who work more hours off-farm, value autonomy less and relationships
ix

with lenders more than other business arrangements. They are likely to be located in counties
with cooperative producers.

x

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The structure of the U.S. agricultural sector has changed greatly in recent years. Hog
farms have decreased drastically in numbers and increased progressively in size. Available data
show that U.S. hog farm numbers have declined from a high of 4.85 million in 1920 to about
85,760 in 2000 (Agricultural Statistics, 1930–2000, NASS, 2001). A more microscopic view of
how the hog industry has changed structurally can be seen in the number of hog operations in
various size categories. The two size categories that have shown the greatest change are the 1 to
99 head and 5,000 or more head. The number of farms having 1 to 99 head decreased 64% from
1993 to 2000. In contrast, farms having 5,000 or more head increased by 112% over the same
time period.

This historical trend reveals that the larger operations are gaining the greatest

market share, while the smaller are showing the greatest loss.
The same conclusion can also be drawn from a marketing perspective.

In 1997, 145

firms marketing 50,000 hogs or more a year marketed approximately 33.1 million hogs, 37% of
the total (Lawrence et. al, 1998). In comparison, in 1994, only 16 million head marketed by 66
firms in that size category.
As these changes in farm size materialize, the way hog farmers conduct business is also
changing. There are many types of business arrangements used in hog production. The most
common ones are independent, cooperative membership, flat-fee contracts, contracts with
incentives, tournament contracts, and vertical integration. In recent years, the greatest increase
in the participation of any one business arrangement has been with contract production.
According to Rhodes (1992), approximately 10% of the nation’s hogs were produced under
contract in 1989. By 1994, he found that the number of growers producing hogs under contract
production had increased to 16%. Another follow-up to Rhodes’ study was conducted by
1

Lawrence et al. (1998).

They found that, in 1997, 40% of the hogs farrowed and 44% of the

hogs finished were produced by producers involved in production contracts. Most of the growth
occurred in the over 50,000 head size category.
Large contractors that contract with hog producers include Cargill, Carroll Foods,
Murphy Farms, Prestage Farms, and others. In many cases, contract production has allowed
producers to establish large-scale hog units due to lower short-run capital requirements.
According to Martin (1997), contract hog production is an important part of the emerging system
of vertical coordination (VC). To some, the phrase “contract farming” to some is analogous to
vertical integration (VI); to others it implies a cooperative agreement. Vertical integration and
contract production have evolved along with or in response to production specialization that has
gradually transformed the production of hogs.

Firms producing hogs under contract have

enhanced the quality and quantity of pork produced within the industry (Kliebenstein and
Lawrence, 1995). There are many more specific factors influencing the trend toward rapid
growth in contract production in the last decade. Some of these factors will be discussed in later
chapters.
In spite of the increased number of contract producers within the last decade, the majority
of the U.S. hog farm population still consists of independent producers. Large changes are
occurring among independent producers. As the number of hog farms continues to decrease, a
large proportion of farmers exiting the market are independent producers. Also, there are some
types of cooperatives, such as Farmland and ValAdCo (Value-Added Corn), that have made it
possible for producers to stabilize farm income as well as maintain some control over marketing
and production decisions. Considering these past and present changes in the structure of the U.S.
hog industry, it is of interest to determine the type of business arrangement that is best suited for
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a producer, given his or her location, production specialty, risk awareness, and financial
situation.
This study examines the factors that influence the hog producer’s choice among business
arrangements offered in the U.S. hog industry. Specifically, the study will provide updated
information about the decision making process of hog producers under alternative business
arrangements, including factors that influence such decisions.
1.2 Problem Statement
Since the late 1970's and early 1980's, the rapid change in the structure of the U.S. hog
industry has altered the way U.S. producers raise hogs. Thus, there are many questions that are
of great interest concerning the U.S. hog industry, such as (1) What types of business
arrangements do producers now accept? (2) What factors influence their decisions to accept one
business arrangement over another?, and (3) Why do producers accept specific business
arrangements with particular types of hog production?
In the hog industry, two keys to stabilizing and increasing farm income are reducing risk
and transaction costs. One of the problems that hog producers face is fluctuating hog prices
(Iowa State University Cooperative Extension Service, 1991–2000).

For some producers,

contract production has been the solution whereby they have reduced price risk and transaction
costs. Some types of cooperative farming have also enabled producers to stabilize farm income
as well as maintain their control over marketing and production decisions. According to Martin
(1997), more than 80% of the hogs marketed in North Carolina are produced under contract.
Lawrence (1998) states that more than seven million hogs are shipped annually into Iowa for
contracted finishing operations. Because of contracts and other supporting factors, such as the
absence of corporate farming and environmental laws, there have been enormous changes in the
hog industry, particularly in the Southeastern U.S. In spite of the benefits contracts offer, a large
3

percentage of today’s hog producers remain independent. It is of interest to determine the type
of business arrangement that is best suited for a producer, given his location, production
specialty, and financial situation.
1.3 Justification
Hog enterprise incomes have increased as farms have become larger. Along with these
larger operations, income variability has increased as more hogs are sold from less diversified
operations. In conjunction with the increase in the size of hog farms, there have been increased
transaction costs and increased asset specificity. Like the poultry industry, the hog industry has
vertically coordinated in an attempt to offset price risk, decrease transaction costs and more
efficiently meet consumer demand. However, in many of the traditional hog producing states,
certain types of business arrangements have been banned.

Anti-corporate farming laws have

become forceful public policies in states such as Iowa, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Kansas, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. Yet, in many non-traditional hog producing
states, VC production has not been restrained.

States such as North Carolina, Arkansas and

Oklahoma have recently experienced substantial increases in hog production through
independent firms and vertically coordinated systems. Some of the key factors that have been
responsible for their expansions are combinations of relatively inexpensive land and labor,
adequate water supplies, less stringent environmental laws, producers’ willingness to adopt new
technology, and the welcoming of VC firms as business opportunities in the state. It is of
national interest to determine which types of producers have been willing and are able to adopt
new business arrangements.

Are these producers significantly different in resources,

background, and goals from the traditional independent producer?

4

1.4 Research Objectives
The main objective of this study is to evaluate the adoption of business arrangements by
hog producers in the U.S. The specific objectives of this study are to:
1)

Identify alternative business arrangements currently being used in the U.S. hog
industry;

2)

Identify the determinants that influence hog producers’ choice among different
types of business arrangements;

3)

Develop a survey to collect information on the various business arrangements
used by hog producers in the U.S., and;

4)

Determine the influence of economic and non-economic factors on the choice of
business arrangements by hog producers.

Before the discussion is continued on factors influencing the choice of business
arrangements, a general overview of the U.S. hog industry is given. The overview of the U.S.
hog industry includes the following: technology and management practices, U.S. pork
consumption, U.S. export markets, environmental concerns, and types of business arrangements
currently being used in the industry.
1.5 External Factors Influencing the Structure of the U.S. Hog Industry
1.5.1 The Impact of Technology on Today’s Hog Industry
As new technology in hog production continues to be adopted, the structure of the hog
industry is becoming more similar to that of the broiler industry, in which virtually all broilers
are raised under contract. Through research and technology, the hog industry has made major
improvements in animal breeding stock, disease control, rations, equipment and facilities.
Changes in equipment and facilities have included the adoption of automatic feeders, climate
controlled buildings, and computerized information systems for monitoring herd performance
and health. Two of the most significant improvements in technology have been in breeding
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stock and swine nutrition. Improvements in the industry’s genetic pool have allowed farmers to
produce greater numbers of leaner, faster growing pigs per sow. For instance, in 1954, the
average litter size per sow was 5.3 piglets; however, by 2000, this figure had increased by 68%
to 8.89 piglets (U.S. Census of Agriculture, 2000).
In addition to improved breeding stock, the quality of hogs (in terms of the leanness and
fat content) has also increased. As a result of these advances in technology, U.S. hog producers
have been able to increase their productivity.

However, the benefits of these advanced

technologies have accrued only to those producers who could finance them. Producers who
could not adopt these new technologies due to insufficient funds, knowledge, or location, lost
their ability to compete causing some to exit the industry. Some other technologies such as, “all
in – all out” hog finishing, weekly farrowing, high-density fat-added diets, intensive breeding to
keep facilities full, split-sex feeding, terminal cross breeding programs, artificial insemination,
porcine somatotropin, and computer programs, have also served to increase productivity.
1.5.2 The U.S. Economy
1.5.2.1 Domestic Pork Consumption
Pork has the world’s highest per-capita consumption of any meat. According to USDA,
of the world meat consumption in 2000, 41% was pork, 29% was poultry, 25% was beef and 5%
was other meats. Pork consumption has been on the rise in recent years. From 1980 to 2000,
the volume of pork consumed in the world rose 73% (Cunningham, 2000).

In the U.S.,

consumer interest in pork is steadily growing. Pork ranks third in meat consumption in the U.S.
USDA data show that U.S. pork consumption increased throughout the 1990s with the exception
of small declines in 1993, 1995, and 1996.
One of the reasons for the increase in U.S. pork demand is the industry’s ability to
enhance the quality of pork by reducing back-fat and increasing leanness. Pork is viewed by
6

some as versatile, convenient and nutritious (Hendricks, 2001).

“The Other White Meat”

campaign was launched in 1987 and studies reveal that consumers have changed their
perceptions of pork, considering it as a white meat (Hendricks, 2001). This association is
important because 54% of consumers surveyed believed white meat was healthier, tasted good,
was leaner, and their families liked it. Results of this study showed that 40% of the respondents
would like to see more pork on restaurant menus and almost 60% of these consumers felt that
pork was different from their routine and was a delicious alternative (Hendricks, 2001). The
interest in pork by consumers has helped drive sales of pork both in restaurants and at the retail
level.
As the popularity of pork increases, supermarkets are enjoying the benefits of pork sales
(Hendricks, 2001). From 1999 to 2000, pork consumption increased by 9.3% and a USDA
(2000) study recorded that retail price levels for pork had increased (Hendricks, 2001). These
findings indicate that consumers were increasingly willing to pay more for pork. This speaks to
the competitiveness of U.S. hog producers and their ability to produce a desirable product.
Technology has made it possible for some independent, cooperative, or contract producers to
finish more uniform hogs. As a result, society has benefited from a continuous flow of uniform
hogs that produce better quality pork products.
1.5.2.2 Changes in the Domestic Price of Pork
Historically, low hog prices have presented major problems for many producers. Iowa
market prices for finished hogs fell as low as $13.92 per hundredweight in December 1998 (see
Table 1.1). As a result, some farmers were not able to cover their production expenses and were
forced out of business.

Farm prices for finished hogs in 2001 averaged $45.40 per

hundredweight, which is $2.54 higher than the 2000 farm price ($42.86) (USDA-Baseline
Projections, 2002). This up-swing can be attributed partly to a lower supply of hogs. Hog prices
7

for April, 2001, reached a high of $67.00 per hundredweight. Market analysts postulated that for
all of 2002, profits were expected to average $10.41 per hundredweight compared with $13.37 in
2001(USDA-Baseline Projections, 2002).

According to Hurt, these good fortunes can be

attributed to smaller pork supplies than expected, and stronger demand as a result of higher retail
beef prices and especially Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) in Europe between 1999-2001 helped
stimulate U.S. pork exports (Hurt, 2001).
Historically, U.S. hog prices have been known to exhibit a cyclical behavior. One of the
basic principles of economics states that as supplies of a commodity increase, prices decrease.
This, in turn, leads to a decrease in supply, and higher prices.

“Hog cycles have been

characterized to some extent by alternating major peaks and minor peaks” (McCoy, 1979: p. 83).
In other words, the propensity for a high peak to be followed by a low peak is almost inevitable.
The variation in prices during the hog cycle provides some insight to reasons why the structure
of the hog industry is changing. To reduce the price risks incurred during the hog cycle, some
hog producers have turned to production contracts. Production contracts have enabled producers
to better stabilize income through fixed, incentive and guaranteed minimum payments. Smaller
hog producers who are not involved in production contracts are forced to compete with larger
vertically coordinated firms that are able to produce better quality pork at lower per unit costs.
This, in turn forces many small hog producers out-of-business, while large contract and
cooperative producers expand to meet the market demands.
Like most agricultural production cycles, the duration of the hog cycle is determined by
many factors. These factors may include “life-cycle of hogs, as well as the rate at which
producers alter production practices in response to enterprise profitability” (Agricultural
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Marketing Manual - February, 1999). A hog seasonal cycle is 12 months (see Figure 1.1). A
hog market cycle is generally about three to four years, compared to a cattle cycle of ten years or
more.
According to Iowa market prices for hogs, which are usually lower than the average U.S.
hog prices, the selling price per hundredweight from 1991 to 2000 followed this behavior. Table
1.1 shows Iowa’s market prices for finished hogs per hundredweight. In 1991, the average price
per hundredweight was $49.92. The lowest selling seasonal price for that year was 22% below
the average price, while the highest was 11% above the average. During 1996, Iowa producers
experienced the highest average price ($52.89 per hundredweight) of the decade. The high price
reported that year was 11% above the average seasonal price, while the lowest price was 19%
below the average. Lower hog prices occurred during the 1998 production period. The average
price for that period was $31.68, which is the lowest recorded in the Iowa market during the
1990s.

The highest price recorded for that period ($42) exceeded only one other production

period. In December, 1998, Iowa producers experienced the lowest price for market hogs they
had received in years. The fluctuation in Iowa and U.S. market prices for finished hogs per
hundredweight, along with some other factors, explain why contract production in the hog
industry is increasing. More hog producers are choosing contractual agreements to help reduce
or eliminate the price risk associated with marketing finished hogs.
1.5.3 U.S. Export Markets
The U.S. has become the second largest net exporter of pork in the world. This is a
surprising turnaround considering that the U.S. was the largest importer of pork during the
1980s. Pork exports totaled 556,895 metric tons in 2000, grossing $1.3 billion (Cohen, 2001).
Pork ranks third among the meats exported by the U.S. In 2000, hog exports increased 12% by

9

Table 1.1: Iowa Market Prices for Finished Hogs per Hundredweight.

Average

Jan-91
to
Dec-91
49.92

Jan-92
to
Dec-92
43.24

Jan-93
to
Dec-93
45.72

Production Period
Jan-96
Jan-95
Jan-94
to
to
to
Dec-96
Dec-95
Dec-94
39.53
41.85
52.89

Highest
56.24
48.64
49.05
47.75
49.18
59.09
Lowest
38.84
39.70
40.38
28.01
35.50
42.60
Source: Iowa State University Cooperative Extension Service, years 1991 - 2000.

Jan-97
to
Dec-97
51.29

Jan-98
to
Dec-98
31.68

Jan-99
to
Dec-99
32.01

Jan-00
to
Dec-00
42.76

58.66
39.85

42.00
13.92

37.44
25.93

49.72
36.03

Dollars

Iowa Hog Cycle for Finished Hogs per Hundredweight from
1991 to 2000.
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

Average

Highest

Lowest

Jan-91
to Dec91

Jan-92
to Dec92

Jan-93
to Dec93

Jan-94
to Dec94

Jan-95
to Dec95

Jan-96
to Dec96

Years

Jan-97
to Dec97

Jan-98
to Dec98

Jan-99
to Dec99

Jan-00
to Dec00

Figure 1.1: Iowa Hog Cycle for Finished Hogs per Hundredweight from 1991 to 2000.
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volume and 18% by value compared to 1999. During the first five months of 2001, pork meat
exports were up 14%, which represents an increase of 23% in value from 2000. From 1990 to
1999, U.S. pork exports increased 469%, which is considerably higher than beef and veal (133%)
or broilers (385%) (Agricultural Statistics, 1990–2000).
The major geographical regions that import U.S. pork are Latin America and Asia.
Within these geographical regions, the countries that consume the most U.S. pork are Japan,
South Korea and Mexico. In 2000, Japan, South Korea, and Mexico imported 192,485, 12,439
and 94,839 metric tons, respectively (ERS-Livestock, 2001). These three countries accounted
for 48%, 3% and 24% of the U.S. pork exports, respectively. Other countries that are expected
to become major importers of U.S. pork are Argentina and China. Argentina recently opened its
market to U.S. boneless pork. In 2001, Argentina was expected to import 30,000 metric tons a
year. Likewise, the U.S.–China trade agreement was projected to increase the supply of pork to
Chinese consumers by 1.2 billion, and boost the value of U.S. market hogs $5 per head in 2001
(NPPC, 2000).
1.5.4 U.S. Hog Production and Environmental Pollution
There are negative externalities generated by hog production units that are presently
threatening the quality of life of people living near them. The move toward specialization and
vertical coordination has increased the size and geographic concentration of hog operations
(Metcalfe, 2001). Hog operations with 2000 or more animals increased from 28% in December,
1993, to 68.5% in December, 1999 (Metcalfe, 2001). According to Hubbell and Welsh (1998),
North Carolina and Arkansas have experienced the greatest growth in large operations. Almost
40% of this growth occurred in North Carolina (Martin and Zering 1997; Hubbell and Welsh,
1998). Due to the high density of hogs per square mile, many environmental issues have arisen
and become of great concern.
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Historically, agricultural industries have accounted for a large percentage of the nonpoint
source pollution in the U.S. To protect people and wildlife habitats, laws such as the Clean
Water Act and the Safe Drinking Water Act were enacted by the federal government. The Clean
Water Act is a quality control policy that was established initially in 1972 to reduce nonpoint
source pollution, such as runoff from urban and agricultural lands and industrial dumping
(USEPA, 1995). The Safe Drinking Water Act was originally passed by Congress in 1974, to
protect public health by regulating the nation’s public drinking water supply.

Further

amendments to these laws concerning non-point source pollution were added from 1986 to 1996
(USDA, 1997 and 1999). The purpose of both Acts was to ensure all U.S. citizens, regardless of
their geographical location, clean drinking water.
The state of North Carolina has experienced manure runoffs that have caused both water
and air pollution.

Manure runoffs from large intensive hog feeding operations have been

responsible for pollution of rivers and shorelines, while large quantities of ammonia (nitrogen)
have caused foul odors in residential areas located near large hog operations (Hog Watch). The
bacteria, antibiotics and heavy metals found in hog manure have also posed threats to human
health. Because of the breadth of these pollution problems in various regions of the U.S., the
federal government has stepped in to ensure the employment of an adequate property rights
regime.

Lax environmental regulation laws in the presence of increasing geographical

concentration of hog feeding operations have been challenging for states like North Carolina.
Studies that have examined the effect of environmental regulation on agricultural operations
have discovered that higher stringency of regulation (as it relates to size and manure
disbursement) does have a significant effect on the location of dairy farm operations (Osei and
Lakshminarayan 1996; Outlaw 1993) and in aquaculture operations (Wirth and Luzar 1998).
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1.6 Discussion of the Current Business Arrangements Used in the U.S. Hog Industry.
The following discussion presents information about the major business arrangements
used in U.S. hog production: independent production, cooperative, and contract production. This
discussion explains the different aspects of producing under these business arrangements and
provides examples of specific firms in the U.S. producing under these business arrangements.
1.6.1 Independent Production
The “do-it-all” philosophy still characterizes the goals of many independent producers.
An independent producer secures all of his or her production inputs, and makes all decisions
concerning the production and marketing of hogs (Welsh and Bryan, 1999). Hogs are sold on
the open market by the producer.

All production expenses/profits generated through the

production and sale of hogs are incurred/realized by the producer.
1.6.2 Cooperative Farming
Cramer et al. (2001) define a cooperative as “an association of member-owners operating
a business that provides services at cost to its patrons” (p.492). Cooperative hog farming
businesses are typically organized, capitalized, and managed by/for its members. There are a
number of different types of cooperatives involved in today’s U.S. hog production industry. One
of the largest cooperatives in the U.S. hog industry is Farmland Industries. As a cooperative,
Farmland Industries strives to (1) provide world-class genetics at a reasonable cost; (2)
incorporate “all in/all out” systems; and (3) identify producers who would maintain an “all in/all
out” hog production system (Reilly and Reynolds, 1994).
From a production perspective, Farmland Industries offers a number of options to
producers working under its program. For instance, under a finishing agreement, producers’
choices include a guaranteed price contract, including incentives based on such factors as feed
conversion, leanness and death/loss ratio (Reilly and Reynolds, 1994). Producers also have the
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choice of an option that entails some market risk, but leads to greater expected profits. These
agreements allow Farmland Industries to supply breeding stock, feed, veterinary care and
medication, transportation, record-keeping needs and other technical assistance to producers, as
well as supplying a market for pigs.
In 2001, Land O’Lakes Farmland Feed utilized three hog production systems. They
include the nursery management system, the lean gain program, and the sow nutritional program.
Land O’Lakes Farmland Feed has a highly productive wean starter program. The program
incorporates a wide base of protein ingredients – milk, animal and plant protein blends – to
produce an optimal mix of protein for the starter – feeding program. Land O’Lakes Farmland
Feeds typically weans at less than 21 days. The all-in/all-out nursery utilizes 7-day weaning and
had a mortality rate of 1.5% in 2001. The lean grain nutrition program has helped Land O’Lakes
Farmland Feed to produce yearly litter weaning weights that are more than 30 percent greater
than 10 years ago.
Another example of a cooperative is ValAdCo (Value-Added Corn) in Minnesota, which
is a farmer-owned cooperative consisting of 130 members (Cooperatives, 2002). The primary
goal of ValAdCo is to add value to products such as gilts, corn and soybeans for resale to farmers
and markets. Of the many production sites ValAdCo has, two of them are “crossing farms”
production sites. At crossing farm 1, breeding, gestation and farrowing are done in three
separate barns at one location. Crossing farm 2 consists of a nursery and four finishing barns
and two-site production involving an “all in/all out” system.

ValAdCo’s by-laws require

producers to produce and supply the cooperative with 2,000 bushels of corn a year. According
to Bill O’Hare, chief executive officer, ValAdCo is the fourth largest load served by RenvilleSibley and has annual sales of about $23 million (Cooperatives, 2002).

14

Alternatively, there are other cooperatives that may offer risk-sharing programs that
include various forms of floor contracts. With such contracts, in exchange for guaranteeing a
certain minimum price to the producer, the cooperative takes a certain percentage of returns
when prices are high (Rhodes, 1994).

In addition to cooperatives that are involved directly in

the production of hogs, there are also cooperatives that provide hog producers transportation,
feed, and access to slaughter houses/packers. Transportation cooperatives are entities made up
of hog producers and trucking companies. They are established to help producers reduce the cost
of transporting feed to production sites and hogs to markets.
There are also grain cooperatives of which hog producers are members.

Grain

cooperatives are organized to create more markets for grain suppliers. One example is the
Farmers Cooperative Elevator Company (FCEC) of Iowa Falls, in North Central Iowa, which
markets grain and supplies, feed, petroleum, fertilizer and other agronomic services (Reilly and
Reynolds, 1994). FCEC also provides agreements that supply technical and other field services
to hog finishers. With these agreements, an active role is taken to help hog producers qualify for
loans to purchase state-of-the art facilities. FCEC guarantees to pay a portion of a seven-year
financial loan that coincides with the length of the production contract. FCEC is involved in hog
production to broaden the demand for its feed products and grains (Reilly and Reynolds, 1994).
Similarly, there are cooperatives for slaughter houses or packers. These cooperatives are
designed to increase the number of hogs slaughtered by packers and to secure markets and
premium prices for quality hogs marketed by producers.
For some independent hog producers, cooperatives have been the key to improving
productivity as well as reducing production costs. As a result, cooperatives have become an
alterative business arrangement that has enabled independent hog producers to compete with
vertically integrated firms.
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1.6.3 Contract Production
Contract production involves “contractual agreements between producers and their input
suppliers or product marketing firms” (Cramer et al., 2001: p.492). Contract farming in the hog
industry began in the late 1960's with Murphy Farms in Rose Hill, North Carolina, and was later
followed by Tyson Foods in the early 1970's at Springdale, Arkansas (Futrell, 1989). Most of the
early contracts in the U.S. hog industry were offered by feed suppliers who were interested in
obtaining or expanding markets for their goods (Martin, 1994; Gillespie, Karantininis, and
Storey, 1998). Producers’ reasons for entering into these contracts were largely to secure credit,
input supplies, and/or a market for their hogs. Some of the early contractual arrangements fell
into one of five categories: (1) open account, (2) hog feedlot, (3) profit-sharing, (4) feed
conversion, and (5) flat fee contracts.
1.6.3.1 Open Account Contracts
Open account contracts consist of an agreement where the contractor sells producers
inputs, such as feed, feeder pigs and medication, on credit or at the retail price (Martin, 1994).
Profits for the seller are made by the mark-up on the inputs sold. The producer makes all of the
production and marketing decisions. Producers participating in open account contracts are able
to shift very little risk, if any, to the input seller. Producers’ reasons for accepting this contract
are primarily to secure quality production inputs (Martin, 1994).
1.6.3.2 Hog Feedlot Contract
The hog feedlot contract is sometimes referred to as a “hog motel” (Martin, 1994). With
this contract, producers who do not have space, equipment or labor to accommodate the number
of hogs scheduled for grow-out arrange for a second party to raise the animals. Space at the
“motel” is rented based on a flat fee, per square footage, per day, or per pound gained basis. The
feed may be supplied by either party. Payment for rental space is made to the owner of the
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“motel.” Once the hogs have reached market weight, the owner retrieves and sells the hogs.
Because the owner of the hogs pays a rental fee and markets his or her own hogs, this
arrangement does little to decrease risk exposure to the hog owner. On the other hand, risk may
be reduced for the contractee since the contractor pays a flat-fee or agreed upon formula price for
hog space and, in some cases, labor. This type of arrangement is common in the upper Midwest.
1.6.3.3 Flat-Fee Contract
With a flat fee contract, the contractor (in most cases a grain supplier) supplies the
producer with feed, feeder pigs, and medication (Cozzarin and Westgren, 2000, and Martin,
1994).

The producer uses his or her finishing house, utilities, labor, and other equipment to

raise hogs for the contractor. The contractor retains ownership of the animals throughout the
production process.

After the grow-out period, the contractor is responsible for marketing the

hogs. The producer is paid a guaranteed flat fee payment (Cozzarin and Westgren, 2000). As a
risk reduction method, the flat fee agreement transfers all price risk associated with pigs, feed,
and medication prices to the contractor, but not for facilities, labor, etc.
1.6.3.4 Profit-Sharing Contracts
Profit-sharing contracts allow profits to be shared between the producer and the
contractor (Cozzarin and Westgren, 2000, and Martin, 1994).

Analogous to open account

contracts, the contractor supplies the producer with the major inputs at retail prices, while the
producer furnishes the finishing house, utilities, labor, and equipment. The contractor controls or
regulates all production and marketing practices. Contractor profits are derived from input markup and revenue from hog sales, while the producer’s profit comes strictly from revenue
generated from hog sales.

Profit-sharing contracts do not shield the producer from the

fluctuations of market hog prices, but they do reduce the producer’s operating capital
requirements.
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1.6.3.5 Feed Conversion Contracts
Feed conversion contracts are designed such that producer compensation is based on feed
efficiency (Martin, 1994). Similar to profit-sharing contracts, the contractor provides the feeder
pigs, feed and some other variable inputs, while the producer furnishes the finishing house,
utilities, labor, and equipment. When the hogs reach market weight, the producer is paid a flat
fee price plus a bonus based on the feed-to-gain ratio of the hogs. If the ratio is below a set feed
to gain ratio, the producer will receive a higher bonus payment. If it is above the suggested feed
efficiency ratio, the producer’s bonus will be reduced or zero.
1.6.3.6 Tournament Contracts
Tournaments are competitive contracts that reward producers with bonuses (monetary) based
upon performance relative to other contract producers. The best performer receives the largest
bonus and the worst performer receives the smallest. Similar to the incentive-based contract,
tournament contracts are resource-providing. The contractor provides the feeder pigs, feed and
other inputs, while the producer furnishes the finishing house, utilities, labor, and other
equipment.
1.6.4 Vertical Integration
“Vertical integration is the linkage of up- and downstream firms through ownership in a
single firm” (Gillespie, Karantininis, and Storey, 1998). Within the vertically integrated system,
employees are paid an hourly wage by the integrator to manage and raise hogs. The integrator
provides all resources used in the production process of hogs, with the exception of labor and
managerial ability.
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1.7 Segments Involved in Hog Production
Swine production can be classified into four segments: specialized farrow-to-nursery,
feeder pig, finishing, and farrow-to-finish units. Some types of VC contracts associated with
each are included in the discussion of each segment.
1.7.1 Specialized Farrow-to-Nursery Units
Specialized farrow-to-nursery units are designed to provide husbandry for piglets from
the time they are farrowed until they are weaned. In a contractual farrow-to-nursery agreement,
the contractor typically determines when the pigs are to be weaned, and supplies the producer
with sows and inputs such as feed, veterinary service and medication (Martin, 1994). The
producer provides the facilities, labor, and utilities.

After the pigs are weaned, the contractor

gathers the pigs and pays the producer for the services. Payment to the producer can be based on
a piece-rate, flat fee, per day, or per pound gained basis. Incentive payments may also be
provided based on the number of pigs weaned (Martin, 1994).
1.7.2 Feeder Pig Enterprises
Feeder pig enterprises are designed to provide husbandry for weaned piglets until the pigs
reach a weight of approximately 60 pounds (Cozzarin and Westgren, 2000). Under a contract,
the contractor typically supplies the producer with feeder pigs, feed, veterinary services and
medication (Martin, 1994). The producer provides the facilities, labor, utilities, and equipment.
Once the growth period is completed, the contractor gathers the pigs and pays the producer for
his or her services. Payment to the producer can be based on a piece-rate, flat fee, per day, or per
pound gained basis. Incentive payments to the producer may also be offered. The incentive
payment may be determined by feed efficiency, grow-out time, or mortality.

With this

agreement, the contractor absorbs all output price risk if the producer is paid on a flat fee or a
piece-rate basis (Martin, 1994).
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1.7.3 Finishing Operations
In finishing operations, hogs are raised from between 40 and 60 pounds to market weight.
Under most contracts, the contractor makes the majority of the production and all marketing
decisions (Martin, 1994).

The contractor may require the producer to purchase specific

equipment or build specific production units. Inputs such as the feeder pigs, feed, and veterinary
services and medication are supplied by the contractor. Other inputs, such as labor, utilities, etc.,
are supplied by the producer. At the end of the grow-out period, the contractor retrieves the hogs
and pays the producer based on feed efficiency, grow-out time and weight or based on a
tournament, which involves other producers with similar characteristics. If the producer is in a
tournament, the bonus payments are determined on a competitive basis with other producers
selling during the same time period. Producers are rewarded based on standards and criteria set
by the contractor (Martin, 1994). This is the most common segment of hog production for
contracts.
1.7.4 Farrow-to-Finish Units
Farrow-to-finish units involve production facilities that are used to facilitate the entire
growth process of a hog. There are three phases: a farrowing unit, a wean to feeder pig unit, and
a grow-out unit. The producer is required by the contractor to supply the facilities, equipment,
utilities and labor needed for production, while the contractor supplies inputs such as animals,
feed, veterinary service and medication. Most production and all marketing decisions are made
by the contractor. Once the hogs reach market weight, they are retrieved by the contractor. The
payment received by the producer is generally based on a flat fee plus a bonus. The bonus is
determined by feed efficiency, mortality rate, number of pigs weaned per sow and/or grow-out
time. Similar to finishing operations, this agreement also reduces price risk since a flat fee
payment is guaranteed (Martin, 1994).
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1.8 Thesis Outline
A literature review is presented in Chapter 2. It includes a discussion of autonomy, risk,
asset specificity, transaction costs, and social capital. An extensive literature search was done to
define and explain the economic theory guiding producers’ choice of business arrangement as it
relates to the aforementioned terms.

Chapter 3 presents the methods, the models and the

variables used in the study. It consists of strategies for data collection, description of data,
discussion of multinomial and binomial logit models, and a discussion of endogenous and
exogenous variables. The results and discussion are presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 gives a
summary, conclusions and implications of the study, recommendations future research, and a
discussion of the limitations of the study.
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CHAPTER 2
PREVIOUS STUDIES EXAMINING FACTORS INFLUENCING THE ADOPTION OF
CONTRACTING IN AGRICULTURE
2.1 Factors That Influence the Choice of Business Arrangement in the Hog Industry
Why do some producers favor contracting while others do not? According to Rhodes
(1994), contracting allows producers to expand their production units, reduce market risk, share
management responsibilities and expertise with the contractor, stabilize income, and adopt new
technology. Kliebenstein and Lawrence (1995) argue that the primary advantage of contractual
arrangements in the hog industry is risk reduction.

It is hypothesized that producers decide

among alternative business arrangements on the basis of risk, transaction costs arising primarily
from asset specificity, and autonomy.
2.2 Autonomy
Gillespie and Eidman (1998) argue that income risk is not the dominant factor that
influences business arrangement selection for some independent producers. Some producers
prefer to remain independent because it gives them complete control over the production and
marketing of their animals. This differs from producers under contracts who share power and
management responsibilities. This control is referred to as producer autonomy. Autonomy
represents “the desirability of a business arrangement on the basis of how business structure and
lifestyle aspects other than income and variability of income are affected” (Gillespie and
Eidman, 1998). There are different levels or measures of autonomy. The level of control a
producer has over his or her farm operation can influence the choice of business arrangement,
with independent farming having the greatest control, generally followed by cooperative
farming, contracts with VCs and lastly, VI. For some independent producers, the preference for
autonomy is great enough to offset the risk-reducing benefits of contracts (Gillespie and Eidman,
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1998). However, other producers are willing to forfeit some of their control to benefit from
various contractual arrangements (Gillespie and Eidman, 1998). Therefore, it is important to
determine the degree to which autonomy influences a producer’s choice of business
arrangements.
2.3 Risk
The production of agricultural commodities involves more uncontrollable factors than
production of most other items. These uncontrollable factors cause variability in net returns,
which is identified as risk. Risk is present in situations where there are a number of potential
outcomes that might occur, and there are probabilities associated with each outcome (Pindyck
and Rubinfeld, 1995). In the production of agricultural goods, output is subject to variable
factors such as weather, disease, prices and technology. Production economists analyze at least
two types of risk: price risk and production risk. In addition to these risks, economists working
in the field of industrial organization have also conducted extensive research in the area of
contract risk (Ward et al., 2000).
2.3.1 Price Risk
From a production perspective, price risk arises due to “differences between realized and
expected prices” (Tomek and Robinson, 1990: p.56). According to Martin (1994), price risk
makes up approximately 94% of the risk that causes income variability in independent hog
production. The amount of price risk a hog producer faces is dependent upon the business
arrangement chosen. Roberts et al., (2000) and Martin (1997) conducted studies that examined
contracts, risk shifting, and relative performance payments in the pork industry.

Martin’s

findings indicate that, assuming “independent hog producers face 100% price risk, contractees
with and without tournaments face only 6.5% and 9.5% price risk,” respectively. Therefore,
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93.5% and 90.5%, respectively, of the price risks that independent producers face are shifted to
the contractor (Martin, 1997).
2.3.2 Production Risk
Production risk arises due to the variability of farm inputs and output. According to
Martin (1994), and Knoeber and Thurman (1995), there are two different types of production
risk: common risk and idiosyncratic risk. Common risk arises as a result of events that are
common across all production units in a given area. Drought is an example of an event that is
common across many units. In the context of VC firms, a common risk might be the probability
associated with a contractor altering the feed or animal genetics provided to all growers
producing under contract (Martin, 1994).
Under a tournament situation, all producers face similar common risks and their relative
rankings are likely to remain unchanged regardless of the common risks faced (Martin, 1994).
An example would be a contractor supplying substandard feed for a particular week to its
producers. The feed will not affect the efficiency rankings because all producers who obtained
feed from the contractor would receive the same substandard feed. Independent producers are
susceptible to all common risks. Cooperative producers’ susceptibility to risk varies depending
upon how the cooperative is structured.
Idiosyncratic risk is another production risk that has different effects upon production
units (Martin, 1997).

Idiosyncratic risk may arise from dysfunctional physical capital. An

example of an idiosyncratic risk is the risk of a cooling system breaking in a hog farrowing
building during the summer. This event is not likely to be common among all producers in an
area at the same time. All producers are subject to idiosyncratic risk. However, the idiosyncratic
risk experienced by contract producers may be less than that experienced by independent
producers given that most contractors require specific technologies that sometimes obligate
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producers to upgrade or purchase new facilities and equipment (Spiekerman, 1998).
Independent producers often have limited capital resources available, due partially to their lower
chance of obtaining loans from lenders and greater associated initial capital investment (since
they must purchase pigs, feed, and some other inputs provided by a contractor). Therefore, their
ability to upgrade production facilities as technology changes may be less likely than with
producers under contract. As a result, contract producers may experience less idiosyncratic risk
since most of their capital inputs are likely to be relatively new in comparison to independent
producers.
2.3.3 Contract Risk
Williamson views market failure as resulting from “contractual incompleteness and
strategic misrepresentation risk” (Williamson, 1971).

Contractual incompleteness is often

caused by ex-ante but not necessarily ex-post uncertainty (Williamson, 1971). “Specifically, ex
ante costs include: (1) search and information costs; (2) drafting, bargaining and decision costs;
and (3) costs of safeguarding an agreement. Ex post costs of contracting include: (1) monitoring
and enforcement costs; (2) adaptation and haggling costs; (3) bonding costs; and (4)
“maladaptation” costs (Williamson, 1971). For example, producers who engage in short term
contracts that require investment in long-life equipment may not be able to fulfill their loan
obligations if the contract is not renewed (Williamson, 1971). Strategic misrepresentation risk is
high where there are both ex-ante and ex-post uncertainties (Hobbs, 1997). Not only is the future
uncertain but it may not be possible, except at great cost, for an outside agency to establish
accurately what has transpired after the fact. Perhaps the greatest contract risk that contract
producers face is the risk associated with unrenewed or broken contracts.

Broken and

unrenewed contracts can leave specialized producers in precarious positions. If the producer
cannot find another contractor with whom to contract, the producer’s possibility of covering his
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or her fixed cost may be slim, given the specificity of equipment used. A producer’s best option
may be to sell the equipment to a producer who is specializing in the same production process.
However, it can be difficult to find a buyer for specialized equipment and housing. Hence,
contract risk becomes important when determining the full risks associated with hog production
using contracts.
2.3.4 Risk Attitudes
Previous studies have identified risk as one of the main factors influencing farmers’
reasons for accepting different business arrangements (Rhodes and Grimes, 1994; Gillespie and
Eidman, 1998; Martin 1994 and 1997; Knoeber and Thurman, 1995). When evaluating risk, it is
common to begin with expected utility theory. von Neumann and Morgenstern postulated that
various sets of axioms validate the existence of utilities with the property that expected utility is
an appropriate guide for consistent decision making.

The four major axioms that support

expected utility theory are state independence, reduction of compound lotteries, continuity, and
independence of irrelevant alternatives (Silberberg, 1990). Expected utility theory assumes that
“if (L,

) satisfy the above axioms, there is a utility function µ defined on L that satisfies the

expected utility property” (Varian, 1992: p. 174). Many economists believe that, based on
normative theories of decision making, an individual should choose a course of action that is
associated with the highest expected utility (Mellers, 1992).
A decision maker is said to be risk averse if his utility function is concave and he prefers
the expected consequence of any nondegenerate lottery to that lottery. A risk neutral decision
maker’s utility function is linear; the decision maker is indifferent between a nondegenerate
lottery and the expected consequence of that lottery. Lastly, a decision maker is said to be risk
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prone if his utility function is convex and he prefers any nondegenerate lottery to the expected
consequence of that lottery.
Over time, economists have used a number of models to elicit the risk attitudes of people.
Officer and Halter (1968) compared three models, von Neumann and Morgenstern (N-M), a
modified version of the von Neumann and Morgenstern (Modified N-M) and the Ramsey
method. A single valued utility function was estimated for each model allowing for calculation
of the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion. The N-M model was the least preferred
model. The Ramsey model performed better than the modified N-M model. People found it
easier to make choices using the Ramsey model, although calculating the utility associated with
each outcome can be more cumbersome than with the Modified N-M (Officer and Halter, 1968,
and Knowles, 1984).
King and Robison have used the Interval Approach to measure decision makers’ risk
attitudes. This approach calculates the interval between the lower and upper bounds on a
decision maker’s absolute risk aversion function. The respondents are asked to choose between
two distributions, each having six possible payoffs with equal probability. A series of questions
is asked until the range of the interval is narrowed. Based on the respondent’s final choice, the
range of the lower and upper bounds determines whether the respondent is very or moderately
risk averse, risk neutral or very or moderately risk prone. The Interval Approach is not exact, in
that it does not give a single coefficient of absolute risk aversion for the respondent like singlevalued utility functions (King and Robison, 1981). Other researchers who have used the Interval
Approach include Wilson and Eidman (1983), Tauer (1986), and Schurle and Tierney (1990).
Using a mail survey, Cardona (1999) utilized a method that asked farmers about their risk
attitude. Louisiana sugarcane producers were asked to rate their risk attitudes when making farm
management decisions. A continuous line was provided between risk averse and risk taker and
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producers were to indicate where they fell in terms of risk preference. Once the risk attitude was
determined, a model was employed to determine whether risk preferences affected the adoption
of best management practices.

The risk attitude of sugarcane producers was found to be

statistically significant in the adoption decision.
Gillespie and Fausti (2000) used a mail survey to examine the degree of consistency
across alternative risk preference elicitation procedures. They compared six risk preference
elicitation procedures: (1) a self-rank elicitation method, (2) a scenario looking at a job
opportunity, given different income probabilities, (3) five hypothetical investments, each with
low, average and high net returns at equal probabilities, (4) the Interval Approach, (5) a
hypothetical question measuring the riskiness of calf marketing alternatives, and (6) the
Modified von Neumann-Morgenstern approach. Their findings indicated that only questions one
and three were rank-order consistent. There was little consistency found in the risk preferences
elicited via the other questions.
2.4 Asset Specificity
Specific assets are assets whose value is much greater in a particular use compared to the
next-best alternative. Asset specificity exists when one or both parties to a transaction make
investments in equipment and/or machinery that involve design characteristics specific to the
transaction and which have lower values in alternative uses (Joskow, 1985). Investments of this
type are common among contractees; contracts typically involve the performance of work that
uses task-specific assets. A specific asset may be physical (unique physical characteristics),
human (unique skills), or site specific (unique location) capital (Martinez et al., 1998).
Williamson (1990) indicates that vertical integration is expected to evolve among firms
experiencing recurrent transactions when asset specificity is present. One reason for this is
vertical integration and some forms of vertical coordination reduces transaction costs. Sporleder
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(1994) argues that asset specificity is viewed as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for
firms to choose vertical integration as a vertically-allied, inter-industry form of coordination.
State-of-the-art hog production facilities are typically useful only for hog production. Initial
investment for such facilities today often exceeds $1 million (Hurt, Boehlje, and Hale, 1995).
Thus, there is an incentive for producers investing in such facilities to identify markets for hogs
that are stable and profitable. In areas with few or no alternative markets, contracts with
financially stable VCs are likely. Thus, divestiture from mistakes when specific assets are
involved may prove costly (Sporleder, 1995).
2.5 Transaction Costs
Coase provides a theoretical framework to understand why resource-providing contracts
have become more prevalent than others in the U.S. hog industry. Coase (1937) argues that
market transactions between independent units are costly, and that the integrated firm can
perform repetitive transactions at lower costs. Resource-providing contracts fall between the two
extremes of the open market and the vertically integrated firm, and may be viewed as a hybrid
between the firm and the market.
Perhaps one reason why hog producers have accepted resource-providing contracts has
been to reduce the number of business transactions, thus reducing transaction costs (Ward et al.,
2000).

Transaction costs are those costs that are required to establish and maintain property

rights (Allen, 1991). On the other hand, Joskow (1995) defines transaction costs as expenses
associated with inefficient pricing and production behavior. In general, transaction costs are
merely expenses producers incur due to the lack of perfect information and resources.
Transaction costs arise in day-to-day business because of communication breakdowns, imperfect
information, incomplete contract stipulation, and ambiguous entitlements.

The number of

transactions involved in the production and marketing of agricultural products is many. As more
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transactions occur during the production and marketing of goods, the total cost of transactions
increases; thus, larger producers are likely to incur higher total transaction costs since they are
likely to buy inputs and sell outputs more often than smaller producers (albeit the average
transaction cost per unit sold may be lower for larger producers). Some of the most common
transaction costs incurred in the livestock industry are information costs, negotiation costs and
monitoring costs (Hobbs, 1997).
2.5.1 Information Costs
Independent producers may incur costs in the search for information about products,
prices, inputs, and buyers or sellers. For instance, in order to produce and sell farm products, the
producer must determine where to purchase inputs and where to market finished products each
time a transaction is made. According to economic theory, a rational producer seeks to minimize
cost by purchasing homogeneous inputs at their lowest prices. Likewise, a producer who seeks
to maximize his or her returns will sell output (hogs) to the buyer who offers the highest price.
In the process of obtaining price information, a cost is incurred. This cost may vary depending
on the availability of information on market prices. In the U.S., hog producers have access to a
time series of published market prices as well as information on the four-year hog cycle.
Nevertheless, U.S. hog producers incur costs associated with educating themselves on hog prices
offered by different buyers, who are likely to pay different prices on a given day. Compounding
this price uncertainty, through public market sales, there is no way of knowing the actual price
that hogs will bring before the sale takes place. Thus, public market sales are uncertain and
become problematic for independent producers.

This situation presents fewer problems to

contractees since payments for hogs are set once their contracts are signed. Intuitively, it can be
inferred that risky situations lead to higher transaction costs. Likewise, input price uncertainty is
reduced for contractees since, with many contracts, inputs are furnished by the contractor.
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Human capital gives rise to another form of information costs.

Human capital is

heterogeneous across firms due to differences in the experience, education, and skill level of
managers (Boehlje, 1992) and laborers.

To a large degree, a person’s managerial skills

determine his or her ability to process and evaluate information as well as implement new
technology. For example, a hog producer’s ability to conduct such tasks as keeping accurate
records of the pedigree of each sow and artificially inseminating hogs in a timely manner
requires technical and managerial skills.
Although it may seem obvious as to why human capital is important to independent and
cooperative producers, given their production and managerial responsibilities, the importance of
human capital to contract producers may not be as obvious. Contract producers need human
capital to efficiently run breeding sow operations.

Breeding sow operations run under

production contracts are used to supply feeder pigs for finishing operations. Human capital is
also essential for those producers who are operating under incentive payment contracts.
Producers under this type of contract are often competing for bonus payments, which require
certain managerial skills in order to achieve the lowest costs production, lowest mortality rate
and highest percentage of pigs weaned.
Over time, there has been an increase in the investment of human capital in agriculture,
allowing producers and agribusiness managers to manage larger scale specialized units and adopt
cost-reducing/output-increasing technology more cost effectively (Boehlje, 1992). Thus, hog
producers who do not incorporate efficient levels of human capital within their production
processes may incur additional information costs from business planners and plant technicians.
2.5.2 Negotiation Costs
Another important classification of transaction costs is negotiation cost. “Negotiation
costs arise from the physical act of the transaction, and are influenced by the way the transaction
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is carried out” (Hobbs, 1996). Negotiation costs are incurred in all transactions encountered by a
producer from the time production inputs are purchased to the time payment is received for the
hogs. Hobbs (1997) discusses some negotiation costs and how they influence the decisions made
by cattle farmers. There are negotiation costs between contractors and contractees in setting up
the contract. For most resource-providing contracts, the contractor supplies the animals, feed,
veterinary care, medication, management expertise and all marketing services, while the
contractee (producer) furnishes the labor, buildings, equipment, utilities and some management
skills. The initial negotiation costs for these types of contracts are normally minimized or
limited due to the set features of the contract for all producers. Little negotiation occurs after the
contract is signed if the contract covers most contingencies. Most resource-providing contracts
are designed such that the contractor incurs the costs of locating a suitable market, negotiating
prices for animals, and conducting administrative transactions. Thus, before the initial signing of
the contract, the producer incurs time, transportation costs, and the opportunity cost of
contracting with another contractor. But, because the life expectancies of these cattle contracts
range from three to ten years, the frequency in which both parties incur these negotiation costs is
minimized.
In contrast to the negotiation costs incurred under resource-providing contracts, an
independent producer faces many of the costs that both the contractor and the contractee incur.
An independent producer’s negotiation cost could begin with his or her negotiations concerning
the location and size of production facilities. Assuming that the producer has the land, hogs, and
all the necessary facilities needed for production, some of the first negotiation costs an
independent producer incurs involve the purchase of inputs such as feed, medication and labor.
The administrative transactions involved in establishing and documenting these agreements are
negotiation costs.
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Employment of labor also leads to negotiation costs. As an employer, the producer draws
up an agreement that establishes the wage per hour and number of hours of work required of
employees, as well as other required benefits. The administrative transactions of processing
employee applications are continuous negotiation costs that an independent producer incurs. For
independent producers, the nature of labor differs from those under contract in that independent
producers are managing, working, and also have other laborers conducting various tasks. On the
other hand, contract producers of the same size typically are operating with less additional labor
since they likely spend less time in managerial operations and more time in operator labor.
Independent producers also incur various other negotiation costs when marketing hogs.
The marketing process begins with the price negotiation between the producer and buyer.
Independent producers incur costs associated with the chance of default in price agreements, and
the delay between the time the hogs are sold and when payment is received (Hobbs 1997).
2.5.3 Monitoring Costs
Monitoring or enforcement costs arise after a transaction has occurred.

It may be

necessary to monitor the quality of inputs from a supplier or to monitor the behavior of a supplier
(or buyer) to assure that all pre-agreed terms of the transaction are in compliance (Hobbs, 1996
and Cozzarin and Westgren, 2000). The cost of monitoring can be expensive for either contract
or independent producers. The value of the time spent by a producer assuring that the input
quality, production procedures and marketing process meet certain expectations are all
considered monitoring costs. Part of this monitoring cost may be borne through the contractor’s
employment of a field person.
Most contractors operating large hog operations with multiple units have production
procedures that are specified within the contract that must be followed by the contractees. For
instance, there are usually specific rations that should be fed to pigs (Cline et al., 1995). In
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addition, producers must maintain room temperatures, specified levels of cleanliness and
biosecurity. The costs of policing these production sites and evaluating producer performance
can be significant.
For independent producers, monitoring costs begin at the production site and end at the
marketplace. At the production site, independent producers face many of the same monitoring
costs that contractees incur, such as monitoring hired labor, input quality and payment fairness.
According to Hobbs (1997), in cattle production there are other situations that lead to monitoring
costs such as “shrinkage, stress, and exhaustion” in the handling of animals during the exchange
process, which can be minimized if detected. Some independent hog producers experience
similar problems. For instance, a disease outbreak in a production unit can destroy an entire herd
if it is not detected in time. Hence, monitoring the performance and health conditions of hogs
can prove to be vital to the success of independent producers.
2.5.5 What Is Missing in Economic Models?
Economists often conduct market analyses based on demand and supply concepts. For
these constructs, determinants of demand and supply of goods and services are often specified as
given. However, Neoclassical models often leave out factors, such as bounded rationality and
social capital that could possibly have tremendous effects on the endogenous variable(s). The
propensity of economists to use ‘ceteris paribus0’ (all other things remaining equal) qualifies
them to make predictions given the stated exogenous variables. However, when conducting
these analyses, statistical programs are able to identify the incompleteness or inaccuracy of
models given the size of their error terms. So, the question arises; what are the missing factors or
variables that are common across social and economic interactions and transactions that could
improve economists’ ability to better understand consumer/producers’ behavior? One of the
dilemmas economists face when examining economic problems is that of “bounded rationality”,
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which is to say information is incomplete (Simon, 1978). Complete information or unbounded
rationality is impossible for humans to obtain. Bounded rationality exists when hog producers
do not have complete information or complete knowledge about available contracts offered by
vertically integrated or vertically coordinated firms, market hog prices, feed prices or leanvalues. The lack of complete information creates opportunities for exploitation. On the other
hand, asymmetric information, which is not complete information, is advantageous to the
exploiting party in that it can give rise to opportunistic behaviors.

Producers who have

asymmetric information are privileged to better contracts, higher hog prices and lower
transaction costs, relative to those who do not have asymmetric information.
Another factor that some economists have failed to consider to narrow the margin of error
in their analyses is social capital.

Human interactions and relationships with one another

influence the flow of resources from one hand to the next. This was recognized by Adam Smith
(1759) who noted that preferences are “interpersonally dependent,” but vary “according to the
strength of the relationship” (Robison, 1996). “Every man feels his own pleasures and his own
pains more sensibly than those of other people… After himself, the members of his family, those
who usually live in the same house with him, his parents, his children, his brothers and sisters,
are naturally the objects of his warmest affection” (Robison, p.321). What this implies is that
people respond or express different feelings for family members, friends, associates, and
members of organizations. This leads us into defining social capital. “Social capital is a
person’s or group’s sympathy or sense of obligation toward another person or group that may
produce a potential benefit, advantage, and preferential treatment for others beyond what might
be expected in an exchange relationship” (Robison, Schmid, and Siles, 1999).
Studies support the idea that relationships matter in the aggregate as well as at the
individual level.

Some economists agree that relationships matter, but none feel they are
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unimportant (Hirshliefer, 1994, and Gardner, 1995). Economists who share these same feelings
also “believe that we can continue business as usual with selfish preferences as the foundation
for our models” (Hirshliefer, 1994, and Gardner, 1995). Social capital is important because it
determines the way goods and services are allocated, consumed and purchased. People who
have businesses and trade with family members, friends, associates and members of
organizations, sometimes show favoritism or preferential treatment toward people with whom
they have an established relationship. An example of this phenomenon is a farmer who goes to a
bank to obtain a loan to purchase a new tractor. At this bank, the loan officer is his neighbor and
friend. Through his or her relationship with the loan officer, the individual receives the loan at
the lowest possible interest rate with less regard to the farmer’s qualifications. In some sense,
the farmer’s relationship with the loan officer acts as collateral. Another example of social
capital is a trading relationship between a hog farmer and feed supplier. The farmer and feed
supplier have been trading for several years and, through this interaction, they have become close
acquaintances. The benefits of this relationship are at least twofold. For the farmer, he or she
can anticipate a fair price for feed, while the feed supplier can expect continuous patronage from
the farmer. As the level of trust between the two persons continues to grow, the farmer may
receive discounts or benefits that exceed his or her perceived costs.
“Whenever the relationship or social capital between individuals is being considered, it is
assumed that there is a level of mutual respect, concern, sympathy or feelings toward one
another” (Robison, Myers and Siles, 1999). In other words, there is a balance. This assumption
enables one to eliminate opportunistic behaviors. Hence, relationships that involve individuals
who have greater feelings or concerns for other persons that are not reciprocated can be
exploitive in nature (Robison, Myers and Siles, 1999). A symmetric relationship in nature is also
a mutually beneficial relationship (Robison, Myers and Siles, 1999). Such conditions lay out the
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foundation on which social capital is established and discussed within this study with respect to
business arrangement choice.
2.6 Social Capital
2.6.1 How Is Social Capital Created?
There are specific resources that are used to build social capital. These resources are
discussed by Peterson, Robison, and Siles. They postulate that trust, reputation, and identity
create three types of social capital: direct, indirect and identity-based social capital (Peterson,
Robison, and Siles, 1999).
Direct social capital is believed to be obtained through repeated transactions between
exchange partners (Peterson, Robison, and Siles, 1999). As these transactions take place, a level
of trust is established between exchange partners through consistency. All relationships are
founded on some level of trust. Friendships, boyfriends, girlfriends, and marriages are based on
some level of trust that is shown through commitments, responsibilities, respect, loyalty and
sympathy. This confidence that is displayed in members of a relationship gives rise to social
capital.

Common kernels contribute to social capital because their similarities create

comfortable environments for communication, interactions, and transactions (Robison, 1999).
Indirect social capital is built upon reputations established with individuals that share
direct social capital (Peterson, Robison, and Siles, 1999).

Reputations are derived from

consistency and reliability of transactions between individuals. A person’s ability to consistently
deliver goods or services as promised helps foster new relationships with other individuals. For
example, a truck driver who picks up and delivers hogs to market safely every week develops a
reputation for his reliability. Producers who receive this service tell others of his reliability and
the truck driver’s clientele increases.
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Identity-based social capital is a short-term acquaintanceship that is based on association
or affiliation but requires reinforcement to establish a trusting relationship (Peterson, Robison,
and Siles, 1999). The association that initiates the acquaintance between the two can be as
fundamental as an inherited trait or characteristic such as one’s gender, age, ethnic background,
nationality, values acquired from parents and other resources inherited as a result of the
conditions of one’s birth (Robison, 1999). As this commonality unites the two to bring about
interactions, as well as transactions, the trading between the two is only temporary.

A more

sound relationship that is based on consistency, loyalty and reliability is warranted in order to
maintain continued transactions (Peterson, Robison, and Siles, 1999). If the relationship is not
nourished through trust, then the acquaintanceship will soon be terminated. An illustration of
identity-based social capital is the following. Suppose your best friend Farmer Brown and his
young son were shopping in your farm supply store and one of the salesmen recognizes the
father and son. The father has purchased items from the store on numerous occasions in the past.
Given the father’s reputation, the son also receives preferential treatment, although he has not
reached the age to establish a reputation of his own. However, if the son does not prove himself
worthy of the special treatment that has been granted to him based on his father’s merits, his
privileges will eventually be taken away.
Robison and Siles (1998) posed a question, “What can organizations achieve that lack
social capital. Can people successfully pursue their economic needs without social capital? The
answer is probably no, unless the other needs are being met in other organizations” (Robison and
Siles, 1998). A continuous flow of transactions that generates economic activity is expected to
occur, many of which are created through some form of association or affiliation between the
buyer and the seller. However, the purpose of theoretical economics is to explain why they are
socially attractive (Robison and Siles, 1998).
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2.6.2 What Impact Does Social Capital Have upon the Economy?
Social capital is a phenomenon that can influence the flow of goods and services
(Robison, 1999). Just as good credit to a loan officer, and good grades and work experiences to
an potential employer are used to evaluate one’s eligibility for loans or jobs, the status of one’s
relationship is also used to the determine the magnitude of the treatment received by an
individual. The special privileges people receive through a shared sympathetic and committed
relationship have not been fully identified (Robison, 1999). It is believed that social capital
separates and distinguishes one consumer from another, but there is no known terminology
explained in economic literature that identifies the type of financial incentive it provides. The
financial incentive associated with social capital is similar to some form of price discrimination,
in that the price an individual pays is discounted, because of his or her social relationship with
the owner of the merchandise. For example, the price a father or faithful customer pays for a
tractor purchased from a farm tractor dealership in which a son or trusted friend works may be
discounted and sold at a lower price, due to the existing relationship between the buyer and
seller.
There are three forms of price discrimination. First degree price discrimination is “a
practice in which the seller is able to sell each successive unit of product at the maximum price
that any buyer is willing to pay” (Eckert and Leftwich, 1988: p. 635). Second degree price
discrimination is a “practice in which the seller is able to sell blocks of output, charging the
maximum possible price for each block and selling additional blocks at successively lower
prices” (Eckert and Leftwich, 1988: p. 635). Third degree price discrimination is a “practice in
which the seller charges different prices in different markets for a product not accounted for by
variations in production or selling costs but based primarily on differences in demand elasticities
and prevention of resale among the markets” (Eckert and Leftwich, 1988: p. 635). A fourth
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degree of price discrimination is warranted to account for the financial deduction received
through social capital. It is true that social capital does not involve direct institutional regulated
discounts, but different prices for the same goods and services are charged to different
customers. In other words, the price, quantity, and quality of goods and services for sale have
little to do with the discounted price received. The deciding factor for preferential treatment is
based upon social capital or the buyer’s social relationship with the seller.
2.6.3 How Might One Measure Social Capital?
Now that social capital has been defined and its effects are properly identified, one may
wonder how social capital is measured. One way to perform this task is to design a study
eliciting information about people’s relationships with other people, businesses, and
organizations. Robison, Myers and Siles (1999) conducted a study examining the percentage of
farmland purchases from sellers whom the buyer viewed as a friendly (unfriendly) neighbor,
complete stranger, relative, influential person or legal entity. They conducted a survey of 1500
farm owner-operators located in Illinois, Michigan, and Nebraska. This study was designed to
determine the influence of relationships on the selection of trading partners and terms of trade for
farmland exchanges. The lowest price farm owner-operators were willing to accept “from their
friendly neighbors” was $1,664.77 (Robison, Myers and Siles, 1999). Respondents were willing
to accept $1,686.45 from friendly neighbors as well. Influential individuals received a higher
minimum-selling price than did strangers, $1,876.63. In drawing a distinction, results indicated
that unfriendly neighbors received the highest minimum-selling price ($2,114.81), which
increases the possibility of a sale not being made between sellers and friendly neighbors
(Robison, Myers and Siles, 1999).
Robison (1996) also conducted another study examining the response of college seniors
in Agricultural and Natural Resources to a hypothetical prisoners of war problem. The surveyees
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were assumed to be prisoners of war with no knowledge of when or if they would be released.
The food was tasteless. One day the prisoners were given Hershey candy bars and were told that
they may do whatever they wanted with them. The surveyees were asked how many candy bars
they would consume and how they would share with other prisoners.

Assuming that all

respondents had the same Cobb-Douglas function, the own consumption coefficient was the
largest followed by sharing, promise keeper (together), and goodwill. Of all the possible
outcomes, the most significant correlation was found between own consumption and promise
keepers. The more candy bars the prisoner consumes, the less likely he or she will keep
promises (Robison, 1996).
Some of the business transactions and neighborly interactions that are highlighted in this
study are neighboring farmers, lending institutions, feed merchants (grain supplier), packers
and/or slaughter houses, veterinarians, and neighbors that are non-farmers. (See Appendix D, for
the survey questions asked concerning social capital.)
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
The following chapter expounds upon the concepts and principles of economic and
choice theories. Consumers and producers are guided by some form of maximization theory,
whether it is utility, profit or welfare. This chapter discusses the neoclassical theory of choice,
the utility function, qualitative choice models and their estimation, design of the survey, and
hypotheses testing procedures.
3.2 Neoclassical Theory of Choice and Preferences
Adam Smith (1776) defines economics as “the” theory of choice. The choices humans
make may be pleasant or dismal, but the aspect of choice is asserted to be pervasive. Decisions,
i.e., choices, are a consequence of the scarcity of goods and services. However, without scarcity,
whatever social science might exist would be vastly different than the present variety. Scarcity,
in turn, depends upon postulates about individual preferences, in particular that people prefer
more goods to less. If such were not the case, then goods, though limited in supply, would not
necessarily be scarce. Therefore, the fundamental conceptualization of the determinants of
choice upon which the neoclassical, or marginalist, paradigm is based begins with individual
preference.
Why does a consumer prefer good “A” over good “B” and not good “B” over good “A”?
The foundation on which the theory of choice stands is sustained and supported by properties
that are rational and exhibit normal behavior. Rational or normal behavioral properties are
guiding principals that are experientially proven through human interactions, whether they are
viewed individually, socially or economically. In addition to individual preferences, there are
other properties or axioms that guide economic theory. The axioms that justify consumer
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preferences are completeness, reflexivity, transitivity, continuity and strong monotonicity
(Varian, 1992).
The axiom of completeness implies that it is possible to compare any two bundles.
Assume that a consumer has a choice between any c–bundle and any d–bundle. Also, assume
that (c1,c2)è (d1,d2), or (d1,d2)è (c1,c2) or both (Varian, 1992). Given this scenario, the consumer
will make a decision based on the two bundles or act indifferently between the two bundles. The
second axiom, reflexivity, implies that any bundle is just as good as itself: (c1,c2)è (c1,c2)
(Varian, 1992). Reflexivity may be viewed as trivial because any bundle is just as good as an
identical bundle. That is, homogenous goods with similar attributes are preferred or indifferent
to themselves.
The third axiom, transitivity, assumes that if (c1,c2)è (d1,d2) and (d1,d2)è (g1,g2), then
(c1,c2)è (g1,g2) (Varian, 1992). In other words, if a person believes that C is at least as good as D
and that D is at least good as G, then that person also believes that C is at least as good as G
(Varian, 1992). For most people, transitivity is more cumbersome. It is not certain whether
transitivity of preferences is an important property that preferences must have. From a logical
perspective, there is not a compelling reason as to why preferences have to be transitive. In fact,
transitivity is viewed more as “a hypothesis about people’s choice behavior, not a statement of
pure logic” (Varian, 1993: p. 36).
The fourth axiom, continuity, states that for all d in C, the set {c:cèd} and {c:cîd} are
closed sets. In other words, if d is strictly preferred to g and if c is a bundle that is close enough
to d, then c must be strictly preferred to g (Varian, 1992).
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The last and final axiom is strong monotonicity. Strong monotonicity implies that if c ≥
d and c ≠ d, then c d (Varian, 1992). This axiom means that more of any good is strictly better.
That is, all goods under observation are good or desirable.
Assuming that these axioms exist, there is said to be a continuous utility function that
represents a consumer’s preferences.

By specifying the above axioms, it can be better

understood how to analyze choices through utility functions.
3.3 The Utility Function and Utility Maximization
A utility function enables one to identify all possible consumption bundles arranged in an
order such that more preferred bundles get assigned higher values than the less preferred bundles
(Varian, 1993). That is, a bundle (c1,c2) is preferred to a bundle (d1,d2) if and only if the utility
of (c1,c2) is larger than the utility of (d1,d2): in symbols, (c1,c2)

(d1,d2) if and only if u(c1,c2) >

u(d1,d2) (Varian, 1993).
From a neoclassical perspective, utility is ordinal. That is, utility is not quantifiable. It is
used only to rank the different consumption bundles in some orderly fashion. In other words,
one person’s utility cannot be compared to another person’s utility by assigning numbers to
bundles of goods. The primary concept on which emphasis is placed, is that more of a good is
preferred to less. Because consumers prefer more to less, whether it is in terms of quality or
quantity, non-satiation is perhaps the most essential property when ordering and ranking utility
functions (Varian, 1993).
In keeping with the non-satiation property, it is assumed that consumers strive to get the
most satisfaction they can out of the various goods and services purchased and consumed.

An

optimal utility solution U*(p1,p2,M) maximizes an individual’s utility given two prices and
income. The quantities x1 and x2 are used to “maximize utility subject to the budget constraint”
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(Silberberg, 1990: p. 310). The behavioral assertion is that a consumer engages in constrained
maximizing behavior such that desirable alternatives are those that satisfy the individual’s
constraints. However, given that we live in a world of scarcity, consumers are faced with
making choices concerning the levels of consumption they will undertake (Silberberg, 1990).
Assuming the consumer is rational, the intricate calculations will be made regardless of scarce
resources to achieve a maximum of utility.
In summary, it has been shown in the last three subsections that the choices of a rational
consumer are rooted in his or her preferences, which are supported by specific axioms that give
rise to a utility function, capturing the individual’s personal desires. Given the postulated utility
function, consumers seek to maximize their levels of satisfaction. Using these same fundamental
principles, the next section identifies and discusses choice models appropriate for analyses of
alternative dependent variables.
3.4 Choice Models
This study utilizes a polychotomous choice framework to determine the factors that
influence producers’ decisions for accepting certain business arrangements (BA). An empirical
multinomial logit (MNL) model is used to analyze the choice of alternative BAs. According to
Maddala (1997), the MNL model was originally derived from the Luce model. Luce (1959)
derived the model given by Equation 3.4.1 starting from the independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA) axiom on the choice probabilities.

prob(Yi = 1| X ) =

evi

∑

m

e
j =1

(3.4.1)

vj

The Luce model is associated with this property because the odds ratio for the ith and jth choices
is exp(Vi)/exp(Vj), where V=bX, which is the same irrespective of the total number m of choices
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considered.

The property of the IIA axiom exists when probabilities are not equally shared for

two or more alternatives that are close substitutes (Kennedy, 1998). In 1974, McFadden updated
the model, which became known as the multinomial logit (MNL) model. As a special case of the
Luce model, the multinomial logit model also has the property of the IIA axiom on the choice
probabilities.

Logit models can be expressed as having dichotomous or polychotomous

variables. Dichotomous or binary models give the option of choosing one of two alternatives.
Polychotomous models such as the multinomial logit consist of many alternative choices, of
which one is chosen (Kennedy, 1998).
The multinomial logit model is derived from a random utility function. Utility Uij is
−

derived by the ith individual from the jth choice. This can be written as: Uij = U ij + eij = xij$ +
eij where Uij is the average utility, eij is a random error, xij is the set of explanatory variables, and

$ is a vector of unknown parameters (Judge et al., 1985). For this utility function, eij is a random
variable that is independently and identically distributed with a Weibull density function. The
model assumes the choice probabilities are dependent on individual characteristics (Maddala,
1997). The multinomial logit model has been used to study choice of transportation modes
(Theil, 1969), automobiles (Cragg and Uhler, 1970), the determinants of occupational choice
(Schmidt and Strauss, 1975b), factors influencing technology adoption (Caffey and Kazmierczak
1994), whether part-time farming is a step in the way out of agriculture (Kimhi, 2000) and
others. In this study, the probability associated with the individual’s adoption of the business
arrangement is assumed to follow an underlying logistic distribution and can be described as
(Greene, 1997):

e βi X i
/

Pij =

m− 1

1+ ∑ e

βi/ X i

j = 1,2,...., m − 1

(3.4.2)

k =1
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where Pij represents the probability that Y=j, for j=1,2,...m, m is the number of choices, X
represents the set of characteristics for individual i, and β is a set of estimated parameters that
describe the influence of X on the probability of preferring a given item.
The Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumptions associated with MNL
become problematic because they impose the restriction that cross-price elasticities are the same
across alternatives. As a solution, McFadden (1981) proposes the Nested Multinomial Logit
(NMNL) model, which is a computationally feasible generalization of the MLN model. The
NMNL model relaxes the homoscedasticity assumption in the conditional logit model that also
provides an intuitively appealing structure to group the alternatives into subgroups.

The

subgroups allow the variance to differ across the groups while maintaining the IIA assumption
within the groups.
3.5 Binominal Logit
While the MNL model is used to analyze producers’ choice of business arrangements
from a more general prospective, the binomial logit model is employed to identify specific
characteristics associated with production contracts. Flat-fee and incentive payment contracts
had to be analyzed separately from business arrangements as a whole in order to capture the
influence of certain contract-specific variables on the selection among production contracts.
Binary choice models are used when decisions of individuals involve two alternatives,
where only one is chosen. The binomial logit model has been used in such studies as applying
marketing channel theory to food marketing in developing countries (Dijkstra and Meulenbery,
2001), determining the effect of strawberry density on the spread of anthracnose caused by
colletotrichum actatum (Madden and Boudreau, 1997), estimating densities of grasshopper
assemblages (Legg et al., 1993), analyzing spring and summer infestations of the Russian wheat
aphid (Legg et al., 1992) and many others. The binary choice of the ith individual is conveniently
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represented by a random variable yi that takes the value 1 if one choice is made and 0 if the other
choice is made. If Pi is the probability that yi takes the value 1, then 1-Pi is the probability that yi
is 0. This can be summarized by writing the probability function for yi as:
f(y i ) = Piy i (1 − Pi )1− y i

y i = 0, 1

(3.5.1)

Economists are typically interested in examining the factors that affect the choice probability Pi.
The average utility derived from a choice by an individual is based on the attributes of the
choice, which are specific to the individual. By taking the utility derived from the choices as the
average utility plus a random disturbance, we have:
−

U i 0 = U ij + ei 0 = Zi′0δ + Wiγ′ 0 + ei 0

(3.5.2)

−

U i1 = U i 1 + ei 1 = Zi′1δ + Wiγ′ 1 + ei1 .

(3.5.3)
−

−

where Ui0 and Ui1 are the utilities of the two choices, U i 0 and U i1 are the average utilities, Zi0′ and
Zi1′ are vectors of characteristics of the alternatives, as perceived by individual i, Wi ′ is a vector of

contract production characteristics of the ith individual, and ei 0 and ei1 are random disturbances
(Judge et al, 1988). Suppose utilities Ui0 and Ui1 are random. The ith individual will choose
alternative one only if Ui1 > Ui0 or if the observable, or latent, random variable
yi* = U i 1 − U i 0 > 0. Values of the observable random variable yi are expressed as:
 1 if yi* > 0
yi = 
*
 0 if yi ≤ 0

(3.5.4)

The probability that yi =1 is Pi = Pr[ yi = 1] = Pr[ yi* > 0] = Pr[ei* > xi′ β ] (Judge et al, 1988: p.
787). To make the model complete, a logistic probability distribution is chosen for disturbance
terms ei* .

The cumulative density function (CDF) of the logistic random variable is

48

F (t ) = 1 / [1 + exp( − t )] (Judge et al, 1988: p. 787). The logistic distribution closely approximates

the normal distribution. Both distributions are symmetric with zero means.
3.6 Marginal Effects
The marginal effects (marginal probabilities) are calculated for the choice of alternative
business arrangements. In the multinomial logit model, the coefficients for β are not directly tied
to the marginal effects (Greene, 2000). From Equation 3.6.1, we can express the marginal
effects of the attributes on the probabilities as such:

δj =

∂Pj

m −1


= P  β j − ∑ Pk β k  = Pj  β j − β  .
∂X k


k =1

(3.6.1)

Each subvector of β is taken into consideration in every marginal effect by way of
probability and weighted average that exists in *j (Greene, 1997). These can be calculated using
the parameter estimates. Equations 3.6.1 could possibly cause some confusion, although the
usual focus is on the coefficient estimates. “Note, for example, that for any particular Xk , MPj/
MXk need not have the same sign as $jk” (Greene, 1997: p. 916).

The Delta method is used to compute the standard errors for functions of parameters
obtained by the standard estimator. To test the null hypothesis, Ho: *j = 0, the t-statistic (3.6.2)
is used, which follows an asymptotically standard normal distribution (Greene, 1997) and is
given by

δ$
.
t=
se(δ$)

(3.6.2)

The asymptotic standard error of δˆ j is given by the root square of the asymptotic variance,

 ∂δ 
 ∂δ 
Asy.Var (δ j ) = ∑ ∑  j  * Asy.Cor [ β l , β m ]  j  ,
 ∂β l 
 ∂β m 
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(3.6.3)

where

∂δ j
= [1( j = l ) − ρ l ][ ρ j I − δ j X ] − ρ j [δ j X ′ ] with a vector with entries equal to 1 if j = l,
∂ βl

and zero if not (Greene, 1997).
When analyzing models with discrete dependent variables, the marginal effects are
sometime calculated differently. For the binomial logit model, the two choices are flat-fee
contract (0) or incentive payment contract (1). The predicted probabilities F ( β$ ′x ) = F$ and the
estimated marginal effects F ( β$ ′x ) = F$ multiplied by β$ = f$β$ are nonlinear functions of the
parameter estimates. To calculate the standard errors, a linear approximation approach (delta
method) is used. The predicted probabilities are,
Asy.Var[ F$ ] = ∂ F$ / ∂ β$]′V [∂ F$ / ∂ β$],

(3.6.4)

where
V = Asy.Var[ β$] .

(3.6.5)

The marginal effects for the binomial logit model are calculated as f$ = Λ$ (1 − Λ$ ) , where the
notation Λ$ represents the logistic cumulative distribution function.
3.7 Multicollinearity Analysis
Because economists are rarely involved in controlled experiments, there are often
concerns surrounding the effects of multicollinearity in their data. Multicollinearity is not a
statistical or econometric problem, but a data problem that violates one of the assumptions of the
Classical Linear Regression (CLR) model, which specifies that there must not be an exact linear
relationship between independent variables (Kennedy, 1998).

The major “consequence of

multicollinearity is that the variances of the OLS estimates of the parameters of the collinear
variables are quite large” (Kennedy, 1998: p.184). If there is high correlation between two
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variables, little variation is unique to each variable, leaving a larger percentage of the variation
common among the two variables (Kennedy, 1998). “This means that the OLS procedure has
little information to use in making its coefficient estimates, just as though it had a very small
sample size, or a sample in which the independent variable did not vary much” (Kennedy, 1998:
p. 185). Having high variance minimizes the accuracy of the parameter estimates, which in turn
makes the hypothesis test groundless.
Multicollinearity problems normally arise when the data that are being analyzed are cross
sectional or panel. Cross sectional or panel data may cause multicollinearity problems for
several reasons other than linear relationships among independent variables. Other possible
reasons cross sectional or panel data may become problematic are: 1) some independent
variables may have varied together because the data were not collected from a wide enough base,
or 2) there could in fact exist some type of approximated value among some of the regressors
(Kennedy, 1998).
3.8 Detecting Multicollinearity
The procedures used in detecting multicollinearity have become quite controversial
among economists. This is believed to have occurred due to the inadequacy of some detection
methods, which are scrutinized justifiably (Kennedy, 1998). The inadequacies of these methods
are centered around their inability to lower the variance of the independent variables. Perhaps
one the most popular ways of detecting multicollinearity is by examining the correlation matrix.
The correlation matrix can be obtained by conducting simple regression analyses where all pairs
of independent variables are compared. A successful analysis of the data reveals correlation
coefficients, which are the off-diagonal elements in the variance co-variance matrix for a given
data set. Multicollinearity is believed to exist whenever the correlation coefficients have values
of 0.8 or greater (Kennedy, 1998). A value of 0.8 or greater indicates that the two independent
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variables are highly correlated with one other. Alternatively, one may use the condition index to
detect multicollinearity. The condition index measures “the square root of the ratio of the largest
to the smallest characteristic root of X`X” (Kennedy, 1998: p. 187). Any number greater than
20 gives indications of possible collinearity problems (Greene, 2000). Another way of detecting
multicollinearity is by calculating the inverse of the correlation matrix (Kennedy, 1998). The
inverse correlation matrix gives us the variance inflation factor (VIF), which is represented by
the diagonal elements of this matrix. If the Ri2 is near unity, the VIF is high, which indicates
that there are collinearity problems (Kennedy, 1998). Collinearity is believed to be harmful
when VIFi is greater than 10 (Kennedy, 1998).
3.9 Testing for Heteroskedasticity
Given the nature of the survey data (cross-sectional), possible heteroskedasticity
problems become a normal concern when testing model significance. Heteroskedasticity is an
econometric problem that exists when the variances in the variance/covariance matrix are not
constant (Judge et al, 1988). In testing for the significance of the model, the null hypothesis and
alternative hypothesis are as such:
H0: β 1 = β 2 = β 3 =…….= β n = 0
HA: at least one ≠ 0
where βs represent the variances in the null hypothesis. If the null hypothesis (H0) is not
rejected, there is not sufficient evidence to suggest that heteroskedasticity exists, but if the
alternative hypothesis (HA) is not rejected, heteroskedasticity exists.
One method of testing for inconsistence of variances in the variance-covariance matrix is
by way of the multiplicative heteroskedasticity model.

Similar to the above test, the

multiplicative heteroskedasticity model tests “the null hypothesis H0:α* = 0 against the
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alternative hypothesis H1:α* ≠ 0” (Judge et al, 1988: p. 370).
heteroskedasticity model utilizes an estimator α$ = (ZZ)-1Zq, where

a

The multiplicative
is the estimator, Z =

(z1z2…zT), and the matrix (ZZ)-1 represents D (the unknown covariance matrix) (Judge et al,
1988). In the (ZZ)-1 matrix the first row and first column are deleted. Then, from
T (α$ − α + 12704
.
d )  → N (0,4.9348Σ −zz1 ) ,

(3.9.1)

α$ * ~ N [α *,4.9348 D]

(3.9.2)

d

and
(α$ − α *) ′ D −1 (α$ − α *)
~ χ S2−1
4.9348

(3.9.3)

hold approximately. Given the null hypothesis α* = 0, Equation 3.9.3breaks down to
(α$ * ′ D − 1α$*) / 4.9348 . To test for heterosckedasticity, the multiplicative model computes this

value and evaluates it based on the χ 2 distribution (Judge et al, 1988).
The final model that may be used is the Heteroskedasticity Extreme Value Logit (HEVL).
HEVL is also a constructive method that is not frequently used but is recommended by
Munizaga et al., (2000) and Greene (2000) for correcting heteroskedasticity between options. In
order to account for heteroskedasticity between options, HEVL assumes that the error terms are
mutually independent extreme value distributed but are allowed to have differing variances. The
choice probabilities are given by (Munizaga et al., 2000):
 Vi − V j + θ iw 
∏ Λ
 λ ( w)dw,
θ
j ∈Cn j ≠ i 

j
w = −∞

∞

Pi =

∫

(3.9.4

−1

−t

where λ (t ) = e − t e − e , V j = nonstochastic part, θ j = scale parameters and Λ (t ) = e − t e − e .
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When testing for the two heteroskedasticity problems, Munizaga et al. 2000, found that
Multinomial Probit (MNP) and the HEVL were the theoretically correct models that showed
better results than the other observed models. The HEVL model “recovered accurately the target
parameter values and performed satisfactorily in terms of the response analysis” (Munizaga et
al., 2000).
3.10 Measuring Goodness-of-Fit
“A goodness-of-fit measure is a summary statistic indicating the accuracy with which a
model approximates the observed data” (Maddala, 1997: p. 37). There are many ways to
measure the goodness-of-fit for a particular model. For linear regression models, one of the most
frequently used methods is the R2. However, for logit models, goodness-of-fit can be measured
by computing the direct R2 or the pseudo R2 from the likelihood-ratio test (Maddala, 1997). As
we consider the goodness-of-fit for limited dependent variable models, the R2 criterion does not
satisfy specific properties of economic theory. The results indicate that the β coefficients are
inconsistent and the parameters are meaningless.

However, hope of finding a legitimate

goodness-of-fit criterion was given through the ingenuity of Cragg and Uhler (1970) and
McFadden (1974) in creating the pseudo-R2. This criterion can be illustrated by defining R2 in
relation to the likelihood ratio statistic.
L 
“ R = 1−  ω 
 LΩ 
2

Suppose we have the goodness-of-fit measure

2/n

where n is the number of observations, LΩ is the maximum of the likelihood

function when maximized with respect to all parameters β j and Lω is the maximum when
maximized with respect to the constant term αj only” (McFadden, 1998: p. 39).

When

considering this goodness-of-fit in the logit model, “even though R2 → 0 as LΩ → Lω, the upper
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bound is much less than 1” (McFadden, 1998: p. 39). Pseudo-R2 is believed to be a better
measure. Cragg and Uhler (1970) define pseudo-R2 as
pseudo − R 2 =

1 − ( Lω / LΩ ) 2/ n
L2Ω/ n − Lω2/ n
=
1 − ( Lω / Lmax ) 2/ n
1 − Lω2/ n

(3.10.1)

nj

n 
where Lω = ∏  j  , Lmax = 1, and LΩ is the same as defined above (Cragg and Uhler, 1970).
j =1  n 
m

The Cragg and Uhler method is ideal because it allows the upper bound on pseudo-R2 to be one.
Thus, as a measuring criteria for goodness-of-fit, one can now make the assumption that the
larger the pseudo-R2, the better the fit of the model.
3.11 T-Test of Different Population Sizes
Before conducting the multinomial logit or binomial logit analysis, it is useful to test for
the differences between the dependent variables for each independent variable. Suppose we
were given two populations with means µ1 and µ2. Now assume that we have independent
random samples of size n1 and n2 for which the sample means x1 and x 2 and s12 and s22 variance
n1

s12 =

t=

∑ (x
i =1

i

− x2 )

n2

2

and

n1 − 1

s22 =

∑ (x
i =1

i

− x2 ) 2

n2 − 1

( x1 − x2 − ( µ 1 − µ 2 )
s
s 
 + 
 n1 n2 
2
1

2
2

(3.11.1)

(3.11.2)

1
2

are calculated (Kanji, 1993). The test statistic in Equation 3.11.2 may be compared with the
Student’s t-distribution with degrees of freedom (Kanji, 1993: p.29) given by
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2


 s12 s22 


 + 


 n1 n2 
v= 
 − 2.
4
4
s1
s2


+
 n12 (n1 + 1) n22 ( n2 + 1) 



(3.11.3)

The interpretation of this t-test is as follows: if the critical value associated with degrees of
freedom is less than the Student’s t-distribution, then the hypothesis that the two population
means are equal is rejected. If the contrary is true, then there is no significant difference between
the two population means.
3.12 Survey Design and Implementation
3.12.1 Mailing the Survey
A national survey was conducted during the summer and fall of 2000 to provide data for
this study. Approximately 4,986 surveys were mailed with a response rate of 21% (1,030). The
producers surveyed were taken from a random sample of National Hog Producer magazine
subscribers. Sufficient numbers of respondents for each business arrangement were represented
in the data sample. As shown in Table 2, a stratified sample of U.S. hog producers was used,
more specifically, 831 producers in each of the following hog inventory categories: 200-999
hogs, 1,000-1,999 hogs, 2,000-2,999 hogs, 3,000-4,999 hogs, 5,000-9,999 hogs, and 10,000 hogs
and over. The U.S. Department of Agriculture reports that in 1999, 52,730 producers had 1-99
hogs, 32,105 had 100-999 hogs, 6,500 had 1,000-1,999 hogs, 5,120 had 2,000-4,999 hogs, and
2,005 had over 5,000 head in inventory. Thus, our group has a higher percentage of the larger
producers than the general hog producer population.
The producers surveyed were asked a series of questions. The survey was divided into
five sections. Section I of the survey attempts to capture the production characteristics of U.S.
hog farmers. The purpose of this section is to determine the size of the farmer’s hog operation
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and farm (in terms of the number of acres), types of labor, as well as the different modern
technologies incorporated within the production and marketing process.
Section II was designed to elicit farmers’ levels of and preferences for autonomy. The
ability to make production and marketing decisions are authoritative powers that are important to
some farmers, and less important to others. This section is used to determine the decisionmaking power exercised by farmers. More specifically, it is of interest to know the inputs and
marketing decisions farmers are more likely and less likely to allow contractors to control.
Table 3.1: Farm Size Categories Surveyed.
________________________________________________________
Size Category
Number of Names Requested
________________________________________________________
10,000+
831
5,000 -- 9,999
831
3,000 -- 4,999
831
2,000 -- 2,999
831
1,000 -- 1,999
831
200 -- 999
831
________________________________________________________
Total
4,986
________________________________________________________
Section III was designed to identify the business arrangements and transaction costs that
are common in the hog industry. More specifically, this section determines whether farmers are
independent farmers, cooperative farmers, vertical integrators or contract farmers. If contract
farmers, the type of contract is determined among flat-fee contract, contract with incentive
payments, or tournament contract.
Section IV elicits the socioeconomic characteristics of farmers. This section captures
personal information that may influence farmers in choosing one business arrangement over
another. These questions ascertain information such as age, gender, martial status, education,
family size, household income, race, social relationships, and reasons for farming.
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Section V was designed to elicit the risk preference of each farmer. Given the nature of
hog production, risk will always be a determining factor that farmers use to make production
plans and marketing decisions. The first question allows each farmer to evaluate and define his
or her own risk preference. The second question gives the farmer a hypothetical situation of a
financial investment venture. Farmers are then asked to choose one of the five investment
options.
In our efforts to design a survey that maximizes response rate, a hybrid stemming from
Dillman’s (1978) Total Design Method (TDM) was used. The major strength of the TDM as a
comprehensive system is that it meticulously follows the prescribed procedures that consistently
produce high response rates for most survey populations. The first step to the TDM is to
formulate questions that are interesting to the respondent and provide a cover letter identifying
the purpose of the survey and the types of questions that will be asked. The second step is to
construct the questions so that they are relatively easy to read and answer. Third, the survey
should be printed in booklet format with a topically neutral but interesting cover. The fourth step
is to use a photo reduction of regular-sized type to make pages seem smaller and easier to
complete. The final step is to use four carefully spaced mailings. These mailings must include a
postcard follow-up one week after the original mailing; a replacement questionnaire and cover
letter informing the recipient the questionnaire has not yet been received four weeks after the
original mailing; and a second replacement questionnaire and cover letter seven weeks after the
first mailing.

Some other methods to improve response rates are first class postage, and

monetary awards or gifts as incentives for completing the survey.
The hybrid method used for this study consisted of an initial mailing of the survey
followed by a postcard reminder two weeks later. After the postcard reminder was mailed, a
second mailing of the survey was sent. In keeping with Dillman’s approach, all of the letters
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sent to farmers during the second mailing of the survey were signed personally. Contrary to
Dillman’s approach, all surveys and reminders were mailed out as bulk mail due to financial
constraints. As a gift, a Community tea bag was mailed with each survey in the first mailing.
3.12.2 Data Specification
In order to conduct a thorough analysis, a sufficient number of respondents for each
business arrangement must be represented in the sample data.

It was estimated that

approximately 167 observations of each business arrangement would be received. Of the 167
observations, 140 were expected to be complete, which is enough to properly determine factors
influencing the choice of business arrangement. The expected response rate was 20%, based on
previous similar studies. Thus, approximately 5,000 hog producers were surveyed in order to
obtain the desired sample size of 1,000. Because previous studies (Lawrence et al. 1998 and
Rhodes and Grimes 1994) have shown that larger producers are more likely to be involved in
some form of contractual agreement with vertical integrators or coordinators, the random
stratified sample was designed to represent the farm size categories shown in Table 2. The study
area is the entire United States, thus enabling the examination of a traditional region of
production (Midwest), as well as the newly expanding regions (Southeast and West).
3.12.3 Pilot Study
A pilot study that consisted of two Louisiana hog farmers, two Louisiana State University
faculty and one staff member was conducted to obtain constructive criticism and ways to
improve the survey. The respondents were informed that this was a pilot study and that the
information collected from the survey would to be used for dissertation research. Emphasis was
placed on the importance of their feedback.
The two LSU faculty members did not answer the survey as if they were hog producers,
but were merely asked to comment on the content. The two Louisiana hog producers and the
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LSU swine unit manager were given the survey and a cover letter addressed to them and asked to
complete the survey as if they had received it in the mail. Respondents were also encouraged to
ask questions in relation to any item that appeared on the survey that they did not understand.
Immediately after the respondents finished, their times of completion were recorded and they
were asked a series of questions in reference to their overall perception of the survey. Each
respondent was asked if the survey was attractive and, if they received it in the mail, would they
fill it out. All of the respondents agreed that the survey was attractive and that they would fill it
out if it were received in the mail. Respondents were then asked to rank the clarity of the survey
on a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being extremely clear and 1 being unclear. One of the respondents
ranked the clarity of the survey as a 9, while two gave it a ranking of 8. Likewise, respondents
were asked to rate the quality of the survey on a scale of 1 to 10. To prevent biasing the results,
the respondents were allowed to use their personal definitions of quality in answering this
question. Using the same measure as in the previous question, they rated the quality of the
survey as 8, 9, and 10, respectively. It was also important to know whether any of the questions
offended the respondents. All responded “no” to this question. Finally, the respondents were
asked whether or not they would fill out this survey if it were from another university outside of
the state of Louisiana. The respondents agreed that they would fill out the survey if it were
received from another university outside of Louisiana.
The comments and suggestions received from the respondents were useful in that they
enabled us to add, delete or clarify the questions in our final survey. All information given by
the respondents was thoroughly analyzed for completeness and immediately incorporated into
the study.
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3.13 Theoretical Model
As illustrated in Figure 3.1, the MNL model is a tree-like structure that consists of the
root and four trunks. The business arrangement is expressed as the root, and the choice of
business arrangement (independent, cooperative, flat-fee contract and incentive payment
contracts) as the trunks. The type of contract chosen (flat-fee or incentive payment/tournament)
is estimated using a binominal logit model. Table 3.2 defines each business arrangement.
However, only four of these business arrangements are used in this study, independent
production, cooperative farming, flat-fee contract, and incentive payment contract. One of the
business arrangements, vertical integration, was deleted due to few observations; another
business arrangement, tournament contract, was combined with the incentive payment contract
due to similar characteristics and few tournament contract observations.
The MNL model proposed above can be written under the following general form:
Business Arrangement = f(Farm/Locational Characteristics, Farm Financial
Characteristics, Producer Attitudes, Social Capital, Production
Characteristics).
A more specific theoretical model can be expressed as:
BAMT = f(NGHF, MKTPRICE, TIMEHSYS, CORN, RISKAVER, AUUNOTIMP,
AUERIMP, COMPHS, BACHELO, AGE, TOTALFD, HOG250, SOUTH,
BIOSECUR, HIINCOME, BREEDSOW, HIGHDEBT,
NHWOFFFA,
FCONTRWI, FFLATFEE, VALFAMAS, LENDINST, FEEDMERC,
NEIGFARM)
CONTRACT = f(MOPUNDCO, CONTWNFA, NEWREFAC, NUACRES,
EXRAIHOG).
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Figure 3.1: A Conceptual Model of U.S. Hog Industry Business Arrangements.
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Table 3.2: A Description of the Business Arrangements Analyzed.
_____________________________________________________________________________
Business Arrangement
Description
_________________________________________________________________________________________________
Independent Production
All inputs involved in the production process are owned and
managed by the producer. The producer incurs all risk and
transaction costs through the production and marketing of hogs.
Cooperative Farming

A jointly owned farm enterprise consisting of two or more
farmers who aggregate their resources and expertise to finance,
produce and/or market hogs.

Contract with Incentives

The contractor or integrator provides the producer with inputs
such as feeder pigs, feed, veterinary services and medication,
while the producer supplies the labor, utilities, buildings, and
fuel. This contract includes an incentive-based payment that is
rewarded on the basis of feed efficiency, minimum mortality,
and length of time in grow-out.

Tournament Contract

This agreement is similar to the previous contract in terms of
input supply and incentive criteria; however, this contract differs
in the number of farmers competing for incentive payments,
which varies with performance.

Flat-fee Contract

This contract has the same characteristics as the previous
contract, but it does not include bonus or incentive payments.
The producer is paid a guaranteed piece-rate payment for his/her
services, and at the end of the grow-out period, the contractor
reclaims the hogs.

Vertical Integration

A firm that owns up-and downstream firms and
supplies all inputs for the production of hogs and employs
producers at a wage to manage the unit.
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3.13.1 Exogenous Variables Used in the Multinomial Logit Analysis


Farm/Locational Characteristics

HOG250 = Number of 250 Pound Hogs Sold per Year
HOG250 is measured as a continuous variable. Producers were asked if they raised hogs
to a weight of 200 – 300 pounds for market in 1999 and, if yes, approximately how many?
Technological change has encouraged hog operation expansion. Studies have shown that the
average production costs of larger hog farms is significantly lower than that of small hog farms
(Barkema and Cook, 1993). Some producers seeking an opportunity to expand small hog farms
have turned to contract production since contractual arrangements help producers establish
steady cash flows and obtain loans for expansion. In order to qualify for some production
contracts, the producer must rent or own land for manure application and purchase new or
renovate existing facilities. Some of the facilities recommended or required by contractors are
capable of housing up to 1,100 pigs per unit. It is hypothesized that producers who finish more
hogs will be more likely to adopt contracts than independent or cooperative production.
BREEDSOW = Number of Sows Used in Hog Operation
BREEDSOW is a continuous variable indicating the number of breeding sows used in the
operation. Producers surveyed were asked, “How many breeding sows are used in your hog
operation?” It is hypothesized that producers with more breeding sows are more likely to be
independent or cooperative producers than contract producers.

The reason for this is that

breeding sow operations are specialized, more highly skilled operations that require more
intensive labor than finishing operations.

Given that contractors have no control over the

additional labor force hired to run breeding sow operations, the quality and quantity of pigs
farrowed are subject to vary from one contract producer to the next. This variation has potential
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to reduce the uniformity of animals produced, which in turn affects the value of the hogs. Many
vertically coordinated firms own the farrow to nursey units and contract out the finishing portion.
TOTALFD = Number of Other Farm Enterprises
TOTALFD is measured as a continuous variable. Producers were asked, “What other
type(s) of farm animals and/or crops do you raise”? Producers were asked to identify any other
additional livestock and/or crops they were raising on the farm. Traditionally, producers have
used diversification as a financial risk management tool. The rationale guiding this management
strategy is that more enterprises reduce total income variability.

Today, there remain a

substantial number of producers who utilize this management strategy.

Some producers

supervise all the breeding, gestation, farrowing, weaning, nursing, finishing of hogs, and raising
of other animals, as well as plant, harvest and mill their own feed on one farm. The incentive to
diversify is less for most contract producers since most contracts are set up to reduce price risk to
the producer.

One of the drawbacks of diversified farming is the potential reduction of

production efficiency due to the inability to excel at multiple tasks. Some contractors do not
allow certain types of diversified farming (often due to concerns of disease that can be
transferred among species). As a result of these factors, it is hypothesized that diversified farms
will more likely be managed by independent producers.
CORN = Corn Production
CORN is measured as a dummy variable. Each producer was asked if he or she raised
corn. Corn is the major ingredient in most U.S. hog feed rations, and corn accounts for almost
two-thirds of the costs of hog production (Barkema and Cook, 1993). It is hypothesized that
corn production is more likely to be vertically integrated with independent or cooperative hog
producers than contract producers. Most producers under resource-providing contracts receive
feed and other inputs from the contractor. This provides the contractor the ability to control
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inputs and, ultimately, the type of hog produced. In such cases, feed costs are incurred by the
contractor; thus there is no need to grow corn for hog feed.
FCONTRWI = Incentive Payment Contracts Used in County
FCONTRWI is measured as a dummy variable. Each producer was asked, “What type(s)
of business arrangements are farmers in your county presently producing hogs under”? This
variable seeks to determine the types of hog operations that are presently being used by other hog
producers in the surveyee’s community. It is hypothesized that, in counties with incentive
payment contracts, the producer will be more likely to adopt a contract. The justification for this
hypothesis could conceivably be based on many factors, anti-corporate farming laws being one
of them. Most states that have anti-corporate farming laws do not allow any form of contracting
to coexist with independent or cooperative operations. Agglomeration economies is another
justification. Based on the hypothesis, it is expected that more flat-fee contracts and incentive
payment contracts would congregate in the same communities.

One of the advantages of

economics of agglomeration is lower input, production and marketing costs.

Vertically

coordinated and vertically integrated firms who own or coordinate with up- and down stream
businesses supply inputs and marketing services to growers at lower cost. The costs of these
production inputs and marketing services are lower because the hog production sites are located
within close proximity of feed suppliers, packagers/slaughter houses and contractors, which help
reduce transportation costs, transaction costs and shorten communication gaps.
FFLATFEE = Flat-fee Contracts Used in County
FFLATFEE is measured as a dummy variable. Similar to FCONTRWI, producers were
asked to indicate whether other flat-fee contracts exist within their communities. Using the same
reasoning expressed for the variable FCONTRWI, it is hypothesized that flat-fee contracts are
more likely to exist in communities where there are other flat-fee contracts.
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SOUTH = Hog Production in the South
South is a dummy variable indicating that the farm is located in one of the following 11
states: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, or Virginia. During the past twenty years, hog production in the
Southern region has increased significantly. For instance, in North Carolina, the number of hogs
produced increased from 1.9 million in 1975 to 9.3 million in 1996, an increase of almost 400%
(Hubbell and Welsh, 1998).

Today, North Carolina ranks second in production in the U.S.

Other southern states that have experienced significant expansion include Arkansas, Mississippi,
and Georgia. The growth of hog production in the Southern states has been attributed to
producers’ willingness to accept vertically coordinated and integrated firms since they had little
existing industry that could be threatened by the advent of a new business arrangement. In
addition, it can be attributed to a lack of anti-corporate farming laws in the South. Thus, it is
hypothesized that producers from the Southern U.S. are more likely to be contract producers than
producers in other regions.
TIMEHSYR = Number of Times Hogs are Sold per Year
TIMEHSYR is measured as a continuous variable. Producers were asked how many
times per year they sold hogs at local auctions, packers or slaughter houses. The number of trips
a producer makes to a market to sell his/her hogs or purchase production inputs is directly related
to the cost of production.

The more transactions a producer makes in selling animals or

purchasing production inputs, the higher are his/her transaction costs (Hobbs, 1997). A guiding
criterion for choosing the appropriate business arrangement lies in the number of market
transactions a producer makes. In today’s hog industry, larger independent hog operations are
more likely to conduct more market transactions than smaller ones due to the number of animals
involved and, in the case of farrow-to-finish operations, year-round breeding. However, over the
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past several decades, producers have been able to reduce these transaction costs via contract
production and certain forms of cooperative farming. This is mainly because contractors and
some types of cooperatives absorb or conduct the transaction. Therefore, it is hypothesized that
producers requiring more market transactions are more likely to contract to reduce transaction
costs.
NHWOFFFA = Number of Hours Worked Off-farm
NHWOFFFA is measured as a continuous variable. The producers surveyed were asked
how many hours per week they worked off the farm. An increasing number of U.S. producers
have accepted off-farm jobs to supplement their primary income. However, it is hypothesized
that producers who work fewer hours off farm are more likely to be independent or cooperative
producers, given their production and marketing responsibilities. Since contract producers of the
same size spend less time making production and marketing decisions, they are expected to have
more time to work off-farm.


Farm Financial Characteristics

HIGHDEBT = High Debt
HIGHDEBT is a dummy variable indicating that the farmer’s debt-to-asset ratio is 40
percent or greater. Producers were asked, “What is your debt-to-asset ratio”? One of the
advantages of most production contracts is that some of the inputs are supplied by the contractor.
Inputs (such as feed, animals, veterinary care, and medication) supplied by the contractor enable
producers to reallocate resources toward purchasing other factors of production.

Initial

investment for other factors of production such as farrowing, nursery and finishing facilities may
cost more than $1 million (Hurt, Boehlje, and Hale, 1995). Most contract producers are required
to purchase one or more of these facilities in order to be eligible for a production contract. In
contrast, independent and cooperative producers are responsible for all inputs involved in the
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production hogs; but are under no obligation to purchase new state-of-the-art facilities. Thus, it
is hypothesized that higher debt producers are more likely to be independent or cooperative than
contract producers.
VALFAMAS = High Level of Farm Assets ≥ $1.5 Million
VALFAMAS is a dummy variable that indicates the value of the operator’s total farm
assets is greater than or equal to $1.5 million. Each producer was asked the total value of his or
her farm assets, including land value. For contract eligibility, there are two essential criteria that
many contractors require of potential contractees. The first is the ownership of state-of-the-art
facilities or renovation of old facilities. The second is the ownership or rental of adequate arable
land for manure application. These two resources account for a large proportion of the total farm
assets. Based on these criteria, it is hypothesized that flat-fee or incentive based contracts will
likely have greater total farm assets than independent or cooperative producers.
HIINCOME = Producer’s Net Household Income ≥ $100,000
HIINCOME is measured as a discrete variable. To measure income, each producer was
asked to indicate his or her total net household income for the year 1999. For this study, the
influence of HIINCOME on the choice of business arrangement is indeterminate. However, it
will be used as an exploratory variable in this study.


Producer Attitudes

AUERIMP = Autonomy Is Very Important
AUERIMP is measured as a dummy variable. Some producers have opposed contract
farming due to the amount of control lost in their operations. The ability to make one’s own
production and marketing decisions is of great importance to some producers.

A producer’s

level of autonomy is related to his or her choice of business arrangement. Independent farming
is considered to involve the highest level of autonomy, followed by cooperative farming, and
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contractual arrangements, respectively.

The autonomy of producers was measured by

determining each producer’s preference for making production and marketing decisions. Based
on this information, it is hypothesized that producers who feel that autonomy is very important
will more likely be independent and secondly cooperative producers (Gillespie and Eidman,
1998).
AUNOTIMP =Autonomy Is Not Very Important
AUNOTIMP is measured as a dummy variable.

Hog producers were asked, “how

important is it to you for you to have complete control over all production, marketing, and
management decisions in your hog operation?” The possible responses were “not important”,
and “not very important”. Consistent with AUERIMP, it is hypothesized that autonomy will not
be as important to persons under flat-fee or incentive based contracts as it is to persons involved
in independent or cooperative operations.
BIOSECUR= Rating of Operation Bio-security
BIOSECUR is measured as a continuous variable. Producers were asked to rate their
bio-security system on a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 being the highest level of bio-security and 0
being the lowest. Biosecurity is a level of protection producers have on the farm to prevent
diseases from destroying their herd. Some biosecurity strategies are shower-in, shower-out, airtight rooms, limited access, etc. With a higher rating indicating greater agency costs and a lower
rating indicating a lower agency costs of bio-security, it is hypothesized that producers who rate
their bio-security higher will more likely be involved in contracts or cooperatives, and producers
who rate their bio-security lower will more likely be independent producers. In reference to
contract producers, it is hypothesized that producers operating under incentive contracts will
have higher bio-security than flat-flee contract producers.

There are two rationales guiding

these hypotheses. The first rationale is based on the fact that many contract producers are
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required to upgrade or purchase new facilities that are highly task programmable. Higher task
programmable facilities give rise to uniformity in the quality and quantity of products produced.
However, if bio-security is low, the quality and quantity of hogs produced by higher task
programmable facilities stand the chance of being destroyed by disease outbreaks. Therefore,
high bio-security is a necessary condition for higher task programmable facilities.
MKTPRICE = Frequency of Checking Hog Prices
MKTPRICE is measured as a continuous variable. Producers were asked how regularly
they consulted sources for information on market hog prices and desired leanness/back-fat
values. The possible responses were “never”, “once quarterly”, “once monthly”, “once every
two weeks”, “once a week”, or “two or more times a week”. The cost of obtaining price
information is a transaction cost incurred by a producer who markets his or her own hogs. Hog
prices can vary greatly from month to month. For instance, the U.S. average price for hogs from
mid 1996 to mid 1997 ranged between $50 and $60 per cwt, but dropped as low as $13 in
November, 1998. To measure MKTPRICE, producers were asked the number of times per
month they collect information on market prices for hogs and desired leanness/back-fat values.
It is hypothesized that producers who consult these sources frequently will more likely be
independent or cooperative producers than contract producers. Contract producers are less likely
to consult various sources for price information because the base price, bonus incentive and
quality of animals desired are specified in their contracts.
RISKAVER = Producer Is Risk Averse
RISKAVER is measured as a discrete variable. Because different business arrangements
involve different associated risks, producers are likely to choose among business arrangements
according to their risk attitudes. To measure producers’ risk attitudes, a hypothetical question
used by Fausti and Gillespie was phased as follows:
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“Suppose you have $100,000 to invest. Suppose there are five different options in which you
might invest your money. These options are illustrated below in the chart and table. With the
first option, you are certain to receive $10,000, or a 10% return. Thus, at the end of the year you
will have $100,000 + $10,000 = $110,000. Money in a savings account would be an example of
such an investment. However, you can increase your average net return by increasing the
riskiness of your investment. In Option 2, for instance, you have a 1/3 chance of receiving an
average net return of $10,600. However, with this investment, you increase the riskiness since
you would also have a 1/3 chance of receiving $8,170 and a 1/3 chance of receiving $13,030,
other options involved larger variances in income. Please examine the five options and answer
the following question. Of these investments, which investment would you choose?” A bar
graph and table showing the returns for each choice were provided on the survey form.
The investments were developed so that the selection of one would indicate the decision
maker fell into one of five intervals of the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. These five
intervals were chosen according to a study conducted by Babcock, Choi and Feinerman (1993).
Based on the answer chosen, a producer could be classified as highly risk averse, very risk
averse, moderately risk averse, moderately risk prone or very risk prone. This question was used
by Fausti and Gillespie (2001), in a comparative analysis of risk preference elicitation procedures
using mail survey.

Given its applicability and understandability for most producers, this

question was added to the survey. It is hypothesized that risk averse producers will more likely
accept risk-reducing contracts, while moderately risk prone or highly risk prone producers will
more likely be involved in independent or cooperative production.

One purpose of many

contracts is to reduce both production and price risk. Most contracts offer payment floors and a
constant flow of animals throughout the operations that help stabilize producer income.
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Producers who are not sheltered from production and/or price risk are subject to incur substantial
risk.
LENDINST = Producer’s Relationship with Lending Institutions
LENDINST is measured as a dummy variable.

Producers were asked to rate how

important were their social relationships with lenders. The possible answers to the question were
“not important at all”, “not very important”, “somewhat important” and “very important”. Along
with the competitive nature of the hog industry comes the need for better production facilities
and resources for expansion. To purchase these facilities, producers must have the financial
resources required, and may be required to obtain a loan from a financial institution. In addition
to the basic criteria required by lenders to provide loans, positive relationships with bankers or
loan officers are often considered advantageous. Personal knowledge of an applicant can make a
difference in the loan approval process in cases where the applicant is “marginal.” To measure
the value of social relationships, surveyed producers were asked to rate the importance of their
relationships with lending institutions. It is hypothesized that relationships between loan officers
and independent and cooperative producers are more important than they are between loan
officers and contract producers.

The justification for this hypothesis is twofold.

First,

independent and cooperative producers are more likely to be dependent on lending institutions
for loans to purchase animals, feed, and other inputs that are supplied by many contractors for
contract producers.

Secondly, contract producers may use their contractual agreements as

leverage or payment security. Because independent and cooperative producers cannot guarantee
a steady flow of animals circulating through their hog operations, social capital may become
more important and play a more significant role in the loan officer’s decision to grant the loan.
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FEEDMERC = Producer’s Relationship with Feed Merchants
FEEDMERC is measured as a dummy variable. Producers were asked to rate how
important were their social relationships with feed merchants. The possible answers to the
question were “not important at all”, “not very important”, “somewhat important” and “very
important”. Most independent and cooperative producers rely on feed merchants to supply feed
for their hog operations. Most contract producers are not faced with the problem of providing
feed for their operations, given that most contractual agreements include feed as one of the inputs
supplied by contractors. Thus, development of social capital between the two parties is likely to
be less important. Therefore, it is hypothesized that producers who rate social relationships with
feed merchants higher are more likely to produce under an independent or cooperative
arrangement producers than a contract.
NEIGFARM = Producer’s Relationship with Neighboring Farmers
NEIGFARM is measured as a dummy variable.

Producers were asked to rate the

importance of their social relationships with neighboring farmers. The possible answers to the
question were “not important at all”, “not very important”, “somewhat important” and “very
important”. Producers have historically shared production and marketing information to help aid
new producers and others who were unfamiliar with procedures used for operating new
technologies. This information held substantial economic value, as producers could use it to
increase productivity and, thus, profit. It is hypothesized that there is less need for information
exchange among contract producers than independent or cooperative producers. Production
contracts involve a relationship between the contractor and contractee, where the production and
marketing decisions are shared. In some instances, the contractor determines the technologies to
be used, the type of feed to use, when to market the hogs and where they are to be sold. The
independent producer holds all decision making power, but may benefit economically from
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information from other producers. Hence, it is hypothesized that social capital with neighboring
farmers is likely to be more important to independent and cooperative producers than contract
producers.


Producer Characteristics

AGE = Age of the Producer
AGE is measured as a continuous variable. The age of producers was obtained by simply
asking them their present age. The age of a producer is likely related to his/her willingness to
accept a contract. It is expected that young or beginning producers are more apt to accept
contracts to help establish a steady cash flow and to enhance chances for loan eligibility.
Contracts are likely more appealing to young, beginning producers because less equity capital is
needed to begin producing and most production inputs with the exception of buildings, land,
labor and utility are supplied by the contractor. However, the opposite is true for experienced
producers who are nearing retirement. Older producers are less likely to be concerned with
expanding production and are likely to have developed and adjusted their own production and
management practices. Boehlje (1992) identifies this point as the third stage in the family life
cycle where producers exit and intergenerational transfer of property takes place. Thus, the
likelihood of their producing under a contract is expected to be lower. It is hypothesized that
new and younger producers will more likely be involved in production contracts, while older
producers will more likely be involved in independent and cooperative operations.
BACHELO = Producer Finished a Bachelor’s Degree
BACHELO is measured as a discrete variable. The higher the level of education a
producer has, the greater the probability that he/she will understand and incorporate the
necessary skills to efficiently manage a hog operation. It is hypothesized that producers with
Bachelors degrees are more likely to be independent or cooperative producers than contract
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producers. The rationale guiding this hypothesis is based on the greater responsibilities held by
independent and cooperative producers as compared to those held by contract producers.
Independent and cooperative producers are more likely to make their own production and
marketing decisions, which require certain amounts of financial, marketing, farm, and
managerial knowledge. Many studies have used education as an indicator for management
capabilities (e.g., Cardona 1999, Caffey and Kazmierczak, 1997). In contrast, most contract
producers do not make all of their production and marketing decisions; many are made by the
contractor. Thus, education is less likely to be of importance.
COMPHS = Producer Completed High School
COMPHS is measured as a dummy variable. As discussed in BACHELO, the higher the
level of education a producer has, the greater the probability that he/she will understand and
incorporate the necessary skills to efficiently manage a hog operation. Thus, it is hypothesized
that producers who completed high school are more likely to be independent or cooperative
producers.
3.13.2 Exogenous Variables Used in the Binomial Logit Analysis
MOPUNDCO = Months the Producer Has Raised Hogs Under Contract
MOPUNDCO is measured as a continuous variable.

Producers were asked to indicate

the number of months they have produced hogs under contract. The influence of MOPUNDCO
on the choice of production contracts is indeterminate. The variable is included for exploratory
purposes.
CONTWNFA = Contracts with Neighboring Farmers
CONTWNFA is measured as a dummy variable. Producers surveyed were asked if their
present contract was with a neighboring farmer. Contracts with neighboring farmers are often
short-term agreements. This type of contract exists in situations where one neighbor has an
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overflow of hogs for which he or she does not have space to complete the grow-out; a contract is
offered to a neighboring farmer to raise them. In these situations, the owner of the hogs is likely
to pay the contractee for the space that the animals occupy plus feed costs and any other costs
associated with the grow-out.

Such “farmer-to-farmer” contracts do not normally include

enough producers to involve tournaments and may not include incentive payments to encourage
efficiency.

Thus, it is hypothesized that contracts with neighboring farmers will be more

strongly associated with flat-fee contract producers than incentive contract producers.
NEWREFAC = Purchase New Facilities or Renovate Existing Facilities
NEWREFAC is measured as a dummy variable. Producers surveyed were asked if new
facilities or the renovation of old facilities was a requirement for their contract. Producers were
to answer “yes” or “no” to this question. The influence of new facilities or renovated facilities is
indeterminate. Thus, this variable is included for exploratory purposes.
NUACRES = Number of Total Farm Acres
NUACRES is measured as a continuous variable.

Each producer was asked,

“Approximately how many acres of land were used to support your hog operation”?

An

important requirement for raising hogs commercially is land. The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) requires that all commercial hog producers have sufficient land for manure
management (Spiekerman, 1998). In addition to the EPA requirement, most contract producers
are also required by the contractor to utilize a certain number of acres in their production
process. For instance, Murphy Farms requires its applicants to own or lease a minimum of 320
acres for 3,300 pigs. It is indeterminate the influence that the number of acres will have on the
choice among contracts.
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EXRAIHOG = Producers with Experience Raising Hogs
EXRAIHOG is analyzed as a discrete variable. A survey question asked producers to
indicate whether or not they had experience raising hogs before signing their first production
contract. Growers who are producing hogs under incentive-based contracts are hypothesized to
be people who will more likely have prior experience raising hogs than flat-fee contract
producers.

The rationale for this hypothesis stems from the nature of incentive contracts.

Incentive contracts are competitive and their bonuses are based on production efficiency. In any
given situation, producers try to maximize profits by utilizing their farming expertise or
knowledge of animal husbandry. Producers who are not able to employ these types of skills are
not likely to be as competitive; thus they are hypothesized to be less willing to accept an
incentive-based contract.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The following section presents comparisons of descriptive statistics on survey data for
each business arrangement, in addition to discussing the model results.
4.1 Descriptive Analysis of Survey and Data
During the summer and fall of 2000, two mailings of the U.S. Hog Production survey
(Appendix D) were sent. Four thousand nine hundred and eighty six surveys were mailed in the
first mailing. A postcard was sent after the first survey mailing. A total of 1,031 surveys were
returned completed. Excluding producers who indicated they were no longer in business, the
return rate was 21 percent. To explain producers’ choices of business arrangements, information
was collected on six basic categories: farm characteristics, financial characteristics, producer
attributes, social capital, producer and locational characteristics, and contract characteristics.
Of the 1,031 complete surveys returned, 684 were from independent producers, while 66,
81, 118, 21 and 61 were from cooperative, flat-fee, incentive payment/tournament, vertical
integration and other producers, respectively. For the purpose of this study, vertical integration
and other types of business arrangements are not included in the multinomial logit or binomial
logit model. Reasons for their exclusion are the lack of sufficient observations and the lack of
clearly defined business arrangements.
In addition, for each variable, a statistical analysis was conducted using a t-test for two
population means (where the variances are unknown and unequal) to determine if the means for
all business arrangement combinations (independent versus cooperative, cooperative versus flatfee, flat-fee versus incentive, cooperative versus incentive, independent versus flat-fee, or
independent versus incentive producers) were equal.
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Using a two-tailed t-distribution, the

hypothesis that the means for each business arrangement combination are equal was tested at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels (see Appendix A).
4.2 Farm Characteristics
Producers were asked to indicate the structure of their farm businesses. From Table 4.1,
the percentage of producers who were involved in sole proprietorships was greater for flat-fee
contract producers than it was for independent, cooperative or incentive payment contract
producers.

The mean values were significantly different for independent and cooperative

producers, cooperative and flat-fee contract producers, and cooperative and incentive payment
contract producers. The percentage of producers who were a part of partnerships was greater
among cooperative producers than it was among independent, flat-fee contract or incentive
payment contract producers. Producers who were involved with partnerships were significantly
different for independent and cooperative producers, cooperative and flat-fee contract producers,
and cooperative and incentive payment contract producers.

Incentive payment contract

producers had a larger percentage of family corporations than did producers under other business
arrangements. Independent and cooperative producers as well as cooperative and incentive
payment contract producers had mean values that were significantly different. The percentage of
cooperative producers involved in non-family corporations exceeded that of independent, flat-fee
contract or incentive payment contract producers, but only independent and cooperative
producers’ mean values were significantly different. As expected, producers who operated under
cooperative agreements were highest, percentage wise, among cooperative producers than among
independent, flat-fee contract, or incentive payment contract producers.

Statistically, only

independent and cooperative producers, cooperative and flat-fee contract producers, and
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Exogenous Variables for the Multinomial Logit Model.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Variable
Independent
Cooperative
Flat-fee
Incentive
Production
Member
Contract
Payment Contract
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Farm / Locational Characteristic

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Number----------------------------------------------------------------------Business Structure
- Sole Proprietorship
367.00
17.00
46.00
56.00
- Partnership
127.00
26.00
16.00
22.00
- Family Corporation
162.00
9.00
15.00
31.00
- Non-Family
17.00
7.00
4.00
5.00
- Cooperative
1.00
9.00
0.00
2.00
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage-------------------------------------------------------------------Business Structure
- Sole Proprietorship
54 .00
25.00
56.00
47.00
- Partnership
19.00
38.00
20.00
19.00
- Family Corporation
24.00
13.00
18.00
26.00
- Non-Family
3.00
10.00
5.00
4.00
- Cooperative
0.00
13.00
0.00
2.00
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Average No. of 250 Pound Hogs
Produced per Farm

2,523.00

7,795.00

3,900.00

10,927.00

0.37

0.51

0.84

0.81

263.00

759.00

49.00

297.00

Percentage of Producers Who Have a
Breeding Sow Operation

0.06

0.04

0.04

0.03

Average No. of 50 Pound Feeder Pigs
Produced per Farm

357.00

1,323.00

2,179.00

2,184.00

Percentage of Producers Who Have a
Feeder Pig Operation

0.18

0.32

0.27

0.21

Percentage of Producers Who Have a
Farrow to Finishing Operation

0.58

0.37

0.01

0.03

Percentage of Producers Who Have a
Farrow to Wean Operation

0.15

0.25

0.09

0.16

Number of Enterprises

3.30

2.80

2.60

2.90

26.80

20.80

18.50

19.20

623.00

803.00

497.00

479.00

Percentage of Producers Who Raised
Corn on the Farm

0.87

0.71

0.80

0.65

Percentage of Producers Who Raised
Soybean on the Farm

0.81

0.69

0.75

0.65

Percentage of Producers Who Have a
Finishing Operation
Average No. of Breeding Sows
Used in Operation, per Farm

Average No. of Years Raising Hogs
Average No. of Acres per Farm

Average No. of Technologies and
2.57
3.96
1.98
2.37
Management Practices Adopted
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

(Table Continued)
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_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Variable
Independent
Cooperative
Flat-fee
Incentive
Production
Member
Contract
Payment Contract
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Farm / Locational Characteristic

Percentage of Flat-fee Contracts Used
in the County

0.40

0.49

0.68

0.35

Percentage of Incentive Contracts
in the County

0.37

0.60

0.50

0.81

Percentage of Farms Located in the
Southern U.S.

0.02

0.01

0.13

0.31

No. of Times Hogs Sold per Year

32.00

48.00

19.00

12.00

No. of Hours Worked Off-Farm Weekly

26.00

22.00

33.00

30.00

1.12

3.40

0.79

1.69

No. of Full-Time Workers

No. of Part-Time Workers
0.78
1.17
0.45
0.70
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

(Table Continued)

82

__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Variable
Independent
Cooperative
Flat-fee
Incentive
Production
Member
Contract
Payment Contract
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Farm Financial Characteristics
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Number----------------------------------------------------------------------Debt-to-Asset Ratio
- No Debt
179
7
8
12
- 1 to 20%
136
11
16
24
- 20 to 40%
175
15
19
23
- 40 to 60%
107
17
20
30
- 61% or Greater
35
4
15
14
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage-------------------------------------------------------------------Debt-to-Asset Ratio
- No Debt
28.3
12.9
10.2
11.6
- 1 to 20%
21.5
20.3
20.5
23.3
- 20 to 40%
27.6
27.7
24.3
22.3
- 40 to 60%
16.9
31.4
25.6
29.1
- 61% or Greater
5.5
7.4
19.2
13.6
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Number----------------------------------------------------------------------Total Value of Farm Assets
- $0 - $499,999
166
11
26
32
- $500,000 to $999,999
201
12
23
35
- $1,000,000 to $1,499,999
114
6
10
18
- $1,500,000 to $1,999,999
49
8
8
12
- $2,000,000 to $2,499,999
43
3
5
6
- > $2,500,000
78
21
6
12
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage-------------------------------------------------------------------Total Value of Farm Assets
- $0 - $499,999
25.5
18.0
33.3
31.0
- $500,000 to $999,999
30.8
19.6
29.4
33.9
- $1,000,000 to $1,499,999
17.5
9.8
12.8
17.4
- $1,500,000 to $1,999,999
7.5
13.1
10.2
11.6
- $2,000,000 to $2,499,999
6.6
4.9
6.4
5.8
- > $2,500,000
11.9
34.4
7.6
11.6
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Number----------------------------------------------------------------------Net Household Income
- $19,999 or Less
81
2
6
8
- $20,000 to 39,999
183
14
30
24
- $40,000 to 59,999
161
19
22
22
- $60,000 to 79,999
69
12
8
19
- $80,000 to 99,999
43
4
4
15
- $100,000 to 199,999
46
4
4
17
- $200,000 or More
24
5
1
2
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage-------------------------------------------------------------------Net Household Income
- $19,999 or Less
13.3
3.3
8.0
7.4
- $20,000 to 39,999
30.1
23.3
40.0
22.4
- $40,000 to 59,999
26.2
31.6
29.3
20.5
- $60,000 to 79,999
11.3
20.0
10.6
17.7
- $80,000 to 99,999
7.0
6.6
5.3
14.0
- $100,000 to 199,999
7.5
6.6
5.3
15.8
- $200,000 or More
3.9
8.3
1.3
1.8
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

(Table Continued)
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____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Variable
Independent
Cooperative
Flat-fee
Incentive
Production
Member
Contract
Payment Contract
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Producer Attitudes
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Number------------------------------------------------------------------------------The Importance of Having Complete Control over All Production, Marketing
and Management Decisions in Your Hog Operation.
- Not Important at All
16
5
20
25
- Not Very Important
169
8
13
17
- Somewhat Important
466
30
33
44
- Very Important
6
22
13
30
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage-------------------------------------------------------------------------The Importance of Having Complete Control over All Production, Marketing
and Management Decisions in Your Hog Operation.
- Not Important at All
2.4
7.7
25.3
21.5
- Not Very Important
25.7
12.3
16.4
14.6
- Somewhat Important
70.9
46.1
41.7
37.9
- Very Important
0.9
33.8
16.4
25.8
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Average Rate of Biosecurity per Farm
5.90
7.03
6.69
6.96
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Number----------------------------------------------------------------------------Frequency of Checking Market Hog Prices
- Never
36
4
35
31
- Once Quarterly
19
3
3
3
- Once Monthly
24
3
3
10
- Once Every Two Weeks
46
5
4
8
- Once a Week
118
13
11
20
- Two or More Times a Week
422
39
23
40
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage------------------------------------------------------------------------Frequency of Checking Market Hog Prices
- Never
5.5
6.0
44.8
27.4
- Once Quarterly
2.8
4.5
3.8
2.9
- Once Monthly
3.5
4.5
3.8
9.7
- Once Every Two Weeks
7.0
6.0
5.1
7.8
- Once a Week
17.7
18.1
14.1
17.7
- Two or More Times a Week
63.4
58.2
29.1
35.3
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Number----------------------------------------------------------------------------Frequency of Checking Lean and Back-Fat Value
- Never
157
8
47
59
- Once Quarterly
133
23
15
23
- Once Monthly
117
10
8
15
- Once Every Two Week
77
5
3
3
- Once a Week
90
12
3
6
- Two or More Times a Week
74
7
3
6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage-------------------------------------------------------------------------Frequency of Checking Lean and Back-Fat Value
- Never
24.2
12.3
59.5
52.6
- Once Quarterly
20.5
35.3
18.9
20.5
- Once Monthly
18.0
15.3
10.1
13.4
- Once Every Two Week
11.8
7.6
3.8
2.6
- Once a Week
13.8
18.4
3.8
5.3
- Two or More Times a Week
11.4
10.7
3.8
5.3
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Labor Quality per Farm
5.9
7.2
6.3
6.5
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Producers Who Were Risk Averse in Invest. 0.79
0.83
0.73
0.77
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Variable
Independent
Cooperative
Flat-fee
Incentive
Production
Member
Contract
Payment Contract
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Social Capital
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Number-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Importance of Relations with Lenders
- Not Important at All
29
0
3
2
- Not Very Important
43
4
6
4
- Somewhat Important
205
13
23
26
- Very Important
389
49
47
85
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage---------------------------------------------------------------------------Importance of Relations with Lenders
- Not Important at All
4.3
0
3.7
1.8
- Not Very Important
6.4
6.0
7.5
3.1
- Somewhat Important
30.7
19.6
29.1
22.4
- Very Important
58.4
74.2
59.4
72.3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Number------------------------------------------------------------------------------Importance of Relations with Feed Merchants
- Not Important at All
23
0
6
15
- Not Very Important
58
4
12
9
- Somewhat Important
327
35
42
53
- Very Important
262
27
18
39
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage----------------------------------------------------------------------------Importance of Relations with Feed Merchants
- Not Important at All
3.4
0
7.6
12.5
- Not Very Important
8.6
6.0
15.3
7.1
- Somewhat Important
48.8
53.0
53.8
46.2
- Very Important
39.1
40.9
23.0
34.0
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Number-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Importance of Relations with Veterinarians
- Not Important at All
11
0
6
7
- Not Very Important
42
7
11
10
- Somewhat Important
257
25
35
42
- Very Important
355
34
27
58
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage----------------------------------------------------------------------------Importance of Relations with Veterinarians
- Not Important at All
1.6
0
7.5
6.0
- Not Very Important
6.3
10.6
13.9
8.0
- Somewhat Important
38.6
37.8
44.3
36.0
- Very Important
53.3
51.5
34.1
50.0
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Number-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Importance of Relations with Neighbors that are Non-Farmers
- Not Important at All
21
2
2
0
- Not Very Important
55
4
1
7
- Somewhat Important
257
27
40
37
- Very Important
334
33
36
70
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage----------------------------------------------------------------------------Importance of Relations with Neighbors that are Non-Farmers
- Not Important at All
3.1
3.0
2.5
2.8
- Not Very Important
8.2
6.0
1.2
6.0
- Somewhat Important
38.5
40.9
50.6
32.5
- Very Important
50.0
50.0
45.5
60.3
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Number-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Importance of Relations with Packers and/or Slaughter Houses
- Not Important at All
29
0
15
27
- Not Very Important
72
7
17
17
- Somewhat Important
269
24
27
37
- Very Important
291
35
20
35
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Importance of Relations with Packers and/or Slaughter Houses
- Not Important at All
4.3
0
18.9
23.0
- Not Very Important
10.8
10.6
21.5
14.0
- Somewhat Important
40.6
36.3
34.1
32.0
- Very Important
44.0
53.0
25.3
31.0
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Variable
Independent
Cooperative
Flat-fee
Incentive
Production
Member
Contract
Payment Contract
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Social Capital
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Number----------------------------------------------------------------------Importance of Relations with Neighboring Farmers
- Not Important at All
20
2
1
1
- Not Very Important
18
2
1
2
- Somewhat Important
234
28
27
34
- Very Important
396
34
50
80
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage-------------------------------------------------------------------Importance of Relations with Neighboring Farmers
- Not Important at All
2.9
3.0
1.2
1.0
- Not Very Important
2.6
3.0
1.2
1.8
- Somewhat Important
35.0
42.4
34.1
29.0
- Very Important
59.2
51.5
63.2
68.0
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Variable
Independent
Cooperative
Flat-fee
Incentive
Production
Member
Contract
Payment Contract
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Producer Characteristics
Average Age
49
45
44
47
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Number--------------------------------------------------------------------------Years of Educational Training
- Less than High School
29
2
4
9
- Completed High School
226
17
21
44
- Some College or Tech School
245
20
37
40
- Bachelor’s Degree
147
21
17
21
- Master’s Degree
22
3
2
3
- Doctoral Degree
11
1
0
1
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage------------------------------------------------------------------------Years of Educational Training
- Less than High School
4.2
3.1
4.9
7.6
- Completed High School
33.2
26.5
25.9
37.2
- Some College or Tech School
36.0
31.2
45.6
33.9
- Bachelor’s Degree
21.6
32.8
20.9
17.8
- Master’s Degree
3.2
4.6
2.4
2.5
- Doctoral Degree
1.6
1.5
0
0.8
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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cooperative and flat-fee contract producers’ mean values were significantly different from each
other.
The average number of finished hogs sold per farm was higher for incentive payment
contract producers than for flat-fee contract or independent producers. Cooperative and flat-fee
contract as well as cooperative and incentive payment contract were the only combinations that
were not significantly different. The percentage of producers who had a finishing operation was
higher for contract producers than it was for cooperative or independent producers. All business
arrangement combinations were significantly different except flat-fee contract and incentive
payment contract.
On average, cooperative producers had more breeding sows on their farms than did
incentive payment contract, independent, or flat-fee contract producers. The number of breeding
sows was significantly different for all business arrangement combinations except for
independent and incentive payment contract. Six percent of the independent producers ran
breeding sow operations, while 4%, 4% and 3% of the cooperative producers, flat-fee contract
producers, and incentive payment contract producers, respectively, ran breeding sow operations.
However, there were no significant differences among the business arrangements as to whether a
breeding sow operation was run.
The average number of feeder pigs sold by contract producers was higher than it was for
independent producers. A larger percentage of cooperative producers (32%) raised feeder pigs
than did flat-fee (27%), incentive payment producers (21%), or independent producers (18%).
Producers who sold feeder pigs were significantly different only for independent and
cooperative, and independent and flat-fee contract.
The percentage of producers who had a farrow to finish operation was higher for
independent producers than it was for cooperative, incentive payment contract or flat-fee
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contract producers. All of the business arrangement combinations were significantly different
except for flat-fee contract and incentive payment contract. The percentage of producers who
had a farrow to wean operation was higher for cooperative producers than it was for independent
or flat-fee contract producers.

Cooperative and incentive payment contract as well as

independent and incentive payment contract were the only business arrangement combinations
that were not significantly different.
Independent producers had more other farm enterprises than did producers under the
other business arrangements.

The only business arrangement combinations that were

significantly different were independent and cooperative, independent and flat-fee contract, and
independent and incentive payment contract.
On average, independent producers had been raising hogs longer than producers under
any other business arrangement. The average number of years independent producers had been
raising hogs was 27. On the other hand, cooperative, flat-fee and incentive payment contract
producers had been raising hogs for averages of 21, 18, and 19 years, respectively. The business
arrangement combinations that were significantly different were independent and cooperative,
independent and flat-fee contract, and independent and incentive payment contract.
Cooperative producers, on average, used more acres for their hog operations than did
producers under contract. The average number of acres used by cooperative producers was 803.
Independent, flat-fee, and incentive payment contract producers used 623, 497, and 479 acres,
respectively. All means were significantly different except for independent and cooperative, and
flat-fee and incentive payment contract.
More independent producers raised corn than did cooperative producers or incentive
payment contract producers. Eighty-seven percent of the independent producers surveyed raised
corn, while 71%, 80% and 65% of the cooperative, flat-fee, and incentive payment contract
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producers, respectively, raised corn. Given these percentages, only independent and cooperative,
flat-fee and incentive payment contract, and independent and incentive payment contract were
significantly different.
Similar to corn production, more independent producers were involved in soybean
production than incentive payment contract or cooperative producers. Eighty-one percent of the
independent producers surveyed raised soybeans, while 69%, 75%, and 65% of the cooperative,
flat-fee contract, and incentive payment contract producers, respectively, raised soybeans.
Cooperative producers adopted more technologies and management practices (TMP) than did
other producers.

TMP include four breeding practices: weekly farrowing, terminal cross-

breeding programs, intensive breeding, and artificial insemination; and five production
management practices: all-in all-out production, the use of high-density fat-added diets, split-sex
feeding, porcine somatotropin, and the use of computer programs for hog farm management.
Flat-fee contract producers adopted fewer TMPs than did the other producers. Only the number
of technologies and management practices adopted by independent and incentive payment
contract producers were not significantly different.
Sixty-eight percent of the flat-fee contract producers surveyed indicated that there were
other flat-fee contract producers in their counties, while 49%, 40% and 35% of the cooperative,
independent, and incentive payment contract producers, respectively, indicated that there were
flat-fee contract producers present in their counties. There were no significant differences in
independent and cooperative, as well as the independent and incentive payment contract mean
values. Eighty-one percent of the incentive payment contract producers indicated that there were
other incentive payment contract producers present in their counties, while 60%, 50%, and 37%
of the cooperative, flat-fee and independent producers, respectively, revealed that there were
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incentive payment contract producers residing in the same counties. All business arrangement
combinations were significantly different except cooperative and flat-fee contract.
Thirty-one percent of incentive payment contract respondents were from one of the
Southern states of the U.S. Only 13%, 1% and 2% of the flat-fee contract, cooperative, and
independent producers who responded to the survey had hog farms located in the South. All
combinations were statistically different except independent and cooperative business
arrangements.
The average number of times per year cooperative and independent producers sold hogs
was 48 and 32, respectively. Flat-fee contract and incentive payment contract producers grew
hogs out for market sale an average of 19 and 12 times per year, respectively. There were
significant differences in all business arrangement combinations except for independent and
cooperative, and flat-fee contract and incentive payment contract.
Flat-fee contract producers worked more hours, on average, off-farm than did producers
under any other business arrangement.

All business arrangement combinations were

significantly different except independent and cooperative, and flat-fee contract and incentive
payment contract.
The average number of full-time workers employed on any given hog farm was higher
for cooperative hog farms than for other hog farms. Cooperative hog farms employed twice as
many full-time workers as incentive payment contract producers, and three and four times as
many as flat-fee contract and independent producers. Only independent and flat-fee contract,
and independent and incentive payment contract were not significantly different. The average
number of part-time workers employed also was higher among cooperative producers. All
business arrangement combinations were significantly different except for independent and
cooperative, and independent and incentive payment contract. Following cooperative producers,
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independent, incentive payment contract and flat-fee contract was the order in which the number
of part-time workers per farm descended.
4.3 Financial Characteristics
Independent producers had lower debt to asset ratios than did cooperative, flat-fee
contract or incentive payment contract producers. There were no significant differences between
the mean values for cooperative and flat-fee, flat-fee and incentive payment contract, or
cooperative and incentive payment contract.
The value of total farm assets, including land, was higher for cooperative producers than
for other business arrangements.

Only the mean values for independent and cooperative,

cooperative and flat-fee, and cooperative and incentive payment contract were significantly
different.
The percentage of producers who had a net household income greater than or equal to
$100,000 for 1999 was higher for incentive payment contracts than for any other business
arrangement, but not significantly greater than cooperative producers.

Following incentive

payment producers, cooperative producers, independent, and flat-fee producers had progressively
lower total net household incomes. All business arrangement combinations were significantly
different except cooperative and incentive payment contract.
4.4 Producer Attributes
Producers were asked how important it was to have complete control over all production,
marketing, and management decisions in their hog operations. A larger percentage of flat-fee
and incentive payment contract producers rated autonomy as not important at all than did
cooperative and independent producers. All of the business arrangements were significantly
different except flat-fee and incentive payment contract. The percentage of contract producers
who rated autonomy as not very important exceeded that of independent, while a higher
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percentage of cooperative producers rated autonomy as somewhat important than did
independent producers. The percentages of producers who rated autonomy as very important
were highest among independent producers relative to producers under any other business
arrangement.

Only flat-fee and incentive payment contract, and cooperative and incentive

payment contract were not significantly different.
Using a scale from 0 to 10, with 10 being the highest and 0 being the lowest, producers
were asked to rate the bio-security system on their hog farms. Cooperative producers rated their
bio-security systems 7, while incentive payment contract, flat-fee contract, and independent
producers rated their systems 6.96, 6.69, and 5.90, respectively; independent production had a
significantly lower rating than the others.
Sixty-three percent of the independent producers consulted sources of information on
market prices for hogs two or more times a week, while 58%, 29%, and 35% of the cooperative,
flat-fee and incentive payment contract producers, respectively, did likewise. Cooperative and
independent producers checked prices more often than did contract producers.

All business

arrangement combinations were significantly different except independent and cooperative, and
flat-fee and incentive payment contract.
The percentage of producers who checked information on lean value and back-fat once a
month or more was greatest among independent producers relative to producers under any other
business arrangement.

Combinations that were not significantly different include independent

and cooperative, and flat-fee contract and incentive payment contract.
The quality of labor available for hog production was rated higher by cooperative
producers than by independent, flat-fee contract, or incentive payment producers. On a scale of
0 to 10, where 0 is the lowest quality and 10 is the highest quality, the average rating for
cooperative producers was 7.2, while the averages for independent, flat-fee contract and
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incentive payment contract producers were 5.9, 6.3, and 6.5, respectively. There were significant
differences between all of the business arrangement combinations except flat-fee contract and
incentive payment contract, and independent and flat-fee contract.
To measure risk attitudes, producers were asked to choose between five investment
opportunities. Each of the five investments had three states of nature and, thus, three potential
net returns outcomes (See the Appendix E). Over 72% of the producers under each alternative
business arrangement were rated risk averse, but no combinations were significantly different.
This result does not indicate that risk is unimportant in the business arrangement selection
decision.

Larger, less diversified producers generally incur greater risk, providing greater

incentive to adopt an alternative business arrangement.
4.5 Social Capital
Social relationships with other people were measured by the producer rating whether the
relations were “not important at all”, “not very important”, “somewhat important”, or “very
important”.

Cooperative producers rated relationships with lending institutions as more

important than did independent or flat-fee contract producers. Interestingly, incentive payment
contract producers rated relationships with lending institutions as more important than did flatfee contract producers.

However, a large percentage of each business arrangement rated

relationships with lending institutions as very important and all were significantly different
except independent and flat-fee contract, and cooperative and incentive payment contract. The
percentages of cooperative, incentive payment contract, flat-fee contract, and independent
producers who rated relationships with lending institutions as very important were 74%, 72%,
59%, and 58%, respectively.
Both cooperative and independent producers felt that relationships with feed merchants
were more important than did contract producers. There were no significant differences between
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independent and cooperative, and flat-fee contract and incentive payment contract.

More

producers felt that relationships with feed merchants were somewhat important than they did
very important, not very important or not important.
Independent, cooperative, and incentive payment contract producers rated relationships
with veterinarians of greater importance than did flat-fee contract producers. Contract producers
felt that relationships with veterinarians were of less importance than did independent or
cooperative producers. The percentage of producers who rated relationships with veterinarians
more important was greater for independent producers followed by cooperative, incentive
payment, and flat-fee contract producers, though all were not significantly different.
Incentive payment producers rated relationships with non-farmers as more important than
did independent producers. Fifty percent of the independent and cooperative producers felt that
these relationships were very important, while 46% and 60% of the flat-fee contract and
incentive payment contract producers, respectively, felt likewise.
Cooperative and independent producers rated relationships with packers and/or
slaughterers more important than did contract producers.

Cooperative producers rated

relationships with packers as more important than did independent producers. All business
arrangement combinations were significantly different except flat-fee and incentive payment
contract.
Social relationships with neighboring farmers were rated as important among contract
producers, independent and cooperative producers, though the mean values of flat-fee contract
and independent were not significantly different.

Following incentive payment contract

producers in declining order, flat-fee contract, independent and cooperative producers,
respectively, felt relationships with neighboring farmers were important, but not all were
significantly different.
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4.6 Producer Characteristics
Independent producers were older than cooperative and flat-fee contract producers. The
average age for independent producers was 48 years old, while the average ages of cooperative,
flat-fee contract, and incentive payment contract producers were 45, 44, and 47, respectively.
Cooperative and flat-fee contract, cooperative and incentive payment contract, and independent
and incentive payment contract were not statistically different.
More incentive payment contract producers completed high school than did flat-fee
contract producers. The percentage of producers who had completed some college was highest
for flat-fee contract (46%) followed by independent (35%), cooperative (32%) and incentive
payment contract (21%). The combinations that were significantly different include cooperative
and flat-fee contract, flat-fee and incentive payment contract, and independent and flat-fee
contract. A higher percentage of cooperative producers completed a Bachelor’s degree than did
producers under any other business arrangement, though the difference between cooperative
producers and flat-fee producers was not statistically significant.
4.7 Contract Production Characteristics
Of the producers under contract, the average number of months under contract was higher
for incentive payment contracts than for flat-fee contracts, and significantly different. The
incentive payment contract producer’s average number of months under contract was 55 months,
while the average for flat-fee contract producers 43 (see Table 4.2).
Thirty-nine percent (32) of the flat-fee contract producers had contracts with neighboring
farmers, while only 10% (12) of the incentive payment contract producers did. These mean
values were significantly different. Sixty-nine percent (81) of the incentive payment contract
producers were required to purchase new or renovate existing facilities. The percentage of
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics of Exogenous Variables for the Binomial Logit Model.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Variable
Flat-fee
Incentive
Contract
Payment Contract
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Contract Production Characteristics
Number of Months Producing Under Contract

43.21

55.49

Percentage of Producers Who Had Contracts with Neighboring Farmers

0.39

0.10

Percentage of Producers Required to Obtain New or Renovate Facilities

0.41

0.68

Percentage of Feed Is Provided by the Contractor

0.88

0.91

Percentage of Animals Are Provided by the Contractor

0.87

0.92

Percentage of Medication Provided by the Contractor

0.87

0.90

Percentage of Producers Who Had Raised Hogs Prior to Accepting a Contract

0.89

0.91

Percentage of Number of Acres Used for Hog Production
497.00
479.00
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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flat-fee contract producers who were required to do the same was 41% (34). These percentages
were significantly different.
The primary inputs supplied by contractors are feed, animals, and medication. Ninetyone percent (107) of the incentive payment contract producers received feed from the contractor,
while 88% (72) of the flat-fee contract producers were provided feed. Ninety-two percent (108)
and 87% (71) of the incentive payment contract and flat-fee contract producers, respectively,
were supplied animals for their production operations. Medication was received by 90% (106)
of the incentive payment contract producers and 87% (71) of the flat-fee contract producers, but
there was no statistical difference between the two.
Approximately 91% (107) of the incentive payment contract producers had experience
raising hogs prior to accepting a contract, while 89% (73) of the flat-fee contract producers did
likewise. The average number of acres used for hog production was higher for flat-fee contract
producers than for incentive payment contract producers, though the difference was not
statistically significant.
4.8 Heteroskedasticity Analysis
Using selected variables expressed in the categories above, both multinomial logit and
binomial logit analyses were conducted to determine their influence on a producer’s choice of
business arrangement. However, there are some potential problems that must be detected and
corrected for in the case of their presence before estimating either of the models. When logit
models employ cross-sectional data, one of the statistical problems that may arise is
heteroskedasticity. Heteroskedasticity implies that the disturbances (error terms) have different
variances (Judge et al, 1988). Although multinomial logit models have been widely used in
agricultural research, the problem with heteroskedasticity has received less attention. Munizaga
et al., (2000) identify two different kinds of heteroskedasticity: between observations and
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between options. Heteroskedasticity between observations exists when two separate data sets are
used concurrently; for example, one data set from a Stated Preference (SP) experiment and
another from a Revealed Preference (RP) experiment. Heteroskedasticity between options exists
when ranking the outcomes from SP experiments where respondents have to consider several
options and rank them in order of preference. Given the two heteroskedasticity problems, the
one that is more applicable to this study is heteroskedasticity between options. There were
several questions asked within the survey that required producers to rank their responses. Thus,
between options could conceivably be a problem, and not between observations given that only
one data set was used. In the study conducted by Munizaga et al., (2000), the MNL, Hierarchical
Logit, Single Element Nested Logit, Heteroskdasticity Extreme Value Logit (HEVL) and
Multinomial Probit were used to test two heteroskedasticity problems that were artificially
incorporated into the data generation process. Of the possible options available to test and
correct for heteroskdasticity problems, Greene (2000) and Munizaga et al., (2000) recommended
using the HEVL. (HEVL was discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.)
Within the framework of the MNL model, the HEVL was implemented and executed
using the Limdep 7.0 software. The results yielded from this analysis indicated that there were
no heteroskedasticity problems since the standard errors and associated P-Values, and the
predicted outcomes remained unchanged after the test was performed. The correctly predicted
outcomes before and after testing for heteroskedasticity were 77.6%. These findings were not
surprising given that the exogenous variables used in this particular analysis did not include any
responses that were ranked in nature. For purposes of this discussion, suppose that there was a
heteroskedasticity problem between observations and not between options. Munizaga et al.
postulated that MNL is remarkably robust in the case of heteroskedasticity between observations.
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Thus, the HEVL model and Munizaga et al. postulation address both heteroskedasticity problems
that are encountered when running MNL models (see Appendix B).
When testing for heteroskedasticity in the binomial logit model, Greene (2000) utilizes a
multiplicative heteroskedasticity model. The multiplicative heteroskedasticity framework is a
constructive model in that it allows one to test and correct for heteroskedasticity.

This

heteroskedasticity test for the binomial logit model was conducted and conveniently run using
Limdep 7.0 software. The analysis revealed that there was no evidence of heteroskedasticity in
the binomial logit model.

The standard errors, P-Values and the percentage of correctly

predicted outcomes (70.5%) remained the same before and after the heteroskedasticity test (see
Appendix B, Table 5.7a & b).

The procedure used to execute the multiplicative

heteroskedasticity model is discussed in Chapter 3.
4.9 Multicollinearity Analysis
A second problem that one may encounter when using cross-sectional data is
multicollinearity. Multicollinearity exists when there are two or more independent variables
correlated with one another. Since multicollinearity is a data problem and not a statistical
problem, it can be resolved by adding more uncensored data, changing the form of certain
correlated variables, or deleting the less important variables that show strong correlations with
more important ones. Technical procedures, such as the Pearson Correlation analysis, Variance
Inflation Factor, or Condition Index can be used to detect this problem. The Pearson Correlation
coefficient was first used to detect multicollinearity. Based on the rule of thumb, if a correlation
coefficient is greater than or equal to 0.80, multicollinearity might prove to be a problem
(Kennedy, 1998). None of the correlation coefficients for the variables used in either model are
greater than or equal to 0.80. The highest coefficient in Table 6.2 (Appendix C) for testing
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multicollinearity for variables used in the multinomial logit is 0.48, between total farm diversity,
TOTALFD, and corn production, CORN, which suggests that corn production is one of the
enterprises that makes up the diversity of the farm. (The first value in the Pearson Correlation
tables in Appendix C represents the coefficient estimates, while the second and third number
represent the probabilities and observations, respectively.) For the binomial logit, the highest
coefficient is 0.24, between new facilities required, NEWREFAC, and MOPUNDCO months
under contract, which suggests that the longer a producer has been producing hogs under
contract, the more likely he was required to purchase new or renovate existing facilities (Table
6.4, Appendix C).
Since correlation coefficients are not precise indicators of multicollinearity (they may be
low, but multicollinearity still may be present), VIF and condition indexes were calculated. The
test results are presented in Tables 4.3a) and b) and Tables 4.4a) and b).
Examining the VIF coefficients, all variables in both tables are 1.43 or smaller. Some of
the VIF coefficients in Table 4.3a) that are slightly larger than the rest of the variables are
autonomy is not important, AUNOTIMP, contract is with a neighboring farmer, NEIGFARM,
and debt asset ratio, DARATIO. The same variables had relatively larger correlation coefficients
(Table 6.2, Appendix C). Also, in Table 4.4a), the VIF coefficients for the binomial logit model
that are slightly larger than the rest of the variables are MOPUNDCO and number of acres on the
farm NUMACRES. Judging purely from the size of the VIF coefficients, multicollinearity does
not appear to be problem.

However, VIF measures are not precise indicators of

multicollinearity, as was discussed in Chapter 3.
The final test of multicollinearity is conducted by examining the condition indexes
presented in Table 4.3b) and Table 4.4b). For two variables, the condition indexes are greater
than 30. Therefore, these two variables may cause multicollinearity. Unfortunately, this test
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Table 4.3a. The Results of the
Multicollinearity
Test: Variance
Inflation Factors.
Multinomial Logit
Variable
Variance
Inflation
INTERCEPT
0
HOG250
1.04842
BREEDSOW
1.09499
TOTALFD
1.26344
DARATIO
1.35445
AUNOTIMP
1.43761
AUVERIMP
1.24916
BIOSECUR
1.18507
AGE
1.18193
COMPHS
1.14110
BACHELO
1.05074
CORN
1.18712
MKTPRICE
1.12722
VALFARAS
1.19748
NEIGFARM
1.39651
RISKAVER
1.10713
FFLATFEE
1.11983
FCONTRWI
1.06022
HINCOME
1.11607
SOUTH
1.26759
LENDINST
1.11618
FEEDMERC
1.34843
TIMEHSYR
1.18974
NHWOFFFA
1.06206
Table 4.4a. The Results of the
Multicollinearity
Test: Variance
Inflation Factors.
Binomial Logit
Variable
INTERCEPT
MOPUNDCO
CONTWNFA
NEWREFAC
NUMACRES
EXRAIHOG

Variance
Inflation
0
1.14531
1.08668
1.01766
1.10599
1.07257

Table 4.3b. The Results of the
Multicollinearity
Test: Condition
Indexes.
Multinomial Logit
Number Eigenvalue Condition
Index
1
15.69144
1.00000
2
1.33335
3.43052
3
1.01152
3.93861
4
0.91677
4.13714
5
0.73992
4.60509
6
0.72222
4.66120
7
0.63683
4.96384
8
0.52201
5.48267
9
0.46525
5.80747
10
0.36967
6.51518
11
0.36433
6.56273
12
0.24717
7.96775
13
0.23505
8.17049
14
0.15350 10.11066
15
0.12187 11.34710
16
0.11470 11.69611
17
0.09943 12.56245
18
0.08609 13.50089
19
0.05374 17.08823
20
0.03978 19.85974
21
0.03158 22.29209
22
0.02546 24.82742
23
0.01593 31.38083
24
0.00239 81.08269
Table 4.4b. The Results of the
Multicollinearity
Test: Condition
Indexes.
Binomial Logit
Number Eigenvalue Condition
Index
1
3.91073
1.00000
2
0.79501
2.21791
3
0.71842
2.33314
4
0.29048
3.66921
5
0.23635
4.06775
6
0.04903
8.93139
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does not allow one to determine which particular variables are causing multicollinearity. Though
condition indexes greater than 20 may point to multicollinearity, only condition indexes of 100
or more can cause substantial variance inflation and large potential harm to regression estimates
(Belsley, Kuh and Welsch). In both models, the condition indexes are less than 100. This
indicates that there are no serious multicollinearity problems for either model.
4.10 Multinomial Logit Analysis
The results section will proceed in the following order: first, the results of the
multinomial logit will be discussed; and secondly, the results of the binomial logit will be
discussed.
Table 4.5 shows the results of the multinomial logit analysis of business arrangement
choices. At the top of the table, the different business arrangement combinations are shown.
The results shown are associated with each exogenous variable. The results reported include the
coefficient estimates and the associated standard errors (in parenthesis). Marginal effects are
also reported. Two asterisks by the coefficient estimate indicate that the variable is significant at
the 5 percent level, while one asterisk indicates that the variable is significant at the 10 percent
level. The percentage correctly predicted for the multinomial logit analysis was 77.6, and the
McFadden’s likelihood ratio index (or Pseudo R2) was 0.2643.
4.10.1 Farm / Locational Characteristics
In the multinomial logit analysis, all of the variables discussed in each category were
significant at the 10% or 5% level except producer’s age. From Table 4.5, cooperative producers
and producers under contract have a higher probability of raising more finisher hogs than do
independent producers. Producers who make significantly large capital investments in buildings
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Table 4.5: Results of the Multinomial Logit Analysis of Business Arrangement Choice.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Variable
Cooperative
Flat-fee
Incentive
Flat-fee
Incentive
Flat-fee
vs.
Contract vs.
Contract vs.
Contract vs.
Contract vs.
Contract vs.
Independent
Independent
Independent
Cooperative
Cooperative
Incen. Con.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
0.273171
1.432510
2.195337 *
0.784372
1.926771
-1.32389
Constant
(1.14666)

(1.11060)

(1.19374)

(1.80390)

(1.62870)

(1.49277)

No. of 250 Pound Hogs Produced

0.000076 **
(.000020)

0.000081 **
(.000023)

0.000092 **
(.000020)

0.000005
(.000018)

0.000015
(.000013)

-0.000010
(.000014)

Number of Breeding Sows

0.000001
(.000034)

-0.002268 **
(.000751)

-0.000440 **
(.000180)

-0.002259 **
(.000755)

-0.000444 **
(.000181)

-0.001795 **
(.000759)

Number of other Enterprises
on Farm

-0.077506
(.091862)

-0.260791 **
(.104584)

-0.058967
(.082979)

-.2165605 *
(.127242)

0.018646
(.106524)

-.2242453 *
(.115785)

Corn Produced on the Farm

-0.716955 **
(.278575)

-0.821658 **
(.283807)

-0.736454 **
(.275020)

0.210977
(.131210)

-0.019529
(.113166)

0.219606 *
(.117702)

Flat-fee Contracts Used in the Co.

-0.013794
(.293307)

1.109618 **
(.305514)

-0.574232 **
(.266033)

1.092989 **
(.394174)

-0.562195 **
(.357309)

1.656162 **
(.357094)

Incentive Contracts in the Co.

0.882185 **
(.295108)

0.028259
(.297359)

2.227833 **
(.305779)

-.845766 **
(.091862)

1.345251 **
(.392517)

-2.206412 **
(.386804)

Farm Located in the Southern U.S.

0.058974
(.674094)

0.150382
(.714558)

1.693151 **
(.430471)

.2087404
(.902693)

1.634253 **
(.694865)

-1.261179 *
(.668546)

No. of Times Hogs Sold per Year

0.001170
(.000848)

-0.000695
(.000505)

-0.000298
(.000487)

-0.001848 **
(.000945)

-0.001485
(.000928)

-0.000338
(.000590)

No. of Hours Worked off Farm

0.005618
(.007506)

0.011698 *
(.006922)

0.014903 **
(.006578)

-0.007035
(.009186)

0.009385
(.008847)

-0.002443
(.008050)

Farm/Locational Characteristics

Freq. of Checking Market Prices

-1.500616
-0.883093
-2.62640 **
0.582653
-1.12772
1.912145
(1.23939)
(1.12260)
(.962640)
(1.47973)
(1.37436)
(1.18935)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Farm Financial Characteristics
Debt-to-Asset Ratio

0.000096
(.000669)

-0.001212 **
(.000538)

-0.001217 **
(.000462)

-0.001311
(.000808)

-0.001313 *
(.000745)

0.000015
(.000608)

Total Value of Farm Assets

0.000026
(.000556)

0.001626 **
(.000673)

0.000284
(.000502)

-0.001565 *
(.000821)

0.000254
(.000679)

0.001339 *
(.000749)

Net Household Income ≥ $100,000

0.099078
-0.967470
0.321851
-1.094316
0.225601
-1.332742 **
(.419063)
(.598787)
(.369594)
(.679275)
(.483895)
(.636729)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Producer Attitudes
Autonomy Is Not Very Important

Autonomy Is Very Important

Rating of Biosecurity

0.950459 **
(.264615)

1.755178 **
(.223250)

1.565193 **
(.214569)

0.791276 **
(.274725)

0.611828 **
(.260847)

0.194493
(.209713)

-0.950381 **
(.264397)

-1.754728 **
(.223117)

-1.561233 **
(.214395)

-0.790883 **
(.274556)

-0.607934 **
(.260644)

-0.197379
(.209669)

0.002837 **
(.001419)

0.000035
(.000618)

0.002704 *
(.001539)

-0.000057
(.000873)

0.001951
(.001226)

0.000083
(.000711)

Self Assess. of Risk Preference

0.396397
-0.144010
-0.291659
-0.547608
-0.690644 *
0.098299
(.340701)
(.311865)
(.276080)
(.432350)
(.404355)
(.365386)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Social Capital
Imp. of Relations with Farmers

0.002527
(.008206)

0.475214 **
(.174202)

0.168021
(.159020)

0.471062 **
(.174008)

0.162947
(.159207)

0.290802 *
(.159536)

Imp. of Relations with Lenders

0.163143
(.164777)

0.070932
(.176723)

0.376650 **
(.170290)

-0.097169
(.223702)

0.209600
(.218308)

-0.289576 *
(.264615)

Imp. of Relations with Feed Merch. -0.165125
-0.546852 **
-0.543779 **
-0..375195 **
-0.372179 **
-0.002670
(.164692)
(.133070)
(.133082)
(.188174)
(.188187)
(.002164)
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

(Table Continued)
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_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Variable
Cooperative
Flat-fee
Incentive
Flat-fee
Incentive
Flat-fee
vs.
Contract vs
Contract vs
Contract vs.
Contract vs.
Contract vs.
Independent
Independent
Independent
Cooperative
Cooperative
Incen. Con.

______________________________________________________________________________
Producer Characteristics
Age

-0.001428
(.000925)

-0.000829
(.001100)

0.001840
(.002479)

-0.000659
(.001230)

0.003269
(.002547)

-0.002542
(.002586)

Producer Completed High School

-0.638242
(.587859)

-0.409624
(.658668)

-1.244805 **
(.511471)

0.156464
(.798653)

-0.607999
(.677438)

0.763650
(.724486)

Producer Holds Bachelor’s Degree

0.228868
-0.387197
-0.611277 **
-0.592506
-0.835997 **
0.304908
(.296363)
(.340116)
(.310721)
(.416749)
(.388279)
(.407182)
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.
% Correctly Predicted: 77.6; McFadden’s likelihood ratio index: 0.2643; Chi-Squared = 440.35**
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Table 4.6: Marginal Effects of the Multinomial Logit Analysis of Business Arrangement
Choice.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Variable
Independent
Cooperative
Flat-fee
Incentive
Production
Member
Contract
Payment Contract
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Constant
-0.202117
-0.000483
0.076047
0.126552
(.206751)
(.143817)
(.116179)
(.084333)
Farm / Locational Characteristics
No. of 250 Pound Hogs Produced

-0.000016 **
(.000005)

0.000006 **
(.000002)

0.000005 **
(.000002)

0.000004 **
(.000001)

Number of Breeding Sows

0.000171 **
(.000063)

0.000027
(.000016)

-0.000185 **
(.000077)

-0.000013
(.000012)

Number of other Enterprises

0.026623 **
(.013344)

-0.004675
(.009237)

-0.020467 *
(.010587)

-0.001479
(.004965)

Corn Produced on the Farm

0.149671 **
(.072180)

-0.058386 *
(.034104)

-0.056245 *
(.032543)

-0.035039 *
(.020797)

Flat-fee Contracts Used in the Co.

-0.045036
(.046371)

-0.008630
(.029475)

0.095635 **
(.042991)

-0.041968 *
(.022233)

Incentive Contracts in the Co.

-0.182350 **
(.054155)

0.072127 **
(.036049)

-0.020263
(.026997)

0.130486 **
(.048855)

Farm Located in the Southern U.S.

-0.096304

-0.008355
(.067220)

0.001661
(.057947)

0.102998 **
(.043567)

0.000127
(.000091)

-0.000068
(.000048)

-0.000023
(.000030)

(.001015)

0.000333
(.000748)

-0.000822
(.000616)

-0.000805 *
(.000470)

0.309790 *
(.169037)

-0.122752
(.125748)

-0.041794
(.090190)

-0.145244 *
(.074295)

on farm

(.091989)
No. of Times Hogs Sold per Year

-0.000036

(.000095)
No. of Hours Worked Off Farm

Freq. of Checking Market Prices

-0.001961**

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Farm Financial Characteristics
Debt-to-Asset Ratio

0.000131
(.000086)

0.000031
(.000068)

-0.000094 *
(.000055)

-0.000068 **
(.000036)

Total Value of Farm Assets

-0.000124
(.000087)

-0.000016
(.000055)

0.000132 *
(.000073)

0.000007
(.000030)

Net Household Income ≥ $100,000

0.040624
(.067642)

0.017673
(.041897)

-0.083214
(.057060)

0.024916
(.023963)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Producer Attitudes
Autonomy Is Not Very Important

-0.271013 **

0.066030 *
(.034603)

0.126249 **
(.048734)

0.078733 **
(.030024)

0.270787 **
(.063906)

-0.066057 *
(.034588)

-0.126236 **
(.048728)

-0.078492 **
(.029939)

-0.000197
(.000135)

-0.000021
(.000073)

0.000234 *
(.000135)

-0.000015
(.000038)

-0.009367
(.043793)

0.043778
(.036398)

-0.014317
(.025661)

-0.020093
(.017966)

(.063962)
Autonomy Is Very Important

Rating of Biosecurity

Risk Averse

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

(Table Continued)

106

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Variable
Independent
Cooperative
Flat-fee
Incentive
Production
Member
Contract
Payment Contract
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Social Capital
Imp. of Relations with Farmers

-0.039890 *
(.023400)

-0.005960
(.004660)

0.038376
(.025142)

0.007474
(.011389)

Imp. of Relations with Lenders

-0.036392 *
(.020443)

0.012920
(.013215)

0.001915
(.013894)

0.021556 **
(.005727)

-0.006903
(.015034)

-0.040361 **
(.015464)

Imp. of Relations with Feed Merch.

0.076241 **
(.023521)

-0.028975 **
(.010584)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Producer Characteristics
Age

0.000085
(.000184)

-0.000149
(.000102)

-0.000065
(.000091)

0.000129
(.000157)

Producer Completed High School

0.140164 *
(.083455)

-0.050892
(.058030)

-0.019828
(.053239)

-0.069443 *
(.037466)

Producer Holds Bachelor’s Degree

0.036103
(.045436)

0.031779
(.031129)

-0.030817
(.029460)

-0.037064
(.022673)

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.
% Correctly Predicted: 77.6; McFadden’s likelihood ratio index: 0.2643; Chi-Squared = 440.35**
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and equipment to raise a larger number of finishing hogs are likely to find the provisions of a
contract more attractive than smaller producers. Also, the uncertainty associated with marketing
and financing the large capital investment is reduced with a contract. Likewise, cooperative
producers are able to combine their resources so that the resources owned by one member of the
cooperative can be devoted to buying more of his or her production specialty. This, in turn,
increases the possibility of cooperative hog producers being able to expand herd size given the
availability of resources.
As expected, a large number of breeding sows is associated with a lower probability of
being a contract producer relative to an independent or cooperative producer. The managerial
abilities required for breeding sows are generally greater than for other types of hog operations.
Thus, vertical coordinators are more likely to manage the breeding of sows in house and contract
out the less management-intensive finishing stage (Knoeber and Thurman, 1995). From a
production contract perspective, the probability is higher that incentive payment contract
producers would have a larger number of breeding sows than flat-fee contract producers.
Incentive payments provide greater incentive for closer management in this management
intensive stage.
Flat-fee contract producers have a lower probability of having other enterprises on their
farms relative to independent, cooperative or incentive payment contract producers. It was
hypothesized that diversified farms would more likely be managed by independent and
cooperative producers than by contract producers. Diversification is a risk management strategy.
Thus, as expected, the greater risk associated with nondiversified production provides greater
incentive for a risk reducing flat-fee contract. In addition, diversified farms, particularly farms
with other animals, pose the threat of disease outbreaks that could potentially destroy the hog
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herd. Some contractors do not allow their hog producers to raise other farm animals to avoid this
problem.
Raising corn is associated with a greater probability of being an independent producer
relative to a cooperative or contract producer. Because independent producers are more likely to
be responsible for supplying all of the production inputs, it is expected that they would be more
likely to raise corn. Corn is the most important input used in the production of hogs as feed
accounts for the largest percentage of total production costs. Independent producers are likely to
raise corn to lower the production costs associated with transportation, transaction costs, etc.
Cooperative producers are less likely to raise corn for the following reasons. Cooperative farms
are often structured such that the members combine their resources and management expertise to
produce hogs. Given the nature of certain cooperatives, such as ValAdCo, corn and other
resources may be supplied by other members of the cooperative. Of the two contracts, flat-fee
contract producers are more likely to raise corn than incentive payment contract producers. Flatfee producers raise more corn, but they are less diversified than incentive payment producers. In
some instances where flat-fee producers are contracting with neighboring farmers (particularly in
the Midwestern Corn Belt) who have an excess supply of hogs, the growers may be responsible
for supplying production inputs, including feed. This would increase the demand for corn by
flat-fee contract producers.
In counties where flat-fee contracts are used, there is a lower probability that contracts
with incentive payments are present relative to independent, cooperative, or flat-fee contract
production. One explanation for this is flat-fee producers were more likely to enter into shortterm contracts with neighboring farmers, who were likely independents or cooperatives who had
an excess supply of hogs. It is possible that short-term flat-fee contracts are complementary with
independent production, especially during periods of favorable prices.
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There is a greater

probability of other flat-fee contracts being present relative to producers under other business
arrangements.
In counties where contracts with incentive payments are used, the probability is higher
that more incentive payment contract and cooperative producers are present. Contrary to the
reported result, it was hypothesized that cooperative producers were less likely to coexist in
counties with contracts with incentive payments. Cooperatives are, in some cases, arising as an
alternative to production contracts. Perhaps the greater likelihood of cooperatives existing in
counties with more incentive payment contracts is due to the greater awareness of the need for
remaining independent producers to compete with the vertically coordinated firms.

The

remaining independent producers must cooperate to compete. Another possible reason could be
that slaughters/packagers in the area require a minimum number of hogs delivered.
Producers in the South have a higher probability of being an incentive payment contract
producer relative to an independent or cooperative producer. Southern states such as Arkansas,
Mississippi and North Carolina have experienced substantial increases in contract production.
This change may be partially due to a lack of anti-corporate farming laws, the need for economic
development in rural communities, and the previous introduction and acceptance of broiler
contracting in the region.
The greater the frequency of selling hogs, the higher the probability that the producer is a
cooperative producer relative to a flat-fee contract producer. By having more control over their
production, marketing and management decisions than flat-fee contract producers, cooperative
producers may sell hogs as often as they like.

This freedom, in turn, increases the number of

transactions incurred by cooperative producers, which also increases transaction costs. For some
flat-fee contract producers, market transaction costs are internalized and absorbed primarily by
the contractor.

The frequency at which hogs are sold is controlled and regulated by the
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contractor. Contract production is designed to lower transaction costs by reducing the number of
market transactions.
The more hours worked off-farm, the higher the probability of being a contract producer
versus an independent producer. Most contract producers are relieved from the responsibility of
making all of the production, marketing and management decisions, thus allowing time for offfarm employment.

Independent producers manage their own hog operations, making all

production and marketing decisions.

These responsibilities leave less time for off-farm

employment.
An increase in the frequency of checking market prices of hogs is associated with an
increase in the probability of being an independent producer relative to an incentive payment
contract producer. Independent producers are more interested in the market price of hogs
because their payments are directly dependent upon market prices.

Conversely, incentive

contract producers are less interested in these prices because their wages are predetermined and
bonuses are typically based on production efficiency. This shows evidence of the decreased
information costs associated with collecting price data under production contracts relative to
cooperative or independent production.
4.10.2 Farm Financial Characteristics
A higher debt-asset ratio is associated with a higher probability of being an independent
producer relative to a flat-fee contract producer. Also, a higher debt-asset ratio is associated with
a higher probability of being an independent or cooperative producer relative to an incentive
payment contract producer. Independent and cooperative producers incur higher debt-asset
ratios than contract producers because the additional production inputs such as feed, animals,
medication, and veterinary services that are supplied by the contractor must be purchased by
independent and most cooperative producers.
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A higher total value of farm assets is associated with a higher probability of being a flatfee contract producer relative to an independent or incentive payment contract producer.
However, a higher total value of farm assets is associated with a higher probability of being a
cooperative producer relative to a flat-fee producer. Given these results, logically, it seems
fitting for cooperative producers to also have greater farm assets than independent or incentive
payment contract producers.

It was hypothesized that flat-fee or incentive payment contract

producers would have the highest total value of farm assets because of the stipulations that
govern contract eligibility.
Having a higher net household income is associated with an increased probability of the
producer being an incentive payment contract producer relative to a flat-fee contract producer.
Incentive payment contract producers had the highest net household income as shown in the
previous descriptive data analysis.
4.10.3 Producers’ Attitudes
The feeling that it is not very important to have complete control over production,
marketing, and management decisions is associated with a higher probability of being a contract
producer relative to being an independent or cooperative producer. Likewise, the feeling is
associated with a higher probability of being a cooperative producer relative to an independent
producer. Autonomy is most important to the independent producers. Their business structure is
generally designed such that power or authority is shared with no other party.

Contract

production and some cooperative operations involve relationships where managerial
responsibilities are shared. These results show the differences in attitudes of producers under
different business arrangements toward autonomy. Results of the “autonomy is very important”
variable are similar to those of the “autonomy is not very important” variable.
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Higher bio-security ratings are associated with an increased probability of being a flat-fee
contract producer relative to an independent or cooperative producer. As hypothesized, contract
producers have higher bio-security ratings due to higher demand for state-of-the-art facilities.
Some of the state-of-the-art hog facilities purchased by contract producers are equipped with airtight doors and showers to prevent disease outbreaks.
eligibility of some contracts.

These facilities are necessary for

State-of-the-art facilities are optional for independent or

cooperative production.
Cooperative producers were more likely to be risk averse than incentive payment contract
producers. This is consistent with the hypothesis. The marginal effects show no significance for
this variable.
4.10.4 Social Capital
A higher rating of the importance of relationships with neighboring farmers is associated
with a greater probability of being a flat-fee contract producer relative to the other business
arrangements. It was hypothesized that independent and cooperative producers would rate the
importance of relationships with neighboring farmers higher than contract producers.

One

explanation for this unexpected finding may exist in the number of flat-fee contracts with
neighbors. Thirty-two percent of flat-fee contracts are with neighboring farmers. This high
percentage of flat-fee neighbor contracts is likely to encourage or be the result of good social
relations between the two parties.
In contrast to the hypothesis made about relations with lending institutions, a higher
rating of the importance of relationships with lending institutions is associated with a greater
probability of being a contract with incentive payments producer relative to an independent or
flat-fee contract producer. The structure of an incentive payment contract is competitive. In
order for an incentive contract producer to maximize profits, he or she must be able to produce
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efficiently to the contractor’s standards.

Production efficiency begins with the technology

adopted. Investing in technologies that increase the level of production efficiency reinforces the
importance of establishing relationships with lending institutions. According to the results of the
survey, on average, incentive contract producers are larger, and are thus more likely to borrow
more money from lending institutions.
A higher rating of the importance of relationships with feed merchants is associated
with a greater probability of being an independent or cooperative producer relative to flat-fee
contract or incentive contract producer.

Resource providing contracts, such as flat-fee or

incentive payment contracts, supply producers with certain inputs for hog production. One of
those inputs is feed. Because feed is supplied by contractors, flat-fee contract and incentive
payment contract producers have little need to develop strong relationships with feed merchants,
which is not the case for most independent and cooperative producers. Independent and many
cooperative producers are responsible for providing all inputs used in hog production.
4.10.5 Producer Characteristics
Having a high school diploma is associated with a higher probability of being an
independent producer relative to an incentive payment contract producer.

Likewise, having a

college bachelor’s degree is associated with a higher probability of being an independent or
cooperative producer relative to being an incentive payment contract producer. As expected,
these results indicate that independent and cooperative producers have higher levels of education
than do incentive payment contract producers. This is consistent with the greater span of control
associated with independent production and cooperative farming relative to contract production.
The skills needed to run an independent or cooperative farm are generally greater due to the
managerial, financial, marketing, and farm knowledge that go into operating the farm. The
knowledge contract producers need to run their hog operations is less relative to independent and
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cooperative producers because contractors generally teach producers how to raise hogs, instruct
them on what technologies to use, provide feed rations, and determine when and where hogs are
to be placed and sold.
4.11 Binomial Logit Results
Table 4.7 shows the results of the binomial logit model for contract choice. Marginal
effects for the model are reported in Table 4.8. Two asterisks by the coefficient estimate indicate
that the variable is significant at the 5 percent level, while one asterisk indicates that the variable
is significant at the 10 percent level. The percentage correctly predicted for the binomial logit
analysis was 70.5, and McFadden’s likelihood ratio index was 0.1438.
The number of years producing under contract, contract with neighboring farmers and the
purchase of new or renovation of existing facilities were significant at the 10%, 5%, and 5%
levels, respectively. The same variables were also significant at their respective levels in the
marginal effects (see Table 4.8). As shown in Table 4.7, more years producing under contract is
associated with a greater probability of being an incentive payment contract producer relative to
a flat-fee contract producer. Incentive payment contract producers have a lower probability
associated with having contracts with neighboring farmers than do flat-fee contract producers.
Most contracts with neighboring farmers are based on some type of a fixed rate payment. In
instances where a neighboring farmer allows spillover hogs to be raised by another farmer, he or
she normally pays for rented space or simply provides the producer a set wage to grow-out the
hogs to market weight. Neighboring farm contracts are less likely to be incentive payment
contracts because incentive payment contracts are normally associated with larger contract
producers and neighboring farm contracts do not typically involve other competing contract
producers. A higher probability that contracts with neighboring farmers are under a flat-fee
contract is consistent with the proposed hypothesis for this variable.
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Table 4.7: Results of the Binomial Logit Analysis of Production Contracts.
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
Variable
Incentive Contract
vs
Flat-fee Contract

________________________________________________________________
Constant

-0.124452
(.531560)

Number of Years Producing Under Contract

0.006998 *
(.004170)

Producers Who Had Contracts with Neighboring Farmers

-1.741972 **
(.401280)

Producers Required to Obtain New or Renovate Facilities

0.936739 **
(.330611)

Number of Acres Used for Hog Production

0.000130
(.000224)

Producers Had Raised Hogs Prior to Accepting a Contract

-0.041332
(.530340)

______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.
% Correctly Predicted: 70.5; McFadden’s likelihood ratio index: 0.1438; Chi-Squared = 38.24**
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Table 4.8: Marginal Effects of the Binomial Logit Analysis of Production Contracts.
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Variable
Incentive Contract
vs
Flat-fee Contract

________________________________________________________________________
CONSTANT

-0.029909
(.127969)

Number of Years Producing Under Contract

-0.001682 *
(.001000)

Producers Who Had Contracts with Neighboring Farmers

-0.418644 **
(.097681)

Producers Required to Obtain New or Renovate Facilities

0.225124 **
(.079373)

Number of Acres Used for Hog Production

0.000031
(.000054)

Producers Had Raised Hogs Prior to Accepting a Contract

-0.009933
(.127460)
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.
% Correctly Predicted: 70.5; McFadden’s likelihood ratio index: 0.1438; Chi-Squared = 38.24**
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Producers who were required to purchase new or renovate existing facilities have a
higher probability associated with being an incentive payment contract producer relative to a
flat-fee contract producer. Because incentive payment contracts are based on incentive or merit
payments, there is greater incentive for producers under this business arrangement to acquire the
best technology available to increase profit. From a contractor’s prospective, new or renovated
existing facilities are needed to produce production uniformity. Thus, one way contractors can
ensure a certain quality or standard is maintained, is by imposing a stricter policy associated with
the purchase of new or renovated facilities for incentive payment contract producers.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 The Problem
Understanding the reasons why hog producers are using certain types of business
arrangements in an industry that is undergoing substantial structural change is what this study
sets out to accomplish. Problems with income stability due to price risk and frequent production
transactions continues to be one of the essential factors responsible for some producers to accept
contract production over independent or cooperative production. On the contrary, independent
production continues to be the most widely used business arrangement in the U.S hog industry.
Thus, it is of interest to know the factors influencing producers’ choice of business arrangement.
5.2 The Purposes of the Study
This study is of interest because it brings together some the most influential economic
and non-economic factors used in agricultural production to examine business arrangement
choice. The primary objective of this study was to determine the effect of transaction costs, risk,
autonomy, social capital, production characteristics and demographic variables on hog
producers’ choice of business arrangements. The specific objectives of this study were to:
identify alternative business arrangements currently being used in the U.S. hog industry; identify
the determinants that influence hog producers’ choice among different types of business
arrangements; develop a survey to collect information on the various business arrangements used
by hog producers in the U.S.; and determine the influence of economic and non-economic factors
on the choice of business arrangements by hog producers.
5.3 General Procedures
Objective One was accomplished through a comprehensive literature search of
agricultural related journal articles and magazines. Through this search, six alternative business
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arrangements currently being used in the U.S. hog industry were identified. The six alternative
business arrangements include the following: independent production, cooperative farming,
contract with incentives payments, tournament contract, flat-fee contract, and vertical
integration.

These business arrangements are arranged in order from the highest level of

autonomy and income risk to the lowest level.
Objective Two, identify potential determinants that influence producers’ choice among
different types of business arrangements, was satisfied through an investigation of previous
studies (e.g. Gillespie et al., (1998), Hobbs (1997), Grimes and Rhodes (1992)) and
implementation of economic theory.
Business Arrangement Choice = f(Farm/Locational Characteristics, Farm Financial
Characteristics, Producer Attitudes, Social Capital,
Production Characteristics)
Choice Among Contracts = f(contract and producer characteristics).
The dependent variables are business arrangements chosen by the producer. The independent
variables are factors hypothesized to influence their decisions. There were eight production
characteristics variables, two autonomy variables, one risk variable, two transaction cost
variables, three social capital variables and seven socioeconomic variables included in the
business arrangement choice model. Only five variables were used in the contract choice model.
Objective Three, develop a survey form to collect information on the various business
arrangements used by hog producers in the U.S., was accomplished through a national mail
survey. The survey consisted of a six section questionnaire that identified several economic and
non-economic variables. These six sections are identified in the business arrangement choice
model above. A hybrid of Dillman’s Total Design Approach was used as a method to increase
the survey response rate. The hybrid method consisted of an initial mailing of the survey
followed by a postcard reminder two weeks later, then a second mailing of the survey.
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Objective Four, determine the influence of economic and non-economic factors on the
choice of business arrangements by hog producers, was achieved through the estimation of two
empirical models.

These two models were derived from a logistic function having

polychotomous and dichotomous variables. The polychotomous or multinomial model consists
of four alternative choices, while the dichotomous or binomial model consists of two alternative
choices (Kennedy, 1998). The multinomial logit and binomial logit models were constructed to
link the decision or outcome to a set of factors, at least in the spirit of regression (Maddala, 1997;
Greene, 1997; Judge et al., 1988).
5.4 Results Summarized
A total 4,986 surveys were mailed. A total of 1,031 surveys were returned completed.
Excluding producers who indicated they were no longer in business, the return rate was 21
percent.

The information collected from the survey was then separated into six different

categories to simplify discussion.

Those categories included farm characteristics, financial

characteristics, producer attributes, social capital, producer and locational characteristics, and
contract production characteristics. A descriptive analysis of the survey data revealed that, of the
1,031 completed surveys, 684 were completed by independent producers, while 66, 81, 118, 21
and 61 were from cooperative, flat-fee, incentive payment/tournament, vertical integration and
other producers, respectively.
5.5 Summary of Descriptive Analysis
In the farm characteristics category, larger percentages of flat-fee contract, cooperative,
and incentive payment contract producers were involved in sole proprietorships, partnerships,
and family corporations, respectively. Cooperative producers had higher percentages of persons
involved in non-family corporations and cooperatives than did producers under other business
arrangements. The average number of hogs sold was higher among incentive payment contract
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producers than it was for the other business arrangements. Over 80% of the contract producers
surveyed were involved in finishing hogs at weights ranging from 200 to 300 pounds.
Cooperative producers had more breeding sows, on average, than any other business
arrangement. Contract producers sold more feeder pigs per farm than independent producers.
However, cooperative and incentive payment contract producers were more likely to have feeder
pig operations than were independent producers.

More farm enterprises (i.e. more

diversification) were owned by independent producers than by any other business arrangement.
On average, independent producers had been raising hogs longer than producers under any other
business arrangement.

Cooperative producers, on average, used more acres for their hog

operations than producers under contract.

Corn was raised by a higher percentage of

independent producers than by incentive payment contract or cooperative producers. Sixty-eight
percent of the flat-fee contract producers surveyed indicated that there were other flat-fee
contract producers in their counties, while 81% of the incentive payment contract producers
indicated that there were other incentive payment contract producers present in their counties.
Thirty-one percent of the incentive payment contract respondents were from one of the southern
states of the U.S. The average number of times per year independent and cooperative producers
placed hogs on the market was 32 and 48, respectively, which were greater than for contract
producers. Flat-fee contract producers worked more hours off-farm than did cooperative or
independent producers. The average number of full-time workers employed on a hog farm was
higher for cooperative hog farms than for other hog farms. The average number of full-time
workers employed on a hog farm was higher for cooperative farms than contract farms.
Independent producers had lower debt-asset ratios than did cooperative, flat-fee or
incentive payment contract producers. Cooperative producers had higher values of total farm
assets than did producers under other business arrangements. The percentage of producers with
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total net household income for 1999 greater than or equal to $100,000 was higher for incentive
payment producers than for independent or flat-fee contract producers.
The producer attitudes category revealed that a larger percentage of flat-fee contract
producers felt that autonomy was either not important at all, or not very important than did other
business arrangements. A higher percentage of independent producers felt that autonomy was
very important than did cooperative, incentive payment, or flat-fee contract producers.
Independent producers rated their bio-security systems lower than any of the other business
arrangements. Independent producers consulted sources for information on market prices for
hogs more often than did other business arrangements.
In the social capital category, a higher percentage of cooperative producers thought that
relationships with lending institutions were more important relative to producers under other
business arrangements.

Relationships with lending institutions were more important to

cooperative than they were to independent or flat-fee contract producers. From a contract
perspective, incentive payment contract producers felt relationships with lending institutions
were more important than did flat-fee contract producers. Relationships with feed merchants
were more important to cooperative and independent producers than they were to contract
producers. Cooperative, independent and incentive payment contract producers felt relationships
with veterinarians were more important than flat-fee producers. Relationships with non-farmers
were more important to incentive payment contract producers than they were to independent
producers. Cooperative producers valued relationships with a packer/slaughterer more than did
independent, flat-fee contract, or incentive payment contract producers. Also, relationships with
a packer/slaughterer were important more to independent producers than they were to contract
producers. Flat-fee contract producers valued relationships with neighboring farmers more than
did independent, cooperative or incentive payment contract producers.
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The producer and locational characteristics category showed that independent producers
were older than flat-fee contract or cooperative producers. The percentage of producers who
completed high school was higher for incentive payment contract producers than flat-fee contract
producers. Cooperative producers held more bachelor and graduate degrees than independent
and incentive payment contract producers.
Contract production characteristics revealed that, on average, incentive payment contract
producers had been producing under contract longer than flat-fee contract producers. A higher
percentage of flat-fee contract producers than incentive payment contract producers were with
neighboring farmers.

A higher percentage of incentive payment contract producers than

incentive payment contract producers were required to purchase new or renovate existing
facilities.
5.6 Summary of Results of the Multinomial Logit and Binomial Logit Analyses
From the multinomial logit analysis, cooperative, flat-fee contract and incentive payment
contract producers were likely to finish more hogs than independent producers. Independent and
cooperative producers were more likely to have a larger breeding sow herd than contract
producers. When comparing the two contracts, incentive payment contract producers were more
likely to have a larger breeding sow herd than flat-fee contract producers.
Farms owned by independent, cooperative and incentive payment contract producers
were more diversified than farms owned by flat-fee contract producers. Corn was more likely to
be produced by independent producers. Flat-fee contract producers were more likely to raise
corn than incentive payment contract producers.
In counties where flat-fee contracts were used, there were more likely to be independent,
cooperative, or flat-fee contract operations present. Cooperative and incentive payment contract
production were more likely to be present in counties where incentive payment contracts were
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used. The number of producers under incentive payment contract production is higher in the
southern states. Cooperative producers were likely to sell hogs more times per year than flat-fee
contract producers. Producers with off farm jobs were more likely to be contract producers
relative to independent producers. Market prices were checked more frequently by independent
producers than by incentive payment contract producers.
A higher debt-asset ratio was associated with a higher probability of being an
independent producer relative to a contract producer. A higher debt-asset ratio was associated
with a higher probability of being a cooperative producer relative to an incentive payment
contract producer. A higher total value of assets was associated with a higher probability of
being a flat-fee contract producer relative to an independent or incentive payment contract
producer. A net household income greater than or equal to $100,000 was associated with a
higher probability of being an incentive payment contract producer relative to a flat-fee contract
producer.
Autonomy rated as not very important was associated with a higher probability of being
a contract producer relative to being an independent or cooperative producer. Autonomy rated as
very important was associated with a higher probability of being an independent producer
relative to a cooperative producer. A higher level of bio-security was associated with a higher
probability of being a flat-fee contract producer relative to an independent or cooperative
producer. More risk averse attitudes were associated with a higher probability of being a
cooperative producer relative to an incentive payment contract producer.
A higher rating of the importance of relationships with neighboring farmers was
associated with a higher probability of being a flat-fee contract producer relative to producers
under other business arrangements. A higher rating of the importance of relationships with
lending institutions was associated with a higher probability of being an incentive payment
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contract producer relative to an independent or flat-fee contract producer. A higher rating of the
importance of relationships with feed merchants was associated with a higher probability of
being an independent or cooperative producer relative to a contract producer.
Age was included in the model. Surprisingly, age was not significant in any of the runs.
Reasons for this insignificant are not known. Independent and cooperative producers tended to
be more educated than incentive payment contract producers.
In the binomial logit analysis, a higher number of years under contract was associated
with a higher probability of being a flat-fee contract producer relative to an incentive payment
contract producer. Involvement in a contract with a neighboring farmer was associated with a
higher probability of being a flat-fee contract producer relative to an incentive payment contract
producer. The requirement of the producer to purchase new or renovate existing facilities was
associated with a higher probability of being an incentive payment contract producer relative to a
flat-fee contract producer.
5.7 Conclusions
This study shows that the choice of business arrangement by producers in the U.S. hog
industry is greatly influenced by factors such as farm/locational characteristics, producer
attitudes, farm financial and producer characteristics. Results of this study show that contract
producers continue to raise more finishing hogs but flat-fee contract producers are less likely to
be involved in the farrowing segment. One of the reasons for this is that farrowing requires a
higher skill level and is more labor intensive than a finishing operation. Because most flat-fee
contracts are short-term, time and other production factors are not as conducive for sow breeding
operations as would be the case for finishing operations.
Results indicate that the number of other enterprises on the farm is greater among
independent, cooperative, and incentive payment contract producers.
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Independent and

cooperative producers use diversification to shield themselves from risk. Incentive payment
contract producers diversify to avoid low farm returns, which may come as a result of low feed
efficiency, high mortality rates, and/or low weaning rates. Flat-fee contracts minimize price risk.
Corn is the one of the main inputs used in the production of hogs. Findings from the
multinomial logit analysis reveal that corn production is higher among independent producers
than producers under other business arrangements. Independent producers are self-reliant and
may grow corn primarily for hog feed, whereas different firms may supply the corn used in
cooperative and contract production.
In counties where flat-fee contracts are used, results indicate that incentive payment
contracts are less likely to be present, and in counties where contracts with incentive payment are
used, it is less likely that flat-fee contracts will be present. However, the most interesting results
here are that in counties where flat-fee contracts are used, independent and cooperative producers
are more likely to be present, and in the counties where incentive payment contracts are used,
cooperative producers are more likely to be present. Approximately 40% of the flat-fee contracts
surveyed were with neighboring farmers. Thus, the presence of independent and cooperative
production in counties where flat-fee contracts exist suggests that a relatively high percentage of
flat-fee contracts are with neighboring farmers who are independent and cooperative producers.
These results indicate possible complementary relationships between independent, cooperative
and flat-fee contract production.
Location continues to be a driving force for structural change in the hog industry
(Gillespie et al., 1998, Reimund et al., 1981). Results indicate that a significant number of
incentive payment contract producers are located in the southern states. This increase in the
number of contract producers in the South is most pronounced in North Carolina, which is
presently the second largest hog producing state in the United States. The South is growing in
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hog production because labor is relatively inexpensive, growers are experienced in contracting,
and the overall business environment is more favorable, partially due to the absence of anticorporate farming laws.
Findings from this study show that contract producers worked more hours off-farm than
independent producers. The production, marketing, and management responsibilities associated
with independent production are greater than they are for contract production. An independent
producer’s time is divided between raising hogs, growing and/or purchasing feed, managing the
farm and supervising workers, and marketing hogs.

In contrast, most contract producers’

responsibilities consist of raising hogs and managing the farm and/or supervising workers. Thus,
fewer responsibilities give contract producers time to work more hours off-farm.
Transaction costs may partially explain the greater acceptance of production contracts.
Results indicate that independent producers check market prices more frequently and sell hogs
more frequently than producers under other business arrangements.

The more frequently

producers check market prices and market animals, the higher are their transaction costs.
Results from the multinomial logit analysis reveal that independent and cooperative
producers have higher debt than contract producers of the same size. This is partially due to the
loans acquired to purchase production inputs. Production inputs purchased by independent and
cooperative producers may include animals, feed, medication, labor, buildings, machinery, etc.
Of these inputs, feed accounts for the largest percentage of producer’s total production costs.
Feed makes up approximately two-thirds of the total production cost (Barkema and Cook, 1993).
Because most producers do not have the available cash to pay for the total costs of production
inputs, many independent and cooperative producers rely on loans, which in turn increases debt.
On the other hand, for most contract producers, the contractor supplies feed and other inputs,
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such as animals, medication, and veterinary service, thus the contractee need not debt finance to
obtain these inputs.
As the U.S. hog industry continues to become more vertically coordinated, autonomy is
likely to become less important to hog producers.

Results reveal that autonomy is more

important to independent producers than it is to producers under other business arrangements.
Independent producers are self-governing, self-reliant individuals who utilize their educational
skills/knowledge to make business decisions. Autonomy is most important to independent
producers because they value their freedom to make production, marketing, and management
decisions more than producers under other business arrangements who are willing to sacrifice
autonomy in exchange for financial stability.
Risk preference as measured by the investment choice elicitation procedure was not
significant in explaining business arrangement choice. However, there are dimensions of risk
other than production and price risk that may influence business arrangement choice. One of the
risk factors that contract producers face is contract renewal. In some instances, there are no
guarantees that contracts will be renewed. Some contractual agreements are short-term in that
they are established between neighboring farmers only when hog prices are “good” and a
producer has an excess number of pigs and needs assistance raising them. If there is no excess
or surplus of hogs to be finished, some flat-fee contract producers may have no income to meet
financial obligations. Although the technology adopted by producers helps reduce production
risk, and flat-fee contractual agreements eliminate hog price risk, flat-fee contract producers still
incur contract risk under seasonal or year-to-year contracts. Contract risk may help to explain
why a risk preference elicitation procedure that analyzes choice of investment does not explain
choice of business arrangement.
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The nature of social capital in the hog industry appears to be changing as the industry
moves toward more contracting. As U.S. hog farms continue to reduce in number and increase
in size, relationships with lending institutions have become more important. Results reveal that
relationships with lending institutions are most important to incentive payment contract
producers. The reasons for the importance of these relationships are not fully understood, given
that incentive payment contract producers, on average, had lower debt than producers under
other business arrangements. Perhaps relationships with lending institutions are likely most
important to incentive payment contract producers because of the financial obligations associated
with the purchase of new facilities or renovation of existing facilities. Most incentive payment
contract producers depend on lending institutions for loans to purchase state-of-the-art facilities
(Hurt, Boehlje, and Hale, 1995). The benefits of these relationships may result in a greater
likelihood of loan approval or a more favorable interest rate.
Because feed is one of the essential inputs in hog production, relationships with feed
merchants will continue to be of great importance to independent and cooperative producers.
Independent producers, as well as members of some cooperatives rely on feed merchants to meet
their production demands for feed.

Relationships with feed merchants that are built on

consistency, loyalty and reliability are beneficial to producers in that they may give rise to higher
quality services, short-term credit, and/or other benefits.
Short-term contracts that evolve due to an overflow of animals are often agreements
established between neighboring farmers via flat-fee contract. Findings from this study show
that relationships with neighboring farmers are more important to flat-fee contract producers than
they are to producers under other business arrangements.

Flat-fee contracts are normally

established such that the owner of the animals pays the grower a set price per pound, per animal,
or a set price based on the space occupied by each animal. Because some flat-fee contract
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producers depend on neighboring farmers for constant flows of animals to grow-out so that they
may meet their financial obligations, relationships with neighboring farmers are believed to be
more important to flat-fee contract producers.
Income is generally associated with years of education. When comparing producers’
education and net household income greater than or equal to $100,000, results reveal that
independent and cooperative producers have more years of education, but incentive payment
contract producers have higher net incomes. One explanation for this may be the technology
requirement by many incentive payment contractors.

Technology adoption generally is

associated with an increase in operation size and economies of size. Some independent and
cooperative producers refuse to adopt technology because its adoption involves a large
investment and debt financing. Hog operations run by incentive payment contract producers are
larger, on average, than those run by independent and cooperative producers. This, coupled with
the greater prevalence of off-farm employment among contract producers, likely explains the
finding that the less educated incentive payment contract producer had higher income.
Approximately 60% of the contract producers who responded to the survey were
incentive payment contract producers. Results reveal that incentive payment contract producers
have more years of experience producing hogs under contract than flat-fee contract producers.
Flat-fee contracts are likely to be short-term contracts established by large producers with an
over supply of hogs and under capacity of space during “favorable” price periods. However, it is
also likely that incentive payment contracts have been longer term because the discounted future
returns associated with incentive payment contract production are greater than for flat-fee
contract production as growers improve their production efficiency. The success of the producer
becomes beneficial to the contractor, as well. As efficiency increases for incentive contract
producers, profit increases for contractors. Therefore, one may conclude that incentive payment
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contracts are long term because of the monetary benefits producers and contractors stand to gain
from them.
The U.S. hog industry is experiencing tremendous growth due to the adoption of
technology.

Results indicate that incentive payment contract producers are more likely to

purchase new facilities or renovate old facilities than flat-fee contract producers. New and
improved production facilities give rise to greater levels of production efficiency. State-of-theart facilities are important to incentive payment contract producers because their payments are
highly correlated with their production efficiency. Feed efficiency and lower mortality rates
yield higher income for producers. Other factors such as grow-out time and weaning percentage
may also be influenced by production facilities.

These factors have a direct effect upon

payments. For some flat-fee contracts, state-of-the-art facilities are required, but production
efficiency is not emphasized to the extent of incentive payment contracts.
In short, this research shows that independent producers are, in general, more likely to be
breeding sow operators, diversified, corn producers, located in the same counties as flat-fee
contract producers, frequent checkers of market prices, have higher debt, value autonomy and
relationships with feed merchants more, and be relatively more educated than incentive payment
contract producers. Cooperative producers are also more likely to be breeding sow operators,
diversified, corn producers, and located in the same counties as flat-fee contractees. They are
also likely to have accumulated greater assets, have higher debt and greater farm assets, be risk
averse, be concerned about autonomy and relationships with feed merchants, and be relatively
more educated than incentive payment contract producers. Flat-fee contract producers are more
likely to be finishers located in counties with independent and cooperative producers, work more
hours off-farm, and be owners of greater farm assets. They are less likely to value autonomy and
more likely to value relationships with neighboring farmers. Finally, incentive payment contract
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producers are generally larger, lower debt finisher or breeding sow operators who work more
hours off-farm, value autonomy less and relationships with lenders more than other business
arrangements. They are likely to be located in counties with cooperative producers.
5.8 Implications
The structure of the hog industry is changing rapidly. Some of the major driving forces
of this structural change in the hog industry include change in technology, shift in location of
production, industry growth and development, and adjustment to risk and transaction costs
(Gillespie et al., 1998, Reimund et al., 1981). Thus, as technology adoption continues, we can
expect to see more contract production and more independent producers becoming members of
cooperatives in order to compete with vertically coordinated firms. As alliances are formed in
different regions of the U.S. that require the adoption of new technology, the size of hog farms is
expected to increase. Evidence of this change has been shown in the average numbers of
finished hogs by independent producers in comparison to contract producers. Larger farms will
lead to an increase in the total asset value per farm, but the number of enterprises held per farm
will likely decline. Transaction costs incurred by newly formed cooperatives and production
contracts will decline through the sharing of information, market agreements, and resources.
These agreements and mergers could potentially lead to reductions in price risk and more
stabilized earnings for newly formed cooperatives.
In addition, we can expect to see larger finishing operations run by cooperative and
incentive payment contract producers. Through the merger of some independent producers into
cooperatives, cooperative production could potentially expand, producing more finishing hogs on
a larger scale. This expansion is also expected to occur with contract production. Contract
production has always and is expected to continue to be characterized primarily by finishing
operations. One explanation for this is the uniformity and consistency associated with finishing
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hog operations. Because breeding sow operations are labor intensive and require a higher quality
of labor, it is expected that independent, cooperative, and incentive payment contract producers
will continue to have more breeding sow operations than flat-fee contract producers. Short-term
contracts will less likely involve operations that are labor intensive and require great
management skills. Thus, vertically coordinated firms are expected to continue to use incentive
payment contracts to produce pigs for finishing operations and manage the breeding sow
operations in-house.
The continuation of this change will also have an impact on producers’ preferences as
they relate to exercising complete control over production, marketing, and management
decisions.

An increase in the number of contract producers will reduce the array of

responsibilities held by producers due to the mandated inputs used in production and the
management exercised by the contractor. Thus, the responsibility of making production as well
as marketing and management decisions will no longer be solely made by the producer but by
the contractor also. For independent producers, autonomy will still be very important, but to
those producers who may decide to form cooperatives, a portion of their autonomy will be
sacrificed for other benefits. Cooperatives will be formed to increase farm size and compete
with contractors.
Social capital will continue to evolve in the business relations of hog producers.
Relationships of hog producers with lending institutions will become more important as the
number of incentive payment contract producers increases. These relationships are driven by the
adoption of technology and an increase in farm size. Independent and cooperative producers’
relationships with feed merchants will continue to be important. The larger independent and
cooperative farms become, the more they will rely on feed merchants. However, given the
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current reduction in the number of independent producers, it is expected that these relationships
would be on the decline.
One of the most interesting questions that is at the center of agricultural debates is, “will
the hog industry follow the poultry industry and become 100 percent vertically integrated.” The
answer to this question is not easy to predict. It has become increasingly difficult for small
farmers to compete with larger vertically integrated/coordinated firms. In 1999, low hog prices
delivered “deadly” blows to many small hog farmers, forcing them out-of-business. However,
most of the larger, vertically integrated firms were able to continue producing hogs (Iowa State
University Cooperative Extension Service, 1991–2000). As vertically integrated/coordinated
firms become larger, it will only become more difficult for smaller independent producers to
survive unless they too begin to form appropriate strategic alliances.
On the other hand, over sixty percent of the U.S. hog farmers are independent producers,
and the majority of their farms are located in the Midwestern states. Some counties within the
Midwestern states have anti-corporate farming laws. In order for the hog industry to become 100
percent vertically integrated, anti-corporate farming laws must be weakened or eliminated, or
alternative vertically coordinated business arrangements will need to be formed that provide the
benefits of the typical integrator-contractee relationship, but are in accordance with the anticorporate farming laws.
5.9 Limitations of the Study and Further Research Needs
The current study is limited to producers who had sold 200 or more hogs. In an attempt
to capture more contract producers in the surveys returned, we disregarded producers who had
sold 199 hogs or less. Presently, there are approximately 85,760 hog producers in the U.S. Five
thousand hog farmers were surveyed using a stratified sample.

Eight hundred thirty-three

surveys were mailed to six different size categories. The sample population is biased toward the
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larger size category (10,000 or greater), which is not entirely representative of the U.S. hog farm
population. The numbers of hog farms having 200 to 999 head, 1,000 to 1,999 head or 2,000 to
2,999 head are greater than the numbers of hog farms with 10,000 or more head.
Another important assumption constraining this study is related to the choice of
cooperative farming.

There are several types of cooperative farmers; this study did not

specifically focus on any one in particular. Emphasis was placed on the general structure of
cooperative farming, which is based on the combining of resources and the sharing of
production, marketing and management decisions.
This study is limited to six business arrangements. One of these business arrangements
was disregarded due to low respondents and another was combined with another business
arrangement because of their similar characteristics.

Outside of these four business

arrangements, there are others that are used by U.S. hog producers that are unidentified and
unexplained in this study.
An investigation of the effects that independent variables used in this study have on the
contract choice in a nested multinomial logit framework is of great interest. The nested portion
of the logit model involves the different contracts, namely, flat-fee contract, incentive payment
contract, and tournament contract. A nested multinomial logit approach coupled with a larger
sample size would enhance the results and provide more information for academia, government
agencies, and U.S. hog producers.
This study represents a pioneering application that includes independent variables that
have not been analyzed together in one study. The survey design is believed to have had an
impact on the 21% response rate. In that sense the proposed methodology is promising and
could be adopted to analyze other studies that involve polychotomous dependent variables.
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Based on the outcomes of the current study, the following general recommendations are
made for future research.
1. Design a survey that proposes hypothetical questions to producers concerning their
behavior and attitude toward hog production if they were operating under a different
business arrangement.

This information may be used to help further explain why

producers accept one business arrangement over another.
2. Conduct an analysis that allows contracts to be nested. The NML is an extension of the
discrete choice model that is based on variations of a two, three, or four level tree
structure (Greene, 2000). The NML model is an integration of the multinomial logit and
conditional logit models. This analysis gives one the latitude to evaluate contracts along
with other business arrangements and individually as separate distinctive production
contracts.
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APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF SURVEY QUESTIONS AND
EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
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Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistic Results on Sole Proprietorship Used by Producers.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

Cooperative ( C)

0.541298
0.248294
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Flat-fee (F)

0.25
0.1875
I vs C
5.212089382***
86.38707924

0.560976
0.246282
C vs F
-4.09718***
149.627

Incentive (IN)

0.474576
0.249354
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
1.207868 -0.33899 -3.21793***
177.0583 302.801
175.2328

I vs IN
1.33997
692.0063

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistic Results on Partnership Used by Producers.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

0.187316
0.152228
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

0.382352941
0.23615917
I vs C
-3.207496989***
76.17692889

0.195122
0.157049
C vs F
2.550688***
130.5708

Incentive (IN)

0.186441
0.151681
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
0.153449 -0.16876 2.840096***
174.3835 653.8223
52.29272

I vs IN
0.022517
731.8639

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistic Results on Family Corporation Used by Producers.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

0.238938
0.181847
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

0.132352941
0.11483564
I vs C
2.40937545**
90.42085726

0.182927
0.149465
C vs F
-0.85345
149.5551

Incentive (IN)

0.262712
0.193694
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
-1.35556 1.224907 -2.25893**
189.4886 305.2318
185.5874

I vs IN
-0.54402
525.5454

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.4 Descriptive Statistic Results on Non-Family Corporation Used by Producers.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

0.025074
0.024445
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

0.102941176
0.092344291
I vs C
-2.085524405**
70.70729241

Flat-fee (F)

0.04878
0.046401
C vs F
1.234799
119.0158

Incentive (IN)

0.042373
0.040577
F vs IN
I vs F
0.21244 -0.96628
168.5898 956.9319

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.
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C vs IN
1.468185
27.85582

I vs IN
-0.88751
829.2706

Table 4.5 Descriptive Statistic Results on Cooperative Used by Producers.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

0.001475
0.001473
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

0.132352941
0
0.11483564
0
I vs C
C vs F
-3.182758433*** 3.220696***
67.17760765
67

0.016949
0.016662
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
-1.42635 1.000738 2.697734***
117
677
78.51956

I vs IN
-1.29233
116.9951

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.6 Descriptive Statistic Results on the Number of 250 Pounds Hogs Sold.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

2522.841481
22321401.78
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

7794.852941
3899.95 10926.8103
433440992.6 29552918 1828914878
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
-2.082797899** 1.5008693 -1.76446932* -2.1958012** -0.669665 -2.1323964**
67.71442236 74.81912 122.501991 28949.919 94.461843 122.59841

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.7 Descriptive Statistic Results on Producers Who Have Finishing Operations.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

0.368731563
0.241618155
t - distribution
V = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

0.514705882
0.8414634 0.80508475
0.249783737
0.1334027 0.25861821
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
-2.29954704** -4.4882952*** 0.58870537 -10.615199*** -3.7916837*** -8.6443886***
80.95833913
121.51258
199.8086
873.81665
59.806809
357.56738

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.8 Descriptive Statistic Results on the Number of Breeding Sows.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

262.5480059
7325136.514
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

758.7014925
48.597561 297.347458
2991510.777
101741.02 1113050.41
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
-2.119523732** 3.3388091*** -2.40775354** 1.9494574* 1.9959988** -0.2446262
104.4003781
70.898741 146.676695 10740.915 1.9560712 121.88156

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.9 Descriptive Statistic Results on the Producers Who Have Breeding Sow Operations.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

0.05899705
0.055516398
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

0.044117647
0.04217128
I vs C
0.56156749
86.26710215

Flat-fee (F)

0.0365854
0.0352469
C vs F
0.2324506
139.34684

Incentive (IN)

0.03389831
0.03274921
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
0.10103049 0.9907343 0.3410805 1.3238901
172.146436 491.08948 78.430522 759.43743

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.
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Table 4.10 Descriptive Statistic Results on Pigs Sold at 50 pounds.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

356.8142645
3556902.552
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

1322.794118 2178.6585 2183.5431
30039517.19 55152990 46677088.7
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
-1.444815771 -0.8107616 -0.00472614 -2.2128221** -0.9406525 -2.8853749***
68.64756159 147.99771 166.650062 225.83037 273.38787
865.69592

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.11 Descriptive Statistic Results on the Producers Who Have Feeder Pig Operations.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

0.182890855
0.14944179
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

0.323529412
0.218858131
I vs C
-2.398244834**
76.73686762

0.2682927
0.1963117
C vs F
0.7373063
141.72028

Incentive (IN)

0.21186441
0.16697788
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
0.91429197 -1.6702292* 1.640436 -0.7164383
166.947643 453.7048 84.906244 856.61375

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.12 Descriptive Statistic Results on the Producers Who Have Farrow to Finishing Operations.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

0.58259587
0.272676447
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

0.367647059
0.0121951 0.03389831
0.232482699
0.0120464 0.03274921
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
3.477316381*** 5.9525656*** -1.05344955 24.342227*** 5.4894677*** 21.046028***
84.06740764
72.942179 196.558432
25517.544 -0.9405801
201.44853

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.13: Descriptive Statistic Results on the Producers Who Have Farrow to Wean Operations.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

0.156342183
0.131899305
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

0.25
0.0853659 0.16101695
0.1875
0.0780785 0.13509049
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
-1.723826694* 2.7030898*** -1.65201803* 2.09597** 1.4244697 -0.1277346
77.03991411
111.61917 198.456466 1251.3431 34.282011 395.25634

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

149

Table 4.14 Descriptive Statistic Results on the Number of Enterprises.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

3.333333333
2.871189774
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

2.779411765 2.5925926 2.92372881
3.730752595 2.1673525 3.51113186
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
2.278551965** 0.655223 -1.39698185 4.2299791*** -0.4961155 2.2217143**
78.01446616 124.99416 197.08564
780.73575 59.822553 420.80629

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.15 Descriptive Statistic Results on the Number of Years Raising Hogs.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

26.79464286
173.169138
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

20.76470588
159.0622837
I vs C
3.743524396***
82.78812964

Incentive (IN)

18.469136 19.2136752
125.36016 149.774856
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
1.1672155 -0.44510156 6.2328926*** 0.8165095 6.1395119***
137.22604 185.762203
527.49944 82.331842
572.21744

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.16 Descriptive Statistic Results on the Number of Acres Used in the Operation.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

623.2567976
781342.7135
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

803.3538462 496.93243
1141605.029
330727.2
I vs C
C vs F
-1.344579591 2.1235495**
76.76034072 99.276485

479.157895
519683.624
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
0.1935063 1.7542206* 2.2269857** 1.9331216*
196.307781 2188.1818 14.759279 429.58385

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.17 Descriptive Statistic Results on Whether Corn Is Produced on the Farm.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

0.865781711
0.11620374
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

0.705882353 0.8024691 0.65254237
0.207612457 0.1585124 0.22673082
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
2.815881865*** -1.3678319 2.41486955** 1.3801255 0.7562667 4.6612173***
74.93964928 136.03387 193.372255 549.69865 87.437537
476.21877

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.18 Descriptive Statistic Results on Whether Soybeans are Produced on the Farm.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

0.81120944
0.153148685
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

0.691176471 0.7530864 0.65254237
0.213451557 0.1859473 0.22673082
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
2.069264388** -0.84197 1.55344593 1.1639669 0.543096 3.4240282***
77.24612716 140.76416 186.735501 469.25413 98.954582
562.26109

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.
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Table 4.19 Descriptive Statistic Results on the Total Number of Techonologies and Management Practices Adopted.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

Cooperative ( C)

2.573746313
4.869930213
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

3.955882353
1.9756098 2.37288136
6.130406574
1.8530637 3.18299339
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
-4.430109213*** 5.8974471*** -1.78429042* 3.4660099*** 4.625425*** 1.0868318
78.38106136
100.56973 198.326361
2038.9785 17.833428 394.9756

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.20 Descriptive Statistic Results on Percentage of Flat-fee Contracts Used in the County.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

0.39528
0.239034
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

0.485294118
0.682927
0.347458
0.249783737
0.216538
0.226731
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
-1.4186682 -2.48718** 4.966698*** -5.25759***
80.80315134
140.6007
178.9205
471.48

C vs IN
I vs IN
1.842784* 1.002854
89.85963 664.921

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.21 Descriptive Statistic Results on Percentage of Incentive Contracts Used in the County.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

0.373156
0.233911
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

0.602941176
0.5
0.813559
0.239403114
0.25
0.151681
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
-3.695821071*** 1.270065 -4.76283*** -2.17734** -3.03809*** -10.9068***
81.10467011 145.989
147.2397
382.7688
95.07156
1334.049

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.22 Descriptive Statistic Results on the Percentage of Business Arrangements Located in the Southern U.S.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

0.023599
0.023042
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

0.014705882
0.134146
0.313559
0.014489619
0.116151
0.21524
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
0.565766472 -2.95881** -3.1517*** -2.90266*** -6.62135*** -6.72682***
90.52603008
104.9389
199.4279
107.8421
364.943
373.5561

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.
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Table 4.23 Descriptive Statistic Results on the Average Number of Times per Year Producers Sell Hogs at Local Auctions, Packing or Slaughter
Houses.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

Cooperative ( C)

32.0739
848.2854
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

34.34848485
18.625
1028.28765
1116.734
I vs C
C vs F
-0.562131158 2.93292***
78.83400145
146.869

12.29358
1445.895
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
1.24476 3.487652*** 4.215279** 5.382623***
189.4497
367.2747
144.2836
527.5494

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.24 Descriptive Statistic Results on the Number of Hours Worked Off-Farm.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

25.98922414
442.6432028
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

22.375
32.85 30.2765957
410.046875
235.8275 416.45541
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
1.398074832 -3.5100359*** 1.01681211 -3.6522376*** -2.555641** -2.0964831**
82.64894392
124.57641 198.795308
788.96926 62.95119 387.62462

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.25 Descriptive Statistic Results on the Number of Full-Time Workers.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

1.122137405
9.359128256
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

3.402985075
0.7922078 1.68695652
41.04655825
3.9308484 26.7367864
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
-2.902702049*** 3.2343842*** -1.70770955* 1.3278034 1.8833492* -1.1520039
70.18810286
77.975181 162.145218 15177.804 11.193348 172.56553

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.26 Descriptive Statistic Results on the Number of Part-Time Workers.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

0.779141104
7.530975949
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

1.166666667 0.4473684 0.69642857
3.108585859 0.6419668 1.76498724
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
-1.625704443 3.108538*** -1.64993395* 2.4109644** 1.9090776* 0.5123198
103.9689109 90.403987 196.288118 3113.6627 14.141242 249.83181

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.
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Table 4.27 Descriptive Statistic Results on Producer’s Debt-to-Asset Ratio.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

2.498417722
1.487339269
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

3 3.109589
1.125 1.4674423
I vs C
C vs F
-3.664228071*** -0.5905234
86.35382453 149.57282

Incentive (IN)

3.09708738
1.52455462
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
0.07121681 -4.3120122*** -0.5656091 -4.8697008***
178.490831
304.83638 174.85043
671.56147

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.28 Descriptive Statistic Results on the Total Value of Farm Assets.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

2.79705401
2.819696722
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

3.661290323
2.5131579 2.72380952
3.901404787
2.486669 2.86657596
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
-3.484018286*** 3.8769936*** -0.90135514 1.5287982 3.2805004*** 0.4342298
77.32341432
128.83195 183.993656 690.56437
54.643422 596.45926

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.29 Descriptive Statistic Results on the Net Household Income > $100,000.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

3.123762376
4.01933634
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

3.606557377
2.8243243
3.63551402
2.500940607
1.6042732
2.58677614
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
-2.336223762** 3.2954655*** -3.98263876*** 1.8754285* -0.1195165 -3.0665229***
90.79153294
129.09508
196.971815 678.73729 70.797916
418.793

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.30 Descriptive Statistic Results on Autonomy Is Not Important at All.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

0.019578313
0.019195003
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

0.075757576 0.2531646
0.070018365 0.1890723
I vs C
C vs F
-1.727168165* -3.071808***
70.84089177 138.07948

Incentive (IN)

0.21551724
0.16906956
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
0.61571862 -4.8349309*** -2.8164105*** -5.1260183***
169.903858
171.67956
426.51075
808.13485

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.
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Table 4.31 Descriptive Statistic Results on Autonomy Is Not Very Important.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

Cooperative ( C)

0.024096386
0.02351575
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Flat-fee (F)

0.121212121 0.164557
0.106519743 0.137478
I vs C
C vs F
-2.427020728** -0.7611357
70.0857692 149.48326

Incentive (IN)

0.14655172
0.12507432
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
0.34419151 -3.3954583*** -0.4944448 -3.7012029***
170.917077
308.5404 164.39728
791.02715

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.32 Descriptive Statistic Results on Autonomy Is Somewhat Important.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

Cooperative ( C)

0.254518072
0.189738623
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Flat-fee (F)

0.454545455 0.4177215
0.247933884 0.2432303
I vs C
C vs F
-2.427020728** -0.7611357
70.0857692 149.48326

Incentive (IN)

0.37931034
0.23543401
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
0.34419151 -3.3954583*** -0.4944448 -3.7012029***
170.917077
308.5404 164.39728
791.02715

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.33 Descriptive Statistic Results on Autonomy Is Very Important.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

Cooperative ( C)

0.701807229
0.209273842
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

0.333333333
0.164557 0.25862069
0.222222222
0.137478 0.19173603
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
6.161256264*** 2.4002083** -1.63708164 12.057905*** 1.0681024 10.078814***
80.5749319 127.60131 192.451579
716.94345 59.591574
486.17216

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.34 Statistical Results on the Rating of Biosecurity.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

Cooperative ( C)

5.899212598
5.435511191
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

7.030769231 6.691358 6.95535714
4.091360947 3.9911599 4.54264987
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
-4.333461023*** 1.0288034 -0.89416911 -3.3270015*** 0.240083 -4.8970153***
86.45330806 144.23468 183.346569
411.66118 115.04705
603.5295

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.35 Statistical Results on the Producers Who Check Sources Twice or More Times a Week for Market Hog Prices.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

0.634586466
0.231886483
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

0.582089552
0.2911392 0.3539823
0.243261305
0.2063772 0.22867883
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
0.838541704 3.7270194*** -0.9415548 6.4234351*** 3.0715204*** 5.8766441***
80.74734622
139.86584 181.958351
483.54768
89.436978
623.37677

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.
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Table 4.36 Statistical Results on the Producers Who Check Sources Once a Week or Less for Market Hog Prices.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

Cooperative ( C)

0.365413534
0.231886483
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

0.417910448
0.7088608 0.6460177
0.243261305
0.2063772 0.22867883
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
-0.838541704 -3.7270194*** 0.9415548 -6.4234351*** -3.0715204*** -5.8766441***
80.74734622
139.8658 181.95835
483.5477
89.43698
623.3768

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.37 Statistical Results on the Producers Who Check Sources Once a Month or More for Leanness and Back-Fat Values.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

Cooperative ( C)

0.552469136
0.24724699

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

0.523076923
0.2151899 0.26548673
0.249467456
0.1688832 0.19500352
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
0.462808657 4.0680165*** -0.82552381 6.8502028*** 3.5312143*** 6.3896363***
81.31563407
131.29492 184.076099
637.59728
61.208557
593.36083

t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.38 Statistical Results on the Producers Who Check Sources Once Quarterly for Leanness and Back-Fat Values.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

0.205246914
0.163120618
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

0.353846154 0.1898734 0.21238938
0.228639053 0.1538215 0.16728013
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
-2.475646793** 2.2655839** -0.39233917 0.3341699 2.0460267** -0.1753991
77.18662069 131.04229 180.968187 643.90001 58.017421 637.07361

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.39 Statistical Results on the Rating of Labor Quality.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

5.916535433
6.81980532
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

7.212121212 6.3291139 6.50442478
4.318640955 6.2967473 7.25882998
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
-4.776626646*** 2.35742** -0.47140013 -1.3999931 2.0014682** -2.1974413**
90.35205563
149.999 183.994222 274.48568 209.93528 596.72015

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.
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Table 4.40 Descriptive Statistic Results on the Percentage of Producers Who Were Identified as Risk Averse for a Particular Investment.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

0.785016
0.168766
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

0.828125
0.142333984
I vs C
-0.890770239
84.26278427

Flat-fee (F)

0.730769
0.196746
C vs F
1.452508
149.9121

Incentive (IN)

0.766355
0.179055
F vs IN
-0.56861
170.9368

I vs F
C vs IN
1.054135 1.027991
288.6015 183.1748

I vs IN
0.44402
787.127

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.41 Descriptive Statistic Results on the Importance of Relationship with Lending Institutions.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

3.428139183
0.647256598
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

3.686567164
3.45 3.65811966
0.334595678
0.6225 0.39593834
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
-3.371544767*** 2.1149071** -1.98915242** -0.2364732 0.3127056 -3.5030718***
95.996508 147.77502 149.890004 223.03031 266.98545
1246.8726

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.42 Descriptive Statistic Results on the Importance of Relationship with Feed Merchants.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

3.233082707
0.57574764
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

3.358208955
2.9240506
3
0.349298285
0.677776 0.96551724
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
-1.617270988 3.7502348*** -0.59220053 3.2369148*** 3.103839*** 2.4526144**
91.43983556
146.99763 193.22712
215.93759 284.27327 477.94707

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.43 Descriptive Statistic Results on the Importance of Relationship with Veterinarians.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

3.434848485
0.494240129
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

3.388059701
3.0625 3.2991453
0.446424593 0.7835938 0.77375995
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
0.547845151 2.5640911** -1.86425584* 3.671535*** 0.7761867 1.589783
83.06729532 148.67363 175.647451 234.04989 261.33404 715.01513

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.
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Table 4.44 Descriptive Statistic Results on the Importance of Relationship with Non-Farmers.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

3.35347432
0.597110286
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

3.373134328
3.4 3.48717949
0.532412564
0.415 0.52333991
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
-0.21065287 -0.2366255 -0.89462822 -0.6035851 -1.0297902 -1.8338541*
83.28596023 136.81487 188.287112 534.47486 83.576516 539.80021

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.45 Descriptive Statistic Results on the Importance of Relationship with Packer/Slaughterer.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

3.240487062
0.67580372
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

3.432835821
2.6625 2.68965517
0.454444197
1.0985938 1.31747919
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
-2.194903663** 5.4361692*** -0.17326695 4.8175215*** 5.5628664*** 4.9948156***
88.91192308
141.50474 185.943218
184.33151
353.97486
573.12811

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.46 Descriptive Statistic Results on the Importance of Relationship with Neighboring Farmers.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

3.50678733
0.488264641
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

3.417910448
3.6 3.64957265
0.482067276
0.34 0.31309811
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
1.005728051 -1.7178591* -0.60116926 -1.3361855 -2.3470253** -2.4583368**
81.64296614 132.94195 171.625992 605.21064 56.710544 769.54386

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.47 Statistical Results on the Producer’s Age.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

48.41728763
146.0285536
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

44.54545455
155.7327824
I vs C
2.446039213**
80.51435648

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

43.691358 46.7372881
92.163999 111.430982
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
0.4622387 -2.11794707** 4.0835985*** -1.2187167 1.5600342
125.76318 186.333879
760.43096 49.226274 563.68794

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

157

Table 4.48 Statistical Results on the Producer Who Completed Less Than High School.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

0.044378698
0.042409229
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

0.030769231 0.0487805 0.06779661
0.029822485 0.046401 0.06320023
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
0.607955517 -0.5683082 -0.57297743 -0.1755924 -1.1863356 -0.957513
87.90000985 149.81635 191.542146 259.12247 231.39389 500.08191

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.49 Statistical Results on the Producer Who Completed High School.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

0.334319527
0.222549981
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

0.261538462
0.193136095
I vs C
1.292983013
83.75378947

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

0.2560976 0.37288136
0.1905116 0.23384085
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
0.0757176 -1.77989869* 1.5190716 -1.6034361 -0.8023366
144.53951 187.046834 406.97913 121.62566 556.90266

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.50 Statistical Results on the Producer Who Completed Some College.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

0.355029586
0.228983579
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

0.323076923 0.4634146 0.33898305
0.218698225 0.2486615 0.22407354
I vs C
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
0.53598843 -1.775345* 1.77192827* -1.8669904* -0.2224018 0.3392978
82.15822281 147.77004 170.356371 349.88212 132.94608 796.11738

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.51 Descriptive Statistic Results on the Producer Who Completed a Bachelor’s Degree.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

0.218934911
0.171002416
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Cooperative ( C)

0.323076923
0.218698225
I vs C
-1.768330685*
78.19642132

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

0.2073171 0.1779661
0.1643367 0.14629417
C vs F
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
I vs IN
1.6021827 0.51533496 0.2445822 2.1738549** 1.0606433
135.42457 169.640296 560.05698 62.626852 806.81607

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.
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Table 4.52 Descriptive Statistic Results on the Producer Who Completed a Master’s Degree.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

Cooperative ( C)

0.032544
0.031485

0.046153846
0.044023669
I vs C
-0.516665908
77.21232225

t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

0.02439
0.023795
C vs F
0.710761
122.0067

0.033898
0.032749
F vs IN
-0.39905
191.9473

I vs F
C vs IN
0.444431 0.402972
861.7611 45.95052

I vs IN
-0.07522
493.5147

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.53 Descriptive Statistic Results on the Producer Who Completed a Ph.D. Degree.

Independent (I)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

Cooperative ( C)

0.014793
0.014574
t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

0.015384615
0.015147929
I vs C
-0.037860619
80.88043214

Flat-fee (F)

Incentive (IN)

0
0
C vs F
1.030776
67

0.008475
0.008403
F vs IN
I vs F
C vs IN
-1.00426 3.190639*** 0.40302
117
72919.6 4.656429

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. ** indicates significance at the 0.05 level. * indicates significance at the 0.10 level.

Table 4.54 Statistical Results on Number of Months Producers Have Been
Producing Under Contract.

Flat-fee (F)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

43.21951
1244.684

t - distribution
V = degree of freedom

Incentive (IN)

55.491525
2100.6906
F vs IN
-2.136881**
197.98882

** indicates significance at the 0.05 level.

Table 4.55 Statistical Results on the Percentage of Producers Who Had Contracts
with Neighboring Farmers.

Flat-fee (F)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

t - distribution
V = degree of freedom

0.390244
0.237954

Incentive (IN)

0.1016949
0.0913531
F vs IN
4.759143***
124.89453

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.
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I vs IN
0.656219
115.1295

Table 4.56 Statistical Results on the Percentage of Producers Who Were Required
to Obtain New or Renovated Facilities.

Flat-fee (F)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

0.414634
0.242713

t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Incentive (IN)

0.6864407
0.2152399
F vs IN
-3.929754***
169.41487

*** indicates significance at the 0.01 level.

Table 4.57 Statistical Results on the Percentage of Producers Who Were Provided
Feed by the Contractor.

Flat-fee (F)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

0.878049
0.107079

t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Incentive (IN)

0.90678
0.08453
F vs IN
-0.63891
162.5114

Table 4.58 Statistical Results on the Percentage of Producers Who Were Provided
Animals by the Contractor.

Flat-fee (F)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Incentive (IN)

0.8658537 0.91525424
0.1161511 0.07756392
F vs IN
-1.08479779
152.674618

Table 4.59 Statistical Results on Medication Provided by the Contractor.

Flat-fee (F)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Incentive (IN)

0.8658537 0.89830508
0.1161511 0.09135306
F vs IN
-0.69334081
162.291215
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Table 4.60 Statistical Results on Producers Who Had Raised Hogs
Prior to Accepting a Contract.

Flat-fee (F)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

Incentive (IN)

0.8902439 0.90677966
0.0977097 0.08453031
F vs IN
-0.37856612
167.95216

Table 4.61 Statistical Results on Average Acres Used for Hog Production.

Flat-fee (F)
Mean Value
Standard Deviation

t - distribution
v = degree of freedom

496.9324
330727.2

Incentive (IN)

479.1579
519683.6
F vs IN
0.193506
196.3078
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APPENDIX B: TESTING FOR HETEROSKEDASTICITY USING THE
HETEROSKEDASTICITY EXTREME VALUE LOGIT AND MULTIPLICATIVE
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Table 5.1a. Results From the Multinomial
Logit Model Before Testing for
Heteroskedasticity.
(Cooperative vs Independent).

Table 5.1b. Results From the Multinomial
Logit Model After Testing for
Heteroskedasticity Using the HEVL
(Cooperative vs Independent).

Exogenous Standard
Variables
Errors
INTERCEPT 1.46662
HOG250
0.00002
BREEDSOW 0.00003
TOTALFD
0.09186
DARATIO
0.00067
AUNOTIMP
0.26462
AUVERIMP
0.26440
BIOSECUR
0.00071
AGE
0.00092
COMPHS
0.58785
BACHELO
0.29636
CORN
0.27857
MKTPRICE
1.23940
VALFARAS
0.00056
NEIGFARM
0.00821
RISKAVER
0.34070
FFLATFEE
0.29330
FCONTRWI
0.29510
HINCOME
0.41906
SOUTH
0.67409
LENDINST
0.16478
FEEDMERC 0.16470
TIMEHSYR
0.00085
NHWOFFFA 0.00751

Exogenous
Variables
INTERCEPT
HOG250
BREEDSOW
TOTALFD
DARATIO
AUNOTIMP
AUVERIMP
BIOSECUR
AGE
COMPHS
BACHELO
CORN
MKTPRICE
VALFARAS
NEIGFARM
RISKAVER
FFLATFEE
FCONTRWI
HINCOME
SOUTH
LENDINST
FEEDMERC
TIMEHSYR
NHWOFFFA

P-Values
0.8522
0.0002
0.9552
0.3988
0.8855
0.0003
0.0003
0.9066
0.1227
0.2776
0.4400
0.0101
0.2260
0.9619
0.7581
0.2446
0.9625
0.0028
0.8131
0.9303
0.3221
0.3161
0.1680
0.4542
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Standard
Errors
1.46662
0.00002
0.00003
0.09186
0.00067
0.26462
0.26440
0.00071
0.00092
0.58785
0.29636
0.27857
1.23940
0.00056
0.00821
0.34070
0.29330
0.29510
0.41906
0.67409
0.16478
0.16470
0.00085
0.00751

P-Values
0.8522
0.0002
0.9552
0.3988
0.8855
0.0003
0.0003
0.9066
0.1227
0.2776
0.4400
0.0101
0.2260
0.9619
0.7581
0.2446
0.9625
0.0028
0.8131
0.9303
0.3221
0.3161
0.1680
0.4542

Table 5.2a. Results From the Multinomial
Logit Model Before Testing for
Heteroskedasticity.
(Flat-Fee Contract vs Independent).

Table 5.2b. Results From the Multinomial
Logit Model After Testing for
Heteroskedasticity Using the HEVL
(Flat-Fee Contract vs Independent).

Exogenous Standard
Variables
Errors
INTERCEPT 1.43251
HOG250
0.00002
BREEDSOW 0.00075
TOTALFD
0.10458
DARATIO
0.00054
AUNOTIMP
0.22325
AUVERIMP
0.22311
BIOSECUR
0.00142
AGE
0.00110
COMPHS
0.65866
BACHELO
0.34011
CORN
0.28381
MKTPRICE
1.12260
VALFARAS
0.00067
NEIGFARM
0.17420
RISKAVER
0.31166
FFLATFEE
0.30551
FCONTRWI
0.29736
HINCOME
0.59879
SOUTH
0.71456
LENDINST
0.17672
FEEDMERC 0.13307
TIMEHSYR
0.00051
NHWOFFFA 0.00692

Exogenous
Variables
INTERCEPT
HOG250
BREEDSOW
TOTALFD
DARATIO
AUNOTIMP
AUVERIMP
BIOSECUR
AGE
COMPHS
BACHELO
CORN
MKTPRICE
VALFARAS
NEIGFARM
RISKAVER
FFLATFEE
FCONTRWI
HINCOME
SOUTH
LENDINST
FEEDMERC
TIMEHSYR
NHWOFFFA

P-Values
0.4382
0.0005
0.0025
0.0126
0.0243
0.0000
0.0000
0.0456
0.4511
0.5340
0.2549
0.0038
0.4315
0.0157
0.0064
0.6442
0.0003
0.9243
0.1062
0.8333
0.6881
0.0000
0.1683
0.0910
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Standard
Errors
1.43251
0.00002
0.00075
0.10458
0.00054
0.22325
0.22311
0.00142
0.00110
0.65866
0.34011
0.28381
1.12260
0.00067
0.17420
0.31166
0.30551
0.29736
0.59879
0.71456
0.17672
0.13307
0.00051
0.00692

P-Values
0.4382
0.0005
0.0025
0.0126
0.0243
0.0000
0.0000
0.0456
0.4511
0.5340
0.2549
0.0038
0.4315
0.0157
0.0064
0.6442
0.0003
0.9243
0.1062
0.8333
0.6881
0.0000
0.1683
0.0910

Table 5.3a. Results From the Multinomial
Logit Model Before Testing for
Heteroskedasticity.
(Incentive Payment Contract vs Independent).

Table 5.3b. Results From the Multinomial
Logit Model After Testing for
Heteroskedasticity Using the HEVL
(Incentive Payment Contract vs Independent).

Exogenous Standard
Variables
Errors
INTERCEPT 1.19374
HOG250
0.00002
BREEDSOW 0.00018
TOTALFD
0.08298
DARATIO
0.00046
AUNOTIMP
0.21457
AUVERIMP
0.21440
BIOSECUR
0.00062
AGE
0.00248
COMPHS
0.51147
BACHELO
0.31072
CORN
0.27502
MKTPRICE
0.96264
VALFARAS
0.00050
NEIGFARM
0.15902
RISKAVER
0.27608
FFLATFEE
0.26603
FCONTRWI
0.30577
HINCOME
0.36959
SOUTH
0.43047
LENDINST
0.17029
FEEDMERC 0.13308
TIMEHSYR
0.00049
NHWOFFFA 0.00657

Exogenous
Variables
INTERCEPT
HOG250
BREEDSOW
TOTALFD
DARATIO
AUNOTIMP
AUVERIMP
BIOSECUR
AGE
COMPHS
BACHELO
CORN
MKTPRICE
VALFARAS
NEIGFARM
RISKAVER
FFLATFEE
FCONTRWI
HINCOME
SOUTH
LENDINST
FEEDMERC
TIMEHSYR
NHWOFFFA

P-Values
0.0659
0.0000
0.0146
0.4773
0.0085
0.0000
0.0000
0.9548
0.4579
0.0149
0.0492
0.0074
0.0064
0.5709
0.2907
0.2908
0.0309
0.0000
0.3839
0.0001
0.0270
0.0000
0.5412
0.0235
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Standard
Errors
1.19374
0.00002
0.00018
0.08298
0.00046
0.21457
0.21440
0.00062
0.00248
0.51147
0.31072
0.27502
0.96264
0.00050
0.15902
0.27608
0.26603
0.30577
0.36959
0.43047
0.17029
0.13308
0.00049
0.00657

P-Values
0.0659
0.0000
0.0146
0.4773
0.0085
0.0000
0.0000
0.9548
0.4579
0.0149
0.0492
0.0074
0.0064
0.5709
0.2907
0.2908
0.0309
0.0000
0.3839
0.0001
0.0270
0.0000
0.5412
0.0235

Table 5.4a. Results From the Multinomial
Logit Model Before Testing for
Heteroskedasticity.
(Flat-Fee Contract vs Cooperative).

Table 5.4b. Results From the Multinomial
Logit Model After Testing for
Heteroskedasticity Using the HEVL
(Flat-Fee Contract vs Cooperative).

Exogenous Standard
Variables
Errors
INTERCEPT 1.80391
HOG250
0.00004
BREEDSOW 0.00076
TOTALFD
0.12724
DARATIO
0.00081
AUNOTIMP
0.27473
AUVERIMP
0.27456
BIOSECUR
0.00154
AGE
0.00123
COMPHS
0.79865
BACHELO
0.41675
CORN
0.13121
MKTPRICE
1.47974
VALFARAS
0.00082
NEIGFARM
0.17401
RISKAVER
0.43235
FFLATFEE
0.39417
FCONTRWI
0.39100
HINCOME
0.67928
SOUTH
0.90269
LENDINST
0.22370
FEEDMERC 0.13308
TIMEHSYR
0.00049
NHWOFFFA 0.00657

Exogenous
Variables
INTERCEPT
HOG250
BREEDSOW
TOTALFD
DARATIO
AUNOTIMP
AUVERIMP
BIOSECUR
AGE
COMPHS
BACHELO
CORN
MKTPRICE
VALFARAS
NEIGFARM
RISKAVER
FFLATFEE
FCONTRWI
HINCOME
SOUTH
LENDINST
FEEDMERC
TIMEHSYR
NHWOFFFA

P-Values
0.6637
0.7768
0.0028
0.0888
0.1046
0.0040
0.0040
0.0789
0.5924
0.8447
0.1551
0.1078
0.6938
0.0566
0.0068
0.2053
0.0056
0.0305
0.1072
0.8171
0.6645
0.0462
0.0506
0.4436
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Standard
Errors
1.80391
0.00004
0.00076
0.12724
0.00081
0.27473
0.27456
0.00154
0.00123
0.79865
0.41675
0.13121
1.47974
0.00082
0.17401
0.43235
0.39417
0.39100
0.67928
0.90269
0.22370
0.13308
0.00049
0.00657

P-Values
0.6637
0.7768
0.0028
0.0888
0.1046
0.0040
0.0040
0.0789
0.5924
0.8447
0.1551
0.1078
0.6938
0.0566
0.0068
0.2053
0.0056
0.0305
0.1072
0.8171
0.6645
0.0462
0.0506
0.4436

Table 5.5a. Results From the Multinomial
Logit Model Before Testing for
Heteroskedasticity.
(Incentive Payment Co. vs Cooperative).

Table 5.5b. Results From the Multinomial
Logit Model After Testing for
Heteroskedasticity Using the HEVL
(Incentive Payment Co. vs Cooperative).

Exogenous Standard
Variables
Errors
INTERCEPT 1.62870
HOG250
0.00001
BREEDSOW 0.00018
TOTALFD
0.10654
DARATIO
0.00075
AUNOTIMP
0.26084
AUVERIMP
0.26064
BIOSECUR
0.00087
AGE
0.00255
COMPHS
0.67744
BACHELO
0.38828
CORN
0.11317
MKTPRICE
1.37436
VALFARAS
0.00068
NEIGFARM
0.15921
RISKAVER
0.40436
FFLATFEE
0.35731
FCONTRWI
0.39252
HINCOME
0.48390
SOUTH
0.69487
LENDINST
0.21831
FEEDMERC 0.18819
TIMEHSYR
0.00093
NHWOFFFA 0.00885

Exogenous
Variables
INTERCEPT
HOG250
BREEDSOW
TOTALFD
DARATIO
AUNOTIMP
AUVERIMP
BIOSECUR
AGE
COMPHS
BACHELO
CORN
MKTPRICE
VALFARAS
NEIGFARM
RISKAVER
FFLATFEE
FCONTRWI
HINCOME
SOUTH
LENDINST
FEEDMERC
TIMEHSYR
NHWOFFFA

P-Values
0.2368
0.2392
0.0141
0.8610
0.0779
0.0190
0.0197
0.9473
0.1995
0.3695
0.0313
0.8630
0.4119
0.7081
0.3061
0.0876
0.1156
0.0006
0.6411
0.0187
0.3370
0.0480
0.1095
0.2888
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Standard
Errors
1.62870
0.00001
0.00018
0.10654
0.00075
0.26084
0.26064
0.00087
0.00255
0.67744
0.38828
0.11317
1.37436
0.00068
0.15921
0.40436
0.35731
0.39252
0.48390
0.69487
0.21831
0.18819
0.00093
0.00885

P-Values
0.2368
0.2392
0.0141
0.8610
0.0779
0.0190
0.0197
0.9473
0.1995
0.3695
0.0313
0.8630
0.4119
0.7081
0.3061
0.0876
0.1156
0.0006
0.6411
0.0187
0.3370
0.0480
0.1095
0.2888

Table 5.6a. Results From the Multinomial
Logit Model Before Testing for
Heteroskedasticity.
(Flat-Fee Contract vs Incentive Payment Co.).

Table 5.6b. Results From the Multinomial
Logit Model After Testing for
Heteroskedasticity Using the HEVL
(Flat-Fee Contract vs Incentive Payment Co.).

Exogenous Standard
Variables
Errors
INTERCEPT 1.49280
HOG250
0.00001
BREEDSOW 0.00076
TOTALFD
0.11578
DARATIO
0.00061
AUNOTIMP
0.20971
AUVERIMP
0.20967
BIOSECUR
0.00123
AGE
0.00259
COMPHS
0.72449
BACHELO
0.40718
CORN
0.11770
MKTPRICE
1.18936
VALFARAS
0.00075
NEIGFARM
0.15954
RISKAVER
0.36539
FFLATFEE
0.35772
FCONTRWI
0.38680
HINCOME
0.63673
SOUTH
0.66855
LENDINST
0.15950
FEEDMERC 0.00217
TIMEHSYR
0.00059
NHWOFFFA 0.00805

Exogenous
Variables
INTERCEPT
HOG250
BREEDSOW
TOTALFD
DARATIO
AUNOTIMP
AUVERIMP
BIOSECUR
AGE
COMPHS
BACHELO
CORN
MKTPRICE
VALFARAS
NEIGFARM
RISKAVER
FFLATFEE
FCONTRWI
HINCOME
SOUTH
LENDINST
FEEDMERC
TIMEHSYR
NHWOFFFA

P-Values
0.3752
0.4454
0.0181
0.0528
0.9801
0.3537
0.3465
0.1115
0.3257
0.2919
0.4540
0.0621
0.1079
0.0739
0.0683
0.7879
0.0000
0.0000
0.0363
0.0592
0.0694
0.2180
0.5669
0.7615
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Standard
Errors
1.49280
0.00001
0.00076
0.11578
0.00061
0.20971
0.20967
0.00123
0.00259
0.72449
0.40718
0.11770
1.18936
0.00075
0.15954
0.36539
0.35772
0.38680
0.63673
0.66855
0.15950
0.00217
0.00059
0.00805

P-Values
0.3752
0.4454
0.0181
0.0528
0.9801
0.3537
0.3465
0.1115
0.3257
0.2919
0.4540
0.0621
0.1079
0.0739
0.0683
0.7879
0.0000
0.0000
0.0363
0.0592
0.0694
0.2180
0.5669
0.7615

Table 5.7a. Results From the Binomial
Logit Model Before Testing for
Heteroskedasticity.
(Flat-Fee Contract vs Incentive Payment Co.).

Table 5.7b. Results From the Binomial
Logit Model After Testing for
Heteroskedasticity Using the Multiplicative.
(Flat-Fee Contract vs Incentive Payment Co.).

Exogenous Standard
Variables
Errors
INTERCEPT 0.53156
HOG250
0.00417
BREEDSOW 0.40128
TOTALFD
0.33061
DARATIO
0.00022
AUNOTIMP
0.53034

Exogenous
Variables
INTERCEPT
HOG250
BREEDSOW
TOTALFD
DARATIO
NHWOFFFA

P-Values
0.8149
0.0933
0.0000
0.0046
0.5628
0.9379

169

Standard
Errors
0.53156
0.00417
0.40128
0.33061
0.00022
0.53034

P-Values
0.8149
0.0933
0.0000
0.0046
0.5628
0.9379

APPENDIX C: PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF THE EXOGENOUS
VARIABLES FOR THE MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL
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Table 6.1 Statistics of the Exogenous Variables Used in the Multinomial Logit Model.
______________________________________________________________________________________
Variable
N
Mean
Std Dev
Sum
Minimum
Maximum
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
United States
(state)
946
22.61
9.98
21386
1.00
50.00
Number of Breeding Sows
(breedsow)

944

283.53

2375

67650

0

70000

No. of 250 Pound Hogs Produced
(hog250)

939

4060

16874

3812474

0

400000

Number of Enterprises
(totalfd)

945

3.18

1.74

3004

0

11.00

Corn Produced on the Farm
(corn)

945

0.82

0.38

777.00

0

1.00

Debt-to-Asset Ratio
(daratio)

872

2.65

1.24

2317

1.00

5.00

No. of Hours Worked Off Farm
(nhwofffa)

946

10.03

18.07

9487

0

80.00

Autonomy Is Not Very Important
(aunotimp)

925

0.07

0.25

63.00

0

1.00

Autonomy Is Very Important
(auverimp)

925

0.57

0.49

531.00

0

1.00

Flat-fee Contracts Used in the Co.
(fflatee)

946

0.42

0.49

398.00

0

1.00

Flat-fee Contracts Used in the Co.
(fcontrwi)

946

0.46

0.50

431.00

0

1.00

Freq. of Checking Market Price
(mrkprice)

924

0.57

0.50

524.00

0

1.00

No. of Times Hogs Sold per Year
(timesyr)

883

28.71

31.79

25347

0

365.00

Total Value of Farm Assets
(valfaras)

854

2.83

1.71

2413

0

7.00

Rating of Biosecurity
(biosecur)

893

6.19

2.30

5524

0

10.00

Producer Age
(age)

936

47.52

11.85

44482

17.0

87.00

Producer Completed High School
(comphs)

941

0.95

0.21

897.00

0

1.00

Producer Holds Bachelor’s Degree
(bachelor)
941
0.27
0.44
250.00
0
1.00
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
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______________________________________________________________________________________
Variable
N
Mean
Std Dev
Sum
Minimum
Maximum
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
Net Household Income ≥ 100,000
(nhincome)
848
3.16
1.59
2681
1.00
7.00
Imp. of Relations with Farmers
(neigfarm)

927

3.53

0.68

3269

1.00

5.00

Imp. of Relations with Lenders
(lendinst)

925

3.48

0.77

3217

0

4.00

Imp. of Relations with Feed Merch.
(feedmerc)
927

3.19

0.79

2954

0

5.00

Self Assess. of Risk Preference
(choicinv)

2.81

1.13

2424

1.00

5.00

863

______________________________________________________________________________
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Table 6.2 Pearson Correlation Coefficients of the Exogenous Variables for the Multinomial Logit Model.
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
state
breedsow hog250
totalfd
corn
daratio nhwofffa
aunotimp
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
state

1.00000

0.01257
0.6996
944

0.03110
0.3412
939

0.12552
0.0001
945

-0.03324
0.3073
945

0.02738
0.4194
872

0.00808
0.8040
946

0.02404
0.4652
925

0.01257
0.6996
944

1.00000

0.10742
0.0010
937

-0.07635
0.0190
943

-0.11001
0.0007
943

0.03063
0.3669
870

-0.04609
0.1571
944

0.02787
0.3977
923

0.03110
0.3412
939

0.10742
0.0010
937

1.00000

-0.00400
0.9027
938

-0.07304
0.0253
938

0.10824
0.0014
865

-0.05448
0.0952
939

0.14729
<.0001
918

0.12552
0.0001
945

-0.07635
0.0190
943

-0.00400
0.9027
938

1.00000

0.48594
<.0001
945

-0.04830
0.1544
871

-0.07141
0.0282
945

-0.00954
0.7721
924

-0.03324
0.3073
945

-0.11001
0.0007
943

-0.07304
0.0253
938

0.48594
<.0001
945

1.00000

-0.03404 -0.13286
0.3156
<.0001
871
945

0.02738
0.4194
872

0.03063
0.3669
870

0.10824
0.0014
865

-0.04830
0.1544
871

-0.03404
0.3156
871

1.00000

0.00808
0.8040
946

-0.04609
0.1571
944

-0.05448
0.0952
939

-0.07141
0.0282
945

-0.13286
<.0001
945

0.07195
0.0336
872

946
breedsow

hog250

totalfd

corn

daratio

nhwofffa

944

939

945

aunotimp

945

872

-0.04554
0.1667
924

0.07195
0.0336
872

0.04823
0.1577
860

1.00000

0.06862
0.0369
925

946

0.02404
0.02787
0.14729
-0.00954
-0.04554
0.04823 0.06862
1.00000
0.4652
0.3977
<.0001
0.7721
0.1667
0.1577
0.0369
925
923
918
924
924
860
925
925
________________________________________________________________________________________________________

173

________________________________________________________________________________________________________
state
breedsow hog250
totalfd
corn
daratio nhwofffa
aunotimp
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
auverimp

-0.03806
0.2476
925

-0.06789
0.0392
923

-0.07581
0.0216
918

0.08331
0.0113
924

0.05393
0.1013
924

-0.15432
<.0001
860

-0.04963
0.1315
925

-0.31385
<.0001
925

fflatee

-0.08422
0.0096
946

0.02180
0.5036
944

-0.03468
0.2885
939

-0.09871
0.0024
945

0.07614
0.0192
945

0.11283
0.0008
872

0.07784
0.0166
946

0.02747
0.4040
925

fcontrwi

-0.05116
0.1159
946

-0.01876
0.5649
944

0.05955
0.0681
939

-0.08325
0.0105
945

-0.04100
0.2080
945

0.06605
0.0512
872

0.01230
0.7055
946

0.09518
0.0038
925

mrkprice

-0.04249
0.1969
924

0.03485
0.2905
922

0.02767
0.4026
917

0.09353
0.0045
923

0.10826
0.0010
923

0.00370
0.9137
859

-0.09798
0.0029
924

-0.14394
<.0001
909

timesyr

-0.04230
0.2092
883

0.06785
0.0441
881

0.35032
<.0001
877

0.02822
0.4022
883

0.07055
0.0361
883

0.12337
0.0004
828

-0.11452
0.0007
883

-0.04422
0.1928
869

valfaras

-0.04130
0.2279
854

0.13719
<.0001
852

0.20784
<.0001
849

0.13746
<.0001
854

0.17057
<.0001
854

-0.03483
0.3192
820

-0.23808
<.0001
854

0.01372
0.6911
842

biosecur

0.00520
0.8767
893

0.07481
0.0255
891

0.08519
0.0112
886

-0.05991
0.0737
892

-0.05476
0.1021
892

0.02631
0.4508
824

-0.09948
0.0029
893

-0.03159
0.3501
877

age

-0.11369
0.0005
936

-0.04113
0.2092
934

0.01956
0.5516
929

-0.00549
0.8668
935

0.01356
0.6787
935

-0.20018
<.0001
865

-0.16044
<.0001
936

-0.00303
0.9270
917

________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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________________________________________________________________________________________________________
state
breedsow hog250
totalfd
corn
daratio nhwofffa
aunotimp
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
comphs

-0.12381
0.0001
941

0.00127
0.9689
939

0.00377
0.9085
934

-0.08144
0.0125
940

0.01494
0.6474
940

0.03715
0.2743
868

0.07888
0.0155
941

-0.02324
0.4812
921

bachelor

-0.00839
0.7971
941

0.07895
0.0155
939

0.09562
0.0034
934

0.00736
0.8217
940

-0.04600
0.1588
940

0.05691
0.0938
868

0.01975
0.5451
941

0.03155
0.3389
921

nhincome

0.01598
0.6421
848

0.11428
0.0009
846

0.15044
<.0001
844

-0.04064
0.2374
847

0.01945
0.5720
847

-0.10596
0.0027
802

0.04950
0.1498
848

0.06136
0.0769
832

neigfarm

-0.00546
0.8681
927

0.02244
0.4956
925

0.01636
0.6203
920

0.04084
0.2144
926

0.04160
0.2059
926

0.00458
0.8935
855

-0.02668
0.4172
927

-0.01807
0.5865
908

lendinst

-0.03112
0.3445
925

0.02874
0.3831
923

0.02872
0.3848
918

-0.04346
0.1869
924

0.01368
0.6780
924

0.26606
<.0001
853

0.01384
0.6741
925

-0.04409
0.1846
907

feedmerc

0.04318
0.1890
927

-0.05003
0.1284
925

0.00273
0.9342
920

0.03423
0.2981
926

0.04256
0.1956
926

-0.07245
0.0341
856

-0.00567
0.8632
927

-0.15854
<.0001
909

choicinv

-0.00157
0.06895 0.06783
-0.01655
-0.02141
0.09969
0.05461 -0.00904
0.9632
0.0431
0.0471
0.6275
0.5301
0.0046
0.1089
0.7926
863
861
857
862
862
806
863
849
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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________________________________________________________________________________________________________
auverimp
fflatee fcontrwi
mrkprice
timesyr
valfaras
biosecur
age
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
state

-0.03806
0.2476
925

-0.08422
0.0096
946

-0.05116
0.1159
946

-0.04249
0.1969
924

-0.04230
0.2092
883

-0.04130
0.2279
854

0.00520
0.8767
893

-0.11369
0.0005
936

breedsow

-0.06789
0.0392
923

0.02180
0.5036
944

-0.01876
0.5649
944

0.03485
0.2905
922

0.06785
0.0441
881

0.13719
<.0001
852

0.07481
0.0255
891

-0.04113
0.2092
934

hog250

-0.07581
0.0216
918

-0.03468
0.2885
939

0.05955
0.0681
939

0.02767
0.4026
917

0.35032
<.0001
877

0.20784
<.0001
849

0.08519
0.0112
886

0.01956
0.5516
929

totalfd

0.08331
0.0113
924

-0.09871
0.0024
945

-0.08325
0.0105
945

0.09353
0.0045
923

0.02822
0.4022
883

0.13746
<.0001
854

-0.05991
0.0737
892

-0.00549
0.8668
935

corn

0.05393
0.1013
924

0.07614
0.0192
945

-0.04100
0.2080
945

0.10826
0.0010
923

0.07055
0.0361
883

0.17057
<.0001
854

-0.05476
0.1021
892

0.01356
0.6787
935

daratio

-0.15432
<.0001
860

0.11283
0.0008
872

0.06605
0.0512
872

0.00370
0.9137
859

0.12337
0.0004
828

-0.03483
0.3192
820

0.02631
0.4508
824

-0.20018
<.0001
865

nhwofffa

-0.04963
0.1315
925

0.07784
0.0166
946

0.01230
0.7055
946

-0.09798
0.0029
924

-0.11452
0.0007
883

-0.23808
<.0001
854

-0.09948
0.0029
893

-0.16044
<.0001
936

aunotimp

-0.31385
<.0001
925

0.02747
0.4040
925

0.09518
0.0038
925

-0.14394
<.0001
909

-0.04422
0.1928
869

0.01372
0.6911
842

-0.03159
0.3501
877

-0.00303
0.9270
917

________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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________________________________________________________________________________________________________
auverimp
fflatee fcontrwi
mrkprice
timesyr
valfaras
biosecur
age
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
auverimp
1.00000
-0.09363 -0.11394
0.11924
0.06238
-0.01984 -0.05252
0.04682
0.0044
0.0005
0.0003
0.0661
0.5653
0.1201
0.1566
925
925
925
909
869
842
877
917
fflatee

fcontrwi

mrkprice

timesyr

valfaras

biosecur

-0.09363
0.0044
925

1.00000

0.29525
<.0001
946

0.06748
0.0403
924

0.06197
0.0657
883

-0.05440
0.1121
854

-0.11394
0.0005
925

0.29525
<.0001
946

1.00000

0.01307
0.6915
924

0.00517
0.8781
883

0.02757
0.4210
854

0.08139 -0.08859
0.0150
0.0067
893
936

0.11924
0.0003
909

0.06748
0.0403
924

0.01307
0.6915
924

1.00000

0.22194
<.0001
870

0.14624
<.0001
841

0.01327
0.6950
876

0.05534
0.0945
914

0.06238
0.0661
869

0.06197
0.0657
883

0.00517
0.8781
883

0.22194
<.0001
870

1.00000

0.26885
<.0001
811

0.07623
0.0273
838

0.05594
0.0982
875

-0.01984
0.5653
842

-0.05440
0.1121
854

0.02757
0.4210
854

0.14624
<.0001
841

0.26885
<.0001
811

1.00000

0.23217
<.0001
813

0.11229
0.0011
847

-0.05252
0.1201
877

0.09287
0.0055
893

0.08139
0.0150
893

0.01327
0.6950
876

0.07623
0.0273
838

0.23217
<.0001
813

946

946

924

age

883

854

0.09287
0.0055
893

-0.11042
0.0007
936

1.00000 -0.06265
0.0625
893
885

0.04682
-0.11042 -0.08859
0.05534
0.05594
0.11229
-0.06265 1.00000
0.1566
0.0007
0.0067
0.0945
0.0982
0.0011
0.0625
917
936
936
914
875
847
885
936
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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________________________________________________________________________________________________________
auverimp
fflatee
fcontrwi
mrkprice
timesyr
valfaras
biosecur
age
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
age

0.04682
0.1566
917

-0.11042
0.0007
936

0.05534
0.0945
914

0.05594
0.0982
875

0.11229
0.0011
847

-0.06265
0.0625
885

1.00000

-0.01928
0.5591
921

-0.01561
0.6325
941

0.04149
0.2035
941

0.07212
.0288
919

0.03843
0.2554
878

-0.02669
0.4370
850

-0.01567
0.6405
891

-0.02037
0.5343
933

bachelor

-0.07451
0.0237
921

0.06854
0.0355
941

0.08095
0.0130
941

0.11049
0.000
919

0.07702
0.0225
878

0.10773
0.0017
850

0.03669
0.2740
891

-0.01666
0.6112
933

nhincome

-0.08637
0.0127
832

0.03102
0.3669
848

0.06056
0.0780
848

0.00376
0.9138
830

0.05137
0.1466
800

0.31218
<.0001
813

0.08507
0.0156
808

0.13306
0.0001
843

neigfarm

0.03847
0.2469
908

-0.02210
0.5016
927

0.01991
0.5449
927

-0.01719
0.6047
909

0.00992
0.7705
867

0.02649
0.4435
839

0.06001
0.0752
880

0.01112
0.7362
920

lendinst

-0.00567
0.8646
907

0.04003
0.2239
925

0.06150
0.0615
925

0.01508
0.6504
906

0.02360
0.4881
865

-0.03006
0.3850
837

feedmerc

0.10509
0.0015
909

0.00455
0.8899
927

-0.02862
0.3841
927

0.06309
0.0572
909

0.02165
0.5244
867

-0.02440
0.4801
840

comphs

-0.08859
0.0067
936

choicinv

936

0.09250 -0.02499
0.0061
0.4495
878
918
0.03890
0.2488
881

0.00289
0.9301
920

-0.04341
0.05524
0.02261
0.01019
0.03859
0.06877
0.05062 -0.03254
0.2063
0.1049
0.5071
0.7672
0.2711
0.0527
0.1451
0.3419
849
863
863
846
815
794
830
855
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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________________________________________________________________________________________________________
comphs
bachelor
nhincome
neigfarm
lendinst
feedmerc
choicinv
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
state

-0.12381
0.0001
941

-0.00839
0.7971
941

0.01598
0.6421
848

-0.00546
0.8681
927

-0.03112
0.3445
925

0.04318
0.1890
927

-0.00157
0.9632
863

breedsow

0.00127
0.9689
939

0.07895
0.0155
939

0.11428
0.0009
846

0.02244
0.4956
925

0.02874
0.3831
923

-0.05003
0.1284
925

0.06895
0.0431
861

hog250

0.00377
0.9085
934

0.09562
0.0034
934

0.15044
<.0001
844

0.01636
0.6203
920

0.02872
0.3848
918

0.00273
0.9342
920

0.06783
0.0471
857

totalfd

-0.08144
0.0125
940

0.00736
0.8217
940

-0.04064
0.2374
847

0.04084
0.2144
926

-0.04346
0.1869
924

0.03423
0.2981
926

-0.01655
0.6275
862

corn

0.01494
0.6474
940

-0.04600
0.1588
940

0.01945
0.5720
847

0.04160
0.2059
926

0.01368
0.6780
924

0.04256
0.1956
926

-0.02141
0.5301
862

daratio

0.03715
0.2743
868

0.05691
0.0938
868

-0.10596
0.0027
802

0.00458
0.8935
855

0.26606
<.0001
853

-0.07245
0.0341
856

0.09969
0.0046
806

nhwofffa

0.07888
0.0155
941

0.01975
0.5451
941

0.04950
0.1498
848

-0.02668
0.4172
927

0.01384
0.6741
925

-0.00567
0.8632
927

0.05461
0.1089
863

aunotimp

-0.02324
0.03155
0.06136
-0.01807
-0.04409
-0.15854
-0.00904
0.4812
0.3389
0.0769
0.5865
0.1846
<.0001
0.7926
921
921
832
908
907
909
849
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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________________________________________________________________________________________________________
comphs
bachelor
nhincome
neigfarm
lendinst
feedmerc
choicinv
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
auverimp

-0.01928
0.5591
921

-0.07451
0.0237
921

-0.08637
0.0127
832

0.03847
0.2469
908

-0.00567
0.8646
907

0.10509
0.0015
909

-0.04341
0.2063
849

fflatee

-0.01561
0.6325
941

0.06854
0.0355
941

0.03102
0.3669
848

-0.02210
0.5016
927

0.04003
0.2239
925

0.00455
0.8899
927

0.05524
0.1049
863

fcontrwi

0.04149
0.2035
941

0.08095
0.0130
941

0.06056
0.0780
848

0.01991
0.5449
927

0.06150
0.0615
925

-0.02862
0.3841
927

0.02261
0.5071
863

mrkprice

0.07212
0.0288
919

0.11049
0.0008
919

0.00376
0.9138
830

-0.01719
0.6047
909

0.01508
0.6504
906

0.06309
0.0572
909

0.01019
0.7672
846

timesyr

0.03843
0.2554
878

0.07702
0.0225
878

0.05137
0.1466
800

0.00992
0.7705
867

0.02360
0.4881
865

0.02165
0.5244
867

0.03859
0.2711
815

valfaras

-0.02669
0.4370
850

0.10773
0.0017
850

0.31218
<.0001
813

0.02649
0.4435
839

-0.03006
0.3850
837

-0.02440
0.4801
840

0.06877
0.0527
794

biosecur

-0.01567
0.6405
891

0.03669
0.2740
891

0.08507
0.0156
808

0.06001
0.0752
880

0.09250
0.0061
878

0.03890
0.2488
881

0.05062
0.1451
830

age

-0.02037
-0.01666
0.13306
0.01112
-0.02499
0.00289
-0.03254
0.5343
0.6112
0.0001
0.7362
0.4495
0.9301
0.3419
933
933
843
920
918
920
855
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
comphs
bachelor
nhincome
neigfarm
lendinst
feedmerc
choicinv
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
comphs
1.00000
0.13322
-0.02729
-0.00254
0.05150
-0.05537
0.03614
<.0001
0.4273
0.9386
0.1179
0.0924
0.2895
941
941
848
925
923
925
861
bachelor

nhincome

neigfarm

lendinst

feedmerc

0.13322
<.0001
941

1.00000

0.08597
0.0123
848

-0.09093
0.0056
925

-0.05257
0.1105
923

-0.07215
0.0282
925

0.03303
0.3331
861

-0.02729
0.4273
848

0.08597
0.0123
848

1.00000

-0.00545
0.8749
835

0.01581
0.6487
833

0.01819
0.5994
836

0.13527
0.0001
792

-0.00254
0.9386
925

-0.09093
0.0056
925

-0.00545
0.8749
835

1.00000

0.31230
<.0001
923

0.20940
<.0001
925

0.07089
0.0383
854

0.05150
0.1179
923

-0.05257
0.1105
923

0.01581
0.6487
833

0.31230
<.0001
923

1.00000

0.33685
<.0001
923

0.02287
0.5043
855

-0.05537
0.0924
925

-0.07215
0.0282
925

0.01819
0.5994
836

1.00000

-0.00277
0.9357
854

941

848

choicinv

927

0.20940
<.0001
925

925
0.33685
<.0001
923

927

0.03614
0.03303
0.13527
0.07089
0.02287
-0.00277
1.00000
0.2895
0.3331
0.0001
0.0383
0.5043
0.9357
861
861
792
854
855
854
863
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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APPENDIX D: PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF THE EXOGENOUS
VARIABLES FOR THE BINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL
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Table 5.3. Statistics of the Exogenous Variables Used in the Binomial Logit Model.
_____________________________________________________________________________
Variable
N
Mean
Std Dev
Sum
Minimum Maximum
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
mopundco
200
50.46
42.36
10092
0
216.00
contwnfa
200
0.22
0.42
44.00
0
1.00
newrefac
200
0.58
0.50
115.00
0
1.00
exraihog
200
0.90
0.30
180.00
0
1.00
numacres
188
486.15
669.15
91397
0
5000
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
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Table 6.4 Pearson Correlation Coefficients of the Exogenous Variables for the Binomial Logit Model.

______________________________________________________________________________
mopundco

mopundco

contwnfa

newrefac

numacres

exraihog

1.00000

0.04877
0.4929
200

0.24748
0.0004
200

-0.21471
0.0031
188

0.19765
0.0050
200

0.04877
4929
200

1.00000

-0.12941
0.0678
200

0.00349
0.9620
188

0.05633
0.4282
200

0.24748
0.0004
200

-0.12941
0.0678
200

1.00000

-0.06658
0.3639
188

0.15172
0.0320
200

-0.21471
0031
188

0.00349
0.9620
188

-0.06658
0.3639
188

1.00000

-0.18671
0.0002
188

200
contwnfa

newrefac

numacres

200

200

exraihog

188

0.19765
0.05633
0.15172
-0.18671
1.00000
0.0050
0.4282
0.0320
0.0103
200
200
200
188
200
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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APPENDIX E: U.S. HOG PRODUCER SURVEY
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U.S. HOG PRODUCER SURVEY

Throughout this survey, you will be asked questions about your hog farm and how you make
decisions with regard to the operation. Please circle the answer that best reflects your situation.
Please follow the directions that are written in italics as you go through the survey.

Section I :
1.

Production Characteristics

My farm business is structured as a (circle one)
a) sole proprietorship
b) partnership

2.

b) no

Did you raise feeder pigs to a weight of 40 - 60 lbs for market in 1999? If yes, approximately
how many?
a) yes _________ (number)

5.

b) no

Did you raise hogs to a weight of 200 - 300 lbs for market in 1999? If yes, approximately
how many?
a) yes _________ (number)

4.

e) cooperative

Do you have breeding sows in your operation? If yes, approximately how many?
a) yes _________ (number)

3.

c) family corporation
d) non-family corporation

b) no

How many years have you been raising hogs?
__________ (years)

6.

Approximately how many acres of land are used to support your hog operation (including
land for crops that support the operation, such as corn for feed and manure disposal)?
__________ (acres)

7.

Are your hogs raised indoors or outdoors on or off “concrete”?
a) indoors (confinement)

b) outdoors on concrete
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c) outdoors off concrete

8.

For this question, please refer to the following definitions of alternative production phases
before responding.
Production Phase

Definition

Farrow-to-Wean

These operations provide breeding care for pigs from the time they are
farrowed until they are weaned.

Feeder Pig/Nursery

These operations involve raising weaned pigs until they are ready
to be transferred to the finishing operation (weighing approximately
40 to 60 pounds).

Finishing

These operations raise pigs from approximately 40 to 60 pounds to
market weight of approximately 200 to 300 pounds.

In which of the above production phases are you currently involved? (Circle all that apply)
a) farrow-to-wean
b) feeder pig or nursery
9.

c) 2
d) 3

e) 4
f) 5

g) 6
h) 7

i) 8
j) 9

k) 10 or more

Of the buildings in your hog operation in which hogs are raised, how many of these buildings
are 10 years old or greater?
a) 0
b) 1

11.

e) farrow-to-finish

Of the buildings in your hog operation in which hogs are raised, how many of these buildings
are less than 10 years old?
a) 0
b) 1

10.

c) finishing
d) raising breeding stock

c) 2
d) 3

e) 4
f) 5

g) 6
h) 7

i) 8
j) 9

k) 10 or more

What would be the total value of your hog facilities, if you were to sell them to another hog
producer today?
__________ (dollars)

12.

What other type(s) of farm animals and/or crops do you raise? (Circle all that apply)
a) corn
b) cotton
c) wheat
d) barley
e) soybeans
f) oats

g) sorghum
h) rice
i) tobacco
j) peanuts
k) sugarcane/beets
l) chicken

m) sheep
n) beef cattle
o) dairy cattle
p) goats
q) horses
r) exotic animals
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s) vegetable production
t) fruit production
u) forestry
v) others (please list)
_______________
w) none

13.

Of the following modern technologies and/or practices, please circle all of those that you are
presently using on your hog farm.
a) “All in - all out” hog finishing
b) Weekly farrowing
c) High-density, fat-added diets
d) Intensive breeding to keep facilities full

f) Terminal cross breeding programs
g) Artificial insemination
h) Porcine Somatotropin (pST)
i) Computer Programs

e) Split-sex feeding
14.

How many part-time employees work on your hog farm between 5 and 39 hours per week?
__________ (number)

15.

How many full-time (40 hours or more per week) employees work on your hog farm?
__________ (number)

16.

What is your debt-to-asset ratio? This is your total debts divided by your total assets.
a) No Debt
c) 20 to 40%
e) 61% or greater
b) 1 to 20%
d) 40 to 60%

17.

Do you receive any income from an off-farm job? If yes, approximately what percentage of
your total net household income for 1999 is from an off-farm job?
a) yes _________ (%)

b) no

If you answered “no” in Question 17, please skip to Question 19. Otherwise, please answer
Questions 18 and 19.
18.

How many hours per week do you work off the farm?
_________ (number)

18.

How many family members work on your farm without pay?
_________ (number)

Section II:
1.

Autonomy

How important is it to you for you to have complete control over all production, marketing,
and management decisions in your hog operation?
a) not important at all

c) somewhat important

b) not very important

d) very important
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2.

Approximately what portion of the everyday production, marketing and management
decisions do you make on your operation? (Please circle one)
a) I make none of these decisions.
d) I make most of these decisions.
b) I make few of these decisions.
e) I make all of these decisions.
c) I share these decisions equally with another party.

3.

Approximately what percentage of the production, marketing and management decisions
would you prefer to make?
a) I prefer to make none of these decisions.
b) I prefer to make few of these decisions.
c) I prefer to share these decisions equally with another party.
d) I prefer to make most of these decisions.
e) I prefer to make all of these decisions.

4.

Would/Do you prefer determining the type of feed (corn and/or soybeans) used in the
production process over allowing a contractor or integrator to determine the type of feed?
a) yes

5.

Would/Do you prefer determining the market in which to sell finished hogs over allowing a
contractor or integrator to make this decision?
a) yes

6.

b) no

Would/Do you prefer determining the type of equipment and facilities used in your
production process over allowing a contractor or integrator to make this decision?
a) yes

8.

b) no

Would/Do you prefer having full control over herd size and the number of hogs to be
marketed each period over allowing a contractor or integrator to make this decision?
a) yes

7.

b) no

b) no

Would/Do prefer to determine when to place and remove your hogs, rather than having a
contractor or integrator to make this decision?
a) yes

b) no
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Section III :

Business Arrangements
The following definitions categorize some of the different types of business
arrangements with which you may be currently involved in the U.S. hog industry:

Independent Producer

All inputs involved in the production process are owned or
purchased and managed by you. You are responsible for all
aspects of producing and marketing hogs.

Cooperative Producer

A jointly owned farm enterprise consisting of you and one or
more other farmers who combine resources and/or expertise to
finance, produce and/or sell hogs.

Contract with Incentives

A contractor provides you with inputs such as feeder pigs, feed,
veterinary services and medication while you supply the labor,
utilities, buildings, and fuel. This contract provides you with an
incentive-based payment that is rewarded on the basis of feed
efficiency, mortality, and/or length of time in grow-out.

Tournament Contract

This contract is the same as the contract with incentives except
that farmers compete for monetary bonuses that vary with
performance.

Flat-Fee Contract

This contract is the same as the contract with incentives except
that it does not include bonus or incentive payments. You are
simply paid a previously agreed upon base price per finished hog
when the production is completed.

Vertical Integration

A firm that owns production resources and hires employees to
produce hogs for the company.

Based on the above definitions, which business arrangement best describes the
agreement under which you are presently producing hogs? (Please circle only one)
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)

I am an independent producer.
I am a cooperative producer.
I produce hogs under a flat-fee contract.
I produce hogs under a contract with incentive payments.
I produce hogs under a tournament contract.
I work for a vertically integrated firm.
Other (please describe)____________________________________________
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2.

How do you feel about the business arrangement under which you are presently producing
hogs?
a) dis-satisfied
b) uncertain
c) somewhat satisfied

3.

d) satisfied
e) very satisfied

What type(s) of business arrangements are farmers in your county presently producing hogs
under? (Circle all that apply)
a) Independent Producer
b) Cooperative Producer
c) Flat-fee Contract
d) Contract with Incentives

e) Tournament Contract
f) Vertical Integration
g) I do not know
h) There are no other hog farmers in my county.

If you are producing hogs under a contract, please skip to Question 6. Otherwise proceed to
Question 4.
4.

Have you ever considered producing under a contract?
a) yes

5.

b) no

If you were to accept a contract, what type of contract would you prefer?
a) a flat-fee contract
b) a contract with incentive payments
c) a contract with incentive bonuses/tournaments
d) other ____________________________

If you are not producing hogs under contract, please skip to Question 15. Otherwise, please proceed
to Question 6.
6.

How long have you been producing under contract?
______________ (please indicate years and months)

7.

Did you have experience raising hogs or any other livestock before signing your first
production contract?
a) yes

8.

Is your present contract with a neighboring farmer?
a) yes

9.

b) no

b) no

Were new facilities or renovation of old facilities a requirement of your contract?
a) yes

b) no
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10.

Are some of your production inputs (such as feed, veterinary services, etc.) supplied by the
contractor?
a) yes

11.

b) no

If you answered “yes” to question 11, please circle all the inputs that are supplied by the
contractor.
a) animals
b) medication
c) feed

12.

13.

a) feed efficiency
b) weight gain

d) lean value
e) efficiency of other producers

c) mortality

f) production cost relative to others

g) all of the above
h) others_________

Please rank from 1 to 5 the following reasons for why you accepted a production
contract (with 1 being the most important reason and 5 being the least important).
a) The contract stabilizes my farm income.
b) The contract improves management by lowering costs.
c) I was better able to expand hog production capabilities.
d) The contract allowed me to afford to adopt new technology.
e) The contract increases my income.

Did the cost of obtaining information on feed prices influence your decision to accept a
production contract?
a) yes

15.

i) buildings
g) labor
d) others _________

If your contract includes incentive or bonus payments, what are they dependent upon? (circle
all that apply)

_____
_____
_____
_____
_____
14.

e) veterinary services
f) equipment
h) nutrition (manure) management

b) no

What is your primary source of information about market prices for finished hogs,
feeder pigs or breeding sows? (Please circle only one)
a) Extension Service
b) media: tv, radio or magazines
c) other farmers
d) farm organizations
e) computer price reports (off the Internet)
f) I do not use the above sources to obtain price information
g) I do not wish to obtain price information
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16.

How regularly do you consult sources of information pertaining to market prices for hogs?
a) two or more times a week
b) once a week
c) once every two weeks

17.

How regularly do you consult sources to obtain information on desired leanness and back fat
of hogs?
a) two or more times a week
b) once a week
c) once every two weeks

18.

d) once monthly
e) once quarterly
f) never

d) once monthly
e) once quarterly
f) never

What type of arrangement do you use to transport your hogs to the market?
a) I pay for my hogs to be transported to the market.
b) I transport my hogs to the market.
c) A contractor transports my hogs to the market.

19.

How many times per year do you sell hogs at local auctions, packing or slaughter houses ?
_________ (number)

20.

How close is your production site to the nearest hog sale barn?
a) 1 to 40 miles b) greater than 41 miles

21.

How far is your production site from the nearest packing plant or slaughter house?
a) 1 to 40 miles b) greater than 41 miles

22.

How far is your production site from the nearest feed supplier?
a) 1 to 40 miles b) greater than 41 miles

23.

Do you plan to increase the number of hogs or pigs you produce next year? If yes, by what
percentage?
a) yes______% b) no

24.

What is the value of your total farm assets including land value?
a) $0 - $499,999
b) $500,000 to $999,999
c) $1,000,000 to $1,499,999

d) $1,500,000 to $1,999,999
e) $2,000,000 to $2,499,999
f) > $2,500,000

193

For questions 25 - 26, please place an X along the line that corresponds to your response. For
example, [-----!-----X-----!-----!-----!-----!-----!-----!-----!-----]
0
5
10

25.

On a scale of 0 to 10, how would you rate the bio-security of your hog production system
(with 10 being the highest level of bio-security and 0 being the lowest)?
[-----!-----!-----!-----!-----!-----!-----!-----!-----!-----]
0
5
10

26.

On a scale of 0 to 10, how would you rate the quality of labor available to assist in operating
your production unit(s) (with 10 being highly skilled and 0 unskilled)?
[-----!-----!-----!-----!-----!-----!-----!-----!-----!-----]
0
5
10

Pork Checkoff Referendum
Later this summer, hog producers will vote on the Pork Checkoff Referendum. The Pork Checkoff is a
mandatory legislative program that was established through the Pork Act of 1985. Under this legislation, 45
cents of every $100 generated through the sale of market pigs/hogs are used to fund programs of promotion,
education and research for the purpose of strengthening the pork industry’s position in the marketplace. These
programs are used to expand domestic and foreign markets for pork and pork products, and to fund research
that supports the advancement of the pork industry.

27.

As an eligible voter, what is your opinion of the Pork Checkoff?
a) Strongly Agree
b) Agree

28.

c) Uncertain
d) Disagree

As an eligible voter, how would you cast your vote?
a) I would vote to continue the Pork Checkoff.
b) I would vote to discontinue the Pork Checkoff.

Section IV :
1.

Are you a male or a female?
a) male

2.

Demographic

b) female

What is your age?
____________ (years)
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e) Strongly Disagree

3.

Are you married?
a) yes

4.

b) no

Which of the following best describes your racial or ethnic background?
a) American Indian
b) Asian or Pacific Islander

5.

c) Black (African American)
d) Hispanic

e) White (Caucasian)
f) other ________

How many years of educational training have you completed?

6.

a) less than high school
b) completed high school

d) completed 4 yr college Bachelor’s degree
e) completed college Master’s degree

c) some college or technical school

g) completed college Doctoral degree

What was your total net household income for 1999?
a) $19,999 or less
b) $20,000 to 39,999
c) $40,000 to 59,999

7.

d) $60,000 to 79,999
e) $80,000 to 99,999
f) $100,000 to 199,999

g) $200,000 or more

Please rank from 1 to 3 the following reasons why you choose to farm (with 1 being the most
important reason and 3 being the least important).
______a) maximize profits
______b) provide family with farming experience
______c) to produce food for family consumption

NI =Not Important at All; NVI = Not Very Important; SI = Somewhat Important; VI = Very
Important

8.

With respect to your social relationships and farm operation, how important are each of the
following relations? (Please circle your response)
I) Relationship with neighboring farmers.
II) Relationship with lending institutions (banks).
III) Relationship with feed merchants (grain suppliers).
IV) Relationship with packers and/or slaughter houses.
V) Relationship with veterinarians.
VI) Relationship with neighbors that are non-farmers.

NI
NI
NI
NI
NI
NI

NVI
NVI
NVI
NVI
NVI
NVI

SI
SI
SI
SI
SI
SI

Section V : Risk Preference
1.

Relative to other investors, how would you characterize yourself? (Please circle one)
a) I tend to take on substantial levels of risk in my investment decisions.
b) I tend to avoid risk when possible in my investment decisions.
c) I neither seek nor avoid risk in my investment decisions.

195

VI
VI
VI
VI
VI
VI

Suppose you have $100,000 to invest. Suppose there are five different options in which you might
invest your money. These options are illustrated below both in the chart and table. With the first
option, you are certain to receive $10,000, or a 10% return. Thus, at the end of the year you will
have $100,000 + $10,000 = $110,000. Money in a savings account would be an example of such an
investment. However, you can increase your average net return by increasing the riskiness of your
investment. In Option 2, for instance, you have a 1/3 chance of receiving an average net return of
$10,600. However, with this investment, you increase the riskiness since you would also have a 1/3
chance of receiving $8,170 and a 1/3 chance of receiving $13,030. Please examine the five options
and answer the following question.

Net Returns of Five Investments

Net Return, $

20000
15000
10000
5000
0

Investment 1

Investment 2

Investment 3

Series1

Series2

Investment 4

Investment 5

Series3

______________________________________________________________________________
(Series 1)
(Series 2)
(Series 3)
Investment Number Lowest
Average
Highest
Net Return
Net Return
Net Return
1/3 Chance
1/3 Chance
1/3 Chance
========================================================================
Investment 1
$10,000
$10,000
$10,000
========================================================================
Investment 2
$8,170
$10,600
$13,030
========================================================================
Investment 3
$6,420
$11,200
$15,980
========================================================================
Investment 4
$5,420
$11,200
$16,980
========================================================================
Investment 5
$3,440
$10,600
$17,760
_________________________________________________________________________________
2. Of these investments, please circle the investment that you would choose (Circle one):
A. Investment 1
D. Investment 3
F. Investment 5
B. Investment 2

E. Investment 4
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APPENDIX F: LETTERS MAILED TO PRODUCERS SURVEYED
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Department of Agricultural
Economics and Agribusiness
101 Agricultural Administration Building
Louisiana State University
Baton Rouge, LA 70803-5604
(504) 388-3282
FAX: (504) 388-2716

July 20, 2000

Dear Hog Producer:
The U.S. hog industry has undergone major structural change in recent years. The rapid
development of technology has led many hog producers to operate larger, more specialized hog
operations. Along with these larger operations, a number of alternative business arrangements
such as contracts have been introduced, while some independent producers have entered into
alternative marketing agreements. We are conducting a study to identify the types of business
arrangements that hog producers are using today and the reasons why they have chosen them.
This study will help the industry determine the direction it is currently heading and the type of
producer that will likely be involved in hog production in the future. This information will be
valuable as the industry seeks to identify paths leading to a more competitive industry that
includes viable family farming operations.
You are one of a relatively small number of hog producers who are being asked to provide
information on their hog operations. Thus, your participation in this study is vital in assuring that
as many producers as possible are represented. Your name was drawn such that we will have a
random sample of hog producers from throughout the U.S.
You may be assured of complete confidentiality. The questionnaire has an identification number
for mailing purposes only. This is so that we may check your name off the mailing list when your
questionnaire is returned. Once the surveys have been returned, we will dispose of the mailing
list. Your name will never be placed on the questionnaire.
The results of this research will be made available to all interested citizens, and to the National
Pork Producer’s Council, which has partially funded this research. You may receive a summary
of the results by simply writing “copy of results requested” on the back of the return envelope,
and printing your name and address below it. Please do not put this information on the
questionnaire itself, so that we can maintain your anonymity.
After completing the survey, please place it in the enclosed business reply, self-addressed
envelope, and drop it in a mailbox. We would be most happy to answer any questions you might
have. Please write or call. Thank you in advance for your assistance.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey M. Gillespie, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
(225) 388-2759
jmgille@lsu.edu
THE LOUISIANA AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENT STATION PROVIDES EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES IN PROGRAMS AND EMPLOYMENT
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Department of Agricultural
Economics and Agribusiness
101 Agricultural Administration Building
Louisiana State University
Baton Rouge, LA 70803-5604
(504) 388-3282
FAX: (504) 388-2716

August 20, 2000
Dear Hog Producer:
About three weeks ago, I wrote to you asking for your help in a study concerning
structural change in the U.S. pork industry. The intent of the study is to determine the
types of business arrangements pork producers are using today and the reasons they are
using them. As of today, we have not yet received your completed survey.
The LSU Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness has undertaken this
study because it is important that the industry understand the direction it is currently
heading and the type of producer that will likely be involved in hog production in the
future. The information in this study will be valuable as the industry seeks to identify
paths that could lead to a more competitive industry including viable family farming
operations. This research is being partially funded by the National Pork Producers
Council. It is important that each questionnaire be completed and returned, as the survey
was sent to a relatively small number of producers.
Remember that you are assured of complete confidentiality. The questionnaire has an
identification number for mailing purposes only. This is so that we may check your name
off the mailing list when your questionnaire is returned.
The results of this research will be made available to all interested citizens. You may
receive a summary of the results by simply writing "copy of results requested" on the
back of the return envelope, and printing your name and address below it. Please do not
put this information on the questionnaire itself, so that we can maintain your anonymity.
After completing the survey, please place it in the enclosed business reply, self-addressed
envelope, and drop it in a mailbox. No postage is necessary. In the event that your
questionnaire has been misplaced, a replacement is enclosed. Your cooperation is greatly
appreciated.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey M. Gillespie, Ph.D.
Associate Professor
(225) 388-2759
jmgille@lsu.edu

THE LOUISIANA AGRICULTURAL EXPERIMENT STATION PROVIDES EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES IN PROGRAMS AND EMPLOYMENT
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